


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




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THE
EMERGING
BLACK
COMMUNITY
OF
BOSTON



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Institute for the Study of Black Culture
University of Massachusetts at Boston

THE EMERGING BLACK COMMUNITY IN BOSTON

A Report of the

INSTITUTE FOR THE STUDY OF BLACK CULTURE
University of Massachusetts at Boston
Boston, Massachusetts

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NOTE: The opinions expressed here are those of the individual authors and do not reflect the views of the University of Massachusetts, or the institutions with which the authors are associated.

PREFACE

This volume is a collaboration of Boston area black scholars. Each of the contributors, in addition to their teaching and research duties, is professionally active in public policy issues in the city. Their contributions reflect both careful analysis and thoughtful reflection on the topics they address.

The research is sponsored by the Institute for the Study of Black Culture at the University of Massachusetts in Boston -- a new organization that sponsors research on cultural issues, public affairs and other matters of concern to the black community in the Boston area.

Important support for this project was provided by Professor Edward Strickland and members of the Task Force on Black Studies. We also appreciate the help provided by Dean Richard Freeland and his staff in the College of Arts and Sciences at the University. Finally, we are grateful to Ms. Sylvia Armstrong who provided conscientious administrative support and to Ms. Susan Andrien who did an excellent job of editing the manuscript. There is a long list of individuals who assisted the authors by sharing data and information. We thank each of them for their invaluable assistance.

A special note of appreciation is due the Massachusetts Black Caucus whose interest in university research on the condition of Blacks led to the legislative support for creating the Institute.

Wornie L. Reed
Director, Institute for
the Study of Black Culture

TABLE OF CONTENTS

THE EMERGING BLACK COMMUNITY IN BOSTON

	AUTHOR	PAGE	
	Phillip Clay	1	
Chapter 1	Jobs, Income and Poverty: The Black Share of the New Boston	James Blackwell	6
Chapter 2	Black Families in Boston: Current Sociodemographic Trends and Implications for Programs and Policies	Michelene Malson	80
Chapter 3	A Changing Mosaic: Boston's Racial Diversity, 1950-1990	Philip Hart	115
Chapter 4	A Ten-Year Perspective on the Role of Blacks in Achieving Desegregation and Quality Education in Boston	Charles Willie	145
Chapter 5	Housing, Neighborhoods and Development	Phillip Clay	181
Chapter 6	The Community of Black Artists in Boston	Edward Strickland	218
Chapter 7	The Status of Institutions in Boston's Black Community	Hubert Jones	269
Chapter 8	Race and Political Change in Boston	James Jennings	314
	Conclusion	Phillip Clay	338

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INTRODUCTION
TO
THE EMERGING BLACK COMMUNITY IN BOSTON
by
PHILLIP L. CLAY

For black Bostonians, this is a time when many of the hopes encouraged by the civil rights victories of the 60s and 70s have withered away or come under attack. Much of the momentum for redressing old injustices is gone -- both within the black community and outside it.

For Blacks throughout the nation the present decade is characterized by severe disappointment, frustration and bitterness. Blacks in Boston are no exception. By most measures of status, Blacks have remained in their historically low status compared to Whites, or have sunk to new lows. Ominous trends suggest that Boston Blacks are on the downside of a slippery slope in a city and region that is experiencing an economic renaissance.

In recent years, we have witnessed the continued high level of unemployment of Boston Blacks. Unemployment is especially critical among youth and continues to grow. Those Blacks who are employed work in jobs that are mainly lower-paying and that have limited possibilities for mobility. The long-standing occupational inequality between Blacks and Whites continues. The promise of desegregation and high quality education has yet to be achieved and delivery of that promise does not seem imminent. Black education in Boston has not been the skill builder that B.T. Washington envisioned or the stimulus to liberation that W.E.B. DuBois hoped.

Housing discrimination and the lack of adequate, affordable housing remain serious problems. Security of tenure for long-term residents in long-established neighborhoods such as the South End and parts of Roxbury is under threat as the gentry and commercial developers seek to reclaim areas which they once avoided.

Teen pregnancy and female-headed households have increased dramatically and now constitute the core of a new "underclass" mired in seemingly intractable poverty. A large proportion of black children in Boston are born into this family situation.

Blacks have participated little, if at all, in the economic benefits created in the "New Boston." Few black businesses are among the hundreds of new enterprises in the Boston area. Only 2 of the nation's top 100 black businesses are in the City of Boston. Few Blacks are found in the thousands of well-paying jobs in the in high-tech and other services generated in the area.

There has been little reward to Blacks for their political loyalty to incumbent politicians or to the Democratic party. Few white voters returned this support by voting across racial lines. Unlike other cities, where black candidates have often done well with white constituencies, black politicians who win election in Boston do so largely on the strength of support from Blacks in minority areas of the city.

The status of Blacks, while serious, is not entirely negative. A small but growing middle class has made isolated gains in the city's mainstream. This is reflected in the very modest access by Blacks to executive and management jobs in institutions, government and cultural organizations, and in some relatively junior executive positions in major corporations. This new

leadership is still small but its emergence is noticeable, especially in public and nonprofit sectors. Blacks now head the city's school and public housing departments and the city's largest foundation. A few other Blacks are in strategic non race-related positions. Virtually all of these symbols of progress have occurred in the last 18 months.

While many of these trends -- both the positive and negative ones -- parallel national developments, Boston Blacks seem to have an especially slow and hard journey toward equality, and they are conscious of this comparison. Boston also has a very negative reputation among Blacks in other cities. Boston Blacks have had no political victories to offer the hope for active involvement in shaping a new future, as the Blacks in Atlanta, Chicago or Los Angeles have experienced. No black developer has a hand in shaping the new physical form the city is taking. No large black business has emerged in the city's economic renaissance. Boston Blacks are still defensive about their roles in the city, and with good reason.

Until two years ago, Blacks suffered an administration whose failure to include them in the life of city for a period of more than 15 years meant that they were in the backwaters of national urban affairs as their comrades in other cities made new and often successful initiatives, spawning a new generation of administrators, civic leaders and business people. The black leadership class in other cities has broadened, deepened and even shown signs of being regenerative. No such progress exists in Boston. Blacks in Boston have managed to get on the carousel, but the "brass ring" is still beyond their grasp.

There is little evidence of a turnaround in any of these trends insofar as objective conditions are concerned. While the status of Blacks in the city

remains the same, the major shift in the last two years is in the confidence with which some Blacks face their future prospects for change.

There is now some renewed attention to the institutional and socio-economic problems faced by Blacks. There is some recognition by the city's leadership of the failure of the community thus far to provide opportunities for black mobility. New confidence about the power of these good intentions and new energy on the part of both Blacks and Whites provide the point of departure for this volume.

Sadly, however, we have little insight into how Blacks have faced the events of recent years; in many cases, analysis and data have not been joined to explore the implications of recent trends. This volume attempts to rectify this problem by rigorous and sensitive analysis of the state of black Boston in education, income, housing, jobs, the arts, family, institutions, class, and politics. Each of the essays in this volume attempts to define the problems that shape the current state of affairs and to offer an analysis of trends. Policy options or alternative scenarios based on these analyses are presented.

This volume, while comprehensive, is not exhaustive. It is only the first in what we hope will be a series of inquiries. We do not explore all of the problems or all of the important issues that are relevant to the State of Black Boston. For example, we do not look at issues of business development or health. We do not address inter- or intra-ethnic relations, or post-secondary education. Nor do we examine the changing political, economic and occupational structure of the region in which the black status is embedded.

The extent to which this monograph encourages debate, competently questions conventional wisdom, or engages responsible actors in a

reconsideration of their approaches is the extent to which it will have served its purpose.

P.L.C.
October 1985

JOBs, INCOME, AND POVERTY: THE BLACK SHARE OF THE NEW BOSTON

JAMES E. BLACKWELL*

INTRODUCTION

During the mid-1970s, the City of Boston began to use busing as a major instrument for implementing court-ordered school desegregation. Public school pupils were often bused across neighborhood lines into neighborhoods which had local reputations as homogenized bastions of racial exclusivity. The attempts of residents of such neighborhoods to prevent the implementation of the law and of court orders erupted into violence not unlike that witnessed in many parts of the South during the 1950s and 1960s. That violence transformed the racial climate of Boston and publicized the patterns of discrimination, segregation, bigotry and racism that had been submerged throughout the metropolitan area. Objective data and subjective accounts by minority residents demonstrate quite graphically how deeply racial exclusion is rooted in Boston. The process of desegregating the schools brought to the surface a long history of discrimination and segregation in the occupational structure and in many other areas of daily life: wage and salary differences between the races, access to higher-paying jobs, housing, health care services, and recreational facilities (Blackwell, 1985:168-174; Blackwell and Hart, 1983).

*James E. Blackwell wishes to express sincere appreciation to Magueye Seck who served as research assistant during the data collection phase of this project; to all persons who graciously consented to be interviewed by the author and who are cited at various points in this paper and to Ms. Anne Foxx who was so diligent in typing the manuscript.

Concern about the national image of Boston as a racially intolerant city led diverse political, civic, religious and community groups to combine their efforts to improve the external and internal image of the city and to create a positive racial climate within Boston. As a result of their efforts, violence and racial confrontations subsided, at least at the public or superficial level. However, the roots of the racial disharmony and the fundamental causes of racial and ethnic discrimination have not been fully addressed. The discontinuity between the rhetoric of racial harmony and demonstrated success at alleviating basic problems of racial discord and exclusion from the basic institutional and social infrastructure of the Boston community have created the impression that Boston is in a period of transition--a period in which it is beginning to respond positively toward meeting the needs of all its citizens. Dissidents argue that present efforts are only cosmetic exercises designed to create an illusion of progress and change.

They point to such indisputable facts as a poverty rate among Blacks in Boston that is more than double that of the white population; to income inequities between the races; to the fact that 75 percent of all the jobs in the downtown area of Boston are held by non-residents; to a teenage unemployment rate among Blacks that is at least 40 percent and that in some communities approaches 60 percent; to a black adult unemployment rate that is double that of the white population; and to recent episodes of violence against the new immigrants--members of the Southeast Asian community--as specific and telling evidence that serious racial problems remain.

In this paper, specific attention is called to these arguments and to objective data that will demonstrate precisely the economic conditions and status of Blacks in Boston in mid-1985. The major foci are structural

barriers and conditions which affect access to the occupational structure; and initiatives generated at the community, local, state and federal government levels that may help Blacks in Boston obtain a fair share of economic opportunity. First, it is necessary to offer explanations for past and present patterns of economic discrimination.

DISCRIMINATION IN THE MARKETPLACE

A plethora of evidence supports the contention that Blacks are often victims of discrimination with respect to job opportunities in Boston (Blackwell and Hart (1983), Cooper (1983), Kaufmann (1983), Lockman (1983), McMillan (1983), Saltonstall (1984), Wessel (1983)). While a considerable amount of that discrimination may be situational, it also manifests widespread prejudice against Blacks and other minority groups in metropolitan Boston. As will be detailed in subsequent sections, racial discrimination is one of the primary reasons for the ubiquitous restrictions that confine Blacks to the secondary tier of the labor market.

Prejudice may be explained by a variety of theories constructed by social and behavioral scientists (Adorno, et al (1950), Allport (1954), Blalock (1967), Marden and Myer (1984), Myrdal (1944), Vander Zanden (1972), Williams (1947)). For purposes of this analysis of discrimination in the labor market, discussion will be confined to selected social psychological theories which embrace attitudes and behavior and exogenous theories of prejudice.

In social psychological theoretical frameworks, it is argued that prejudice is learned behavior. It is learned through a process of socialization provided by such agents as families, membership groups, significant others, reference groups, peers and friends. Individuals

internalize notions of preference and social distance from others in ways that permit them to select discrimination as a preferred mechanism for ensuring perceived entitlements or privilege and for denying the same opportunity to others who are different from them. Inasmuch as prejudice is learned behavior, it may also be unlearned through reduction-of-prejudice techniques. (Blackwell (1982), Myrdal (1944)).

One aspect of learning process is Merton's notion (1949) that the fear of the cost of discrimination prevents some people from actualizing prejudiced attitudes as overt discriminatory behavior. Specifically, if prejudiced individuals believe that the sanctions for discriminating against a person or group will be inordinately high or detrimental to their social, political or economic well-being or status, they will not discriminate even if they hold covertly such prejudiced attitudes. Support for this position may be found in the hiring practices of prejudiced persons who are convinced that severe economic sanctions will be imposed on them if they are found to violate city anti-discrimination ordinances, state statutes, or federal guidelines that stipulate such negative sanctions (Blackwell, 1982). On the other hand, without such sanctions, or where they are not likely to be enforced, the prejudiced person will perceive no cost for discrimination. Consequently, these persons will continue to discriminate and exclude unfavored persons and/or groups from equal access to the economic marketplace.

Implicit in such social-psychological theories is the salience of sanctions or law enforcement as instruments for behavioral management. That is to say, enforcement with the threat of severe sanctions for non-compliance with the law is a method of minimizing day-to-day discrimination--a behavioral dimension. It may not eliminate prejudice (an attitudinal construct) but it

will prevent these negative sentiments from being actualized in ways that keep individuals from entering the job market, obtaining a promotion, or from staying on the job long enough to build up seniority and some form of job security.

Economists often describe discrimination in the marketplace in terms of exogenous and endogenous theories (Blackwell, 1982). Exogenous theories refer to "a taste for discrimination" by employers, especially white males, who are socialized outside the labor market arena to believe they deserve their special entitlements and rewards. Many come to believe in their exclusionary rights to the best rewards of the labor market, whether in terms of primary access to available jobs, first access to the most remunerative and lucrative positions, first choice of the status positions, or total access to positions of power. As Thurow (1969) asserts, white male employers acquire a monopoly of power which permeates the entire occupational structure. This attitude -- sense of power, privilege, belief of the right to first choice -- as manifested in the labor market, is a transference of conditions to which they are exposed outside the labor market. Thus, this "taste for discrimination" is manifested in such areas as housing, educational institutions, and in leisure-time and recreational pursuits.

By contrast, endogenous theories focus attention on situations, conditions, and problems which exist within the labor market itself. Of special concern is the actual behavior of workers in the work situation. For instance, what do favored workers do in order to protect their gains or, as Swinton (1977) says, to improve their economic well-being against the intrusion of outsider groups? One response is that such workers will engage in various forms of direct and indirect or subtle discrimination. This is

done in ways which enhance the status, income, job-allocation, and other social rewards of the favored group to the discomfort and exclusion of unfavored groups. Implicit in this behavior is the fear of competition with groups who are capable of competing successfully for higher economic and status gains. However, so long as the favored insiders within the marketplace observe the success of their discriminatory behavior in maximizing their own gains, they will continue to discriminate against Blacks, for example. Blacks will be confined to entry level positions, be denied promotions, and be victimized by unfair wage and salary structures.

The persistence of such manifestations of prejudice and discrimination demands changes in public policies and the enforcement of anti-discrimination legislation. Such action is often too slow and ineffectual in the view of those who have been excluded from the economic, political and social benefits of the larger social system. By the same token, any action perceived as an attempt to alter power relations to include outsider groups in more than token numbers is often regarded by insider privileged groups as too fast. This position is based on the proposition that such policy changes are threats to their privileged position in the economic structure. Despite this potential for disagreement, policy changes require coordination of widely diverse efforts: community action, informed and courageous political leadership, negotiations with upper-and-lower-level decision-makers or implementors of policies, and support from an enormous array of actors within the public and private sectors of a city. Effective public policy to correct social and economic inequities requires a sufficient amount of leverage and the commitment to utilize that leverage in creative ways that will result in desired change.

At varying junctures since 1970, the federal government, the Commonwealth of Massachusetts and the City of Boston have promulgated a number of executive orders, statutes and ordinances designed to produce enlightened public policy to reduce occupational and job discrimination.

The most effective public policy, where carefully conceptualized and rigorously enforced, has been affirmative action. Without question, and as documented by the Potomac Institute and in other studies (Blackwell, 1985a), many Blacks have found meaningful employment. Some have moved from the working class into middle-class positions or achieved some degree of equal employment opportunity which enabled them to obtain professional, managerial and administrative positions. Many would not have obtained that opportunity without the existence of a federal affirmative action policy. So long as the federal government carefully monitored its policies, the Federal Equal Opportunity Commission investigated complaints, and either levied or threatened to impose sanctions on recalcitrant employers, affirmative action policies worked effectively. Importantly, past U.S. Presidents established a tone of compliance either by verbal commitment to the goals of affirmative action, by tacit approval, or at least by endorsement through silence. The importance of conformity to federal expectations of equal employment opportunity filtered down to state, municipal and local governments and to the individual employers.

The commitment of affirmative action of state and local governments, as well as of individual employers, will be tested in the 1980s as a consequence of federal government and presidential retrenchment from these programs. President Ronald Reagan is unequivocally against affirmative action: A major thrust of his Administration has been and continues to be the dismantling of

federally-sponsored and derivative affirmative action programs implemented at levels below that of the federal government.

Using the U.S. Justice Department as its central instrument, primarily through the work of Assistant U.S. Attorney General William Bradford Reynolds, the President has moved aggressively to undo all affirmative action programs. That frontal assault on affirmative action was accelerated in 1984 when the U.S. Supreme Court ruled in FIREFIGHTERS VS. STOTTS that the city of Memphis did not have to honor affirmative action in such cases (Blackwell, 1985a:75). Since that decision in mid-1984, the U.S. Justice Department has ordered 50 jurisdictions to dismantle affirmative action programs that are not only in place but have demonstrated success in achieving their goals. Many local jurisdictions are resisting this federal intrusion in their perceived perogatives because they are pleased with the heterogeneity of their workforce and with the positive racial climate created in their cities, so protected court action may result.

The City of Boston embarked on a potentially aggressive affirmative action program in 1979 when Mayor Kevin White issued an Executive Order which mandated job guarantees for residents of Boston. Pressure to move in that direction arose from demands made by the Boston Jobs Coalition. This group's objectives are succinctly expressed by their slogan: "Boston Jobs for Boston People." This collection of community groups had organized to combat racism and discrimination by the construction union in metropolitan Boston (Lung,

*As we go to press, the Attorney General of the United States is preparing an Executive Order for President Reagan's signature that will abolish many affirmative action policies initiated by President Johnson and followed by all of his successors, except Ronald Reagan.

1985:4). Although once comprised largely of residents of Boston, a great part of the leadership and membership of these unions had by the mid-1970s migrated to the suburban fringes of Boston. However, they still controlled access to almost all the major construction and crafts jobs in Boston.

During this period, the City of Boston obtained substantial federal funds under grants from the Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD). Further, the City was granted the right of "primary responsibility for administering" those funds earmarked largely for construction (Lung, 1985). This right of primary responsibility was precisely the kind of leverage needed for the initial promulgation and partial enforcement of city hiring policies governing the use of federal funds. Therefore, in partial response to the demands of the Boston Jobs Coalition, (and encouraged by Chuck Turner of the Third World Jobs Clearing House), Mayor Kevin White seized upon the opportunity to establish a policy which affected employment of white citizens who had been excluded from their share of jobs in Boston and also secured jobs for Blacks, who had been blatantly discriminated against by union hiring practices. His Executive Order specified employment goals that must be met by all construction firms working in Boston on projects funded by the City of Boston and City-administered federal funds. Under this order, the workforce of such firms must consist of 50 percent residents of Boston; 25 percent minorities and 10 percent women. This distribution was mandated for every construction unit that was to participate in project implementation.

The implementation of this policy began almost immediately and, as will be discussed in subsequent sections, with mixed results. In arguments presented by the various unions, it was also challenged as "reverse discrimination," as violation of union prerogatives and unconstitutional.

Ultimately, the unions took their case to the courts. However, in 1983 in the case of WHITE VS MASSACHUSETTS COUNCIL (No. 81-1003), the United States Supreme Court ruled on behalf of Boston that a city has the right to designate "a fixed proportion of local residents who should be hired by contractors" on projects funded by the city and/or city-administered federal funds (Blackwell, 1985a:75). The City of Boston was then free to move aggressively to enforce that order and to give it new teeth through the enactment of a City Ordinance that would supersede the Executive Order.

The bill to establish the Boston Job Residency Policy was introduced and shepherded through the Boston City Council by Councilman Bruce Bolling. This Ordinance was passed on September 28, 1983 and approved by the Mayor Kevin White on October 14, 1983. Section 3 (Policy) states:

- (a) On any construction project funded in whole or in part by city funds, or funds which, in accordance with a federal grant or otherwise, the city expends or administers, or for which the city is a signatory to the construction contract, the worker hours of a craft-by-craft basis shall be performed, in accordance with the contract documents provided in section 3(b) below, as follows:
 1. at least 50 percent of the total employee man-hours in each trade shall be bona fide Boston residents;
 2. at least 25 percent of the total employee man-hours in each trade shall be minorities;
 3. at least 10 percent of the total employee man-hours shall be by women (City Document No. 62:2).

This document also outlines policies for planning and implementation, compliance, enforcement and sanctions. It details the establishment of a

Liaison Committee which has, inter alia, responsibility for monitoring compliance. It also mandates that the city be aggressive in the establishment of job training programs, as a matter of official policy, that will enable Boston residents to attain employment. The issue of permanent jobs was also confronted as the city attempted to implement its new policy.

Realizing that the city had not moved as forcefully as desired in recruiting, training and hiring of minorities and women, Councilman Bolling introduced legislation in the Boston City Council which created the position of Municipal Affirmative Action Officer. This ordinance was passed December 1984, and, in May 1985, Atty. David Cortiella became the city's first affirmative action officer hired under this new policy. Importantly, he reports directly to the Mayor.

At the state level, new steps were also taken to assure greater inclusion of underrepresented groups into the total fabric of state-funded employment. For example, Governor Michael Dukakis issued Executive Order No. 227, A Code of Fair Practices, which strengthens the Commonwealth's commitment to implement affirmative action policies. This Order, inter alia, specifies that "all affirmative action programs shall be subject to review by the Executive Office for Administration and Finance (Commissioner), the Massachusetts Commission Against Discrimination (MCAD), and the State Office of Affirmative Action (SOAA)." (Governor's Executive Order No. 227:2).

In addition, Governor Dukakis has issued Executive Orders which address affirmative action with respect to the hiring of the physically handicapped (Executive Order 246), and to including veterans under such programs (Executive Order 235). In 1985, he initiated a highly publicized Executive Search Program that is designed to identify, recruit and hire more Blacks,

other minorities and women into higher-paying executive positions of the State employment system. These actions are components of a more coherent policy designed to transform recruitment and hiring practices which have heretofore either been adverse in their impact on the hiring of underrepresented groups or which have not been enforced to any appreciable degree.

THE ECONOMIC STATUS OF BLACKS IN BOSTON

Any examination of the objective data about the economic status of Blacks in Boston leads inevitably to the conclusion that Blacks have not obtained a fair share of economic rewards either in the city or in the state. In 1983, the Boston Globe published a Pulitzer Prize winning series on "Boston Jobs: The Race Factor," which detailed rampant underutilization of Blacks and discrimination against them in city and state jobs, private industries, educational institutions, and in labor unions. This study led the Boston Globe writers (1983) to conclude that "Boston is the most difficult city in the United States" for a "black person to hold a job or earn a promotion." Kaufman (1983) showed that Blacks are excluded from executive, managerial and administrative positions and membership on the board of directors of literally all of the city's most powerful business, banking, high-technology and educational institutions. This is the case whether one is considering the executive structure of Boston's banking institutions, or the ten deans of Harvard University, or the leadership structure of the Boston Building and Construction Trades Council, or the upper echelons of city and state government. The executives are white; not only that, they are almost uniformly white males.

Using 1982 data from the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission,

Kaufmann (1983) demonstrated racial disparities in the composition of all types of occupations in the private sector. For instance, Blacks were about three times less likely than Whites (4.5 percent vs. 12.4 percent) to hold positions as officials or managers in the private sector. Only 4.5 percent of all Blacks working in private industry held positions as officers and managers, compared to 12.4 percent for white employees. In other professional positions, 7.8 percent of all Blacks, compared to 17.7 percent of all Whites, were in that job category. The percentage white in professional jobs was more than double the percentage black among professional positions. Blacks (7.4 percent) and Whites (8.2 percent) approximated each other more closely among persons who held technical jobs. However, a significantly larger proportion of Whites (10.9 percent) than Blacks (6.1 percent) were employed as sales workers. On the other hand, the percentage of Blacks (19.7) more than doubled the percentage among Whites (8.9) who held clerical and office jobs.

Blacks (10.0 percent) were somewhat more likely than Whites (8.3 percent) to hold skilled positions in private industry. Similarly, Blacks (15.9 percent) were significantly more likely than Whites (10.6 percent) to be found in semi-skilled job categories. Six point three percent of all Blacks in the private sector, compared to 4.4 percent of Whites, were found in unskilled jobs. Finally, almost one-fourth (22.3 percent) of all Blacks, compared to one in eleven (8.7 percent) of all Whites, held service jobs (Kaufmann, 1983).

This distribution in the occupational structure supports arguments advanced by Bonacich (1972) and others that a split-labor market places Whites disproportionately in the upper tier of preferred executive, managerial/administrative positions and generally restricts Blacks in disproportionate numbers to the lower tier of non-professional, semi-skilled

and service occupational roles. If parity is tied to the proportion of a given group in the total population of a given universe of study, such as city of Boston, then it is quite evident that Blacks are grossly underrepresented in the upper tier of a segmented labor structure since Blacks make up approximately 22 percent of Boston's population.

When Wessel (1983) focused attention on occupational distribution in the high technology industry of metropolitan Boston, and analyzed 1981 EEOC data, the underrepresentation of Blacks was not only blatant at the upper tier of the occupational structure, it was a general pattern throughout that industry. For instance, the EEOC data showed that Blacks made up only 3.6 percent of the 225,000 employees in the high technology industry in Massachusetts. As in the private sector in general, the largest share of black employees in high tech industries was concentrated in the lower-level, lower-paying positions. Blacks were and are rarely employed as officials. They represent one percent of the total number in this category in high technology firms. Neither are they likely to be hired as professionals; they constitute a mere 1.3 percent of this category. In 1981, only 3.0 percent of the technicians, 2.1 percent of all sales persons and 2.7 percent of the clerical persons employed in these firms were Blacks. At the same time, Blacks constituted only 3.8 percent of the skilled workers, 6.8 percent of the semi-skilled; 11.1 percent of the unskilled workers, and 5.3 percent of persons holding service jobs in this industry.

Digital Equipment, one of the largest high technology firms in the State, has black managers. However, not one of its board members was black, and not one of its chief officers was black. In fact, in 1981, neither Digital Equipment, Data General, Prime, Wang or Raytheon had a single Black among

their total of 164 officers (Wessel, 1983). At the same time that the absolute number of Blacks graduating from the 280 schools and colleges of engineering in the United States has been increasing, (Blackwell, 1981), the high technology industry in Boston and the State has hired and retained relatively few Blacks who are engineers. In effect, Blacks were underrepresented in all areas of employment in one of the largest areas of employment in the state in 1981. That underrepresentation continues in 1985.

Impediments to the employment of Blacks in high technology industries in Boston and Massachusetts are not unlike such barriers found in many other areas of the country. An important consideration is the fact that the nation has experienced a suburbanization of the high technology industry. These companies have either moved from the central city, which once held most industries and manufacturing firms, or have located or re-located in the suburban fringes of the city. Few Blacks can afford transportation costs from the city to the suburbs, even if hired, not only because of inadequate transportation services demanding substantial commuting time but because Blacks hired are likely to be found in lower-paying entry-level positions. Another restriction faced by Blacks is housing discrimination in suburban communities. If the discrimination is not explicit as, for instance, refusing to sell or show housing to blacks, or steering them to some other area, it may be economically discriminative as, for example, inflating the cost of housing, or by merely pricing housing out of reach of black applicants, or through zoning ordinances of suburban communities which exclude the construction of low-cost, multi-family housing (Blackwell, 1985a).

Suburbanization of high technology is especially noticeable in Massachusetts, and in metropolitan Boston. Wessel (1983) noted the Digital

Equipment was unique in operating plants near black neighborhoods in both Boston and Springfield. Not only did that fact ease the transportation problem, it helped to account for the greater success of Digital in the recruitment and hiring of Blacks in all categories. By contrast, plants operated by the Data General Company were in towns in which very few Blacks live: Milford, Westborough, and Scarborough, and along the Route 495 belt outside of Boston. On the other hand, Wang Laboratories, located in Lowell, increased its success in the hiring of minority group members by providing a van for its Boston employees. This company increased its number of black employees by seventeen-fold in a three-year period between 1979 and 1983 because of a renewed commitment to expanded opportunities, and by solving the transportation problem (Wessel, 1983).

The underutilization of Blacks, Asians, Hispanics and women in the high technology industry, and in private sector employment as a whole, cannot be accelerated without a sustained commitment by these firms' major decision-makers to change their racial and gender composition. That kind of commitment may be strengthened in part by the appointment of more Blacks, for instance, to corporate boards of directors. In these firms, as noted by the Boston Globe, there is a clear "homogenous concentration of power" among white males. In 1985, of 545 directors in the corporate, private sector in the state, only one director was black. Consciousness-raising and sensitivity to the needs to close what Thomas Saltonstall (1985) calls the "opportunity gap" between the races continue to be difficult under such circumstances.

Commercial Banking: Blacks have a somewhat better chance of being employed in commercial banks in Boston than in high technology firms. The Equal Opportunity Commission (EEOC) reported in 1981 that 7.8 percent of the

24,812 employees in banking institutions of metropolitan Boston were black. Of the 5,114 officials and managers of those institutions, 2.4 percent were black. Of the 3,269 professionals, 5.3 percent were black. Blacks comprised 6.1 percent of the 619 technicians; 5.4 percent of the 629 persons in sales; 10.2 percent of the 14,225 clerical and office workers; 4.4 percent of the 46 skilled and 11.8 percent of the 255 semi-skilled and 14.0 percent of 645 service workers in commercial banks at that time.

Thomas Saltonstall, Area Director of the U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) stated in 1984 that the opportunity gap continues in this area and related areas of employment in metropolitan Boston. Saltonstall (1984) defined the opportunity gap as "the difference between a protected group's availability in the civilian labor force (CLF) within the standard metropolitan statistical area (SMSA) at a particular job level, and the actual participation rate of that group at that level." (Saltonstall, 1984:5). Minorities represented only 8 percent of the CLF for the Boston SMSA and 29 percent of the CLF of the City of Boston.

Saltonstall argued that the opportunity gap for minorities widened between 1972 and 1982 for jobs in security/commodity brokers and services in the Boston SMSA. He reported that minorities had lost ground in total employment, proportion among officials and managers, and in their representation among persons hired in the professional category. Although he did not provide 1972 data for comparison, his 1982 data were alarming. In that year, only 93 of a total workforce of 3,139 employees were members of a minority group. Minorities constituted 4 of the 401 officials and managers; 7 of 402 professionals; 0 of 17 technicians; 18 of 1,046 salesworkers; and 63 of 1,266 office/clerical workers.

In 1984, Saltonstall made a similar observation about holding and other investment companies. He stated that, while the absolute number of employees tripled in these companies between 1972 and 1982, minorities (Blacks, Hispanics and Asians) lost ground. His statistical data referred only to the year 1982. At that time, with 100 percent of reporting facilities located in the City of Boston, minorities represented only 150 or 6.2 percent of the 2,393 employees in these companies. Minorities constituted 4 of the 348 officials and managers; 6 of the 185 professionals, 5 of the 214 technicians; only 2 of the 184 salesworkers, and 0 of the 241 laborers, all of whom were white. The remaining 133 minorities were concentrated in the office/clerical category in which they were not underrepresented.

Among credit institutions, Saltonstall (1985) reported that the minority participation rate declined from 5.7 percent of all employees in 1975 to 4.0 percent in 1983. Again, Blacks and other minorities were critically underrepresented at all levels but especially at the upper echelons of the positions in such institutions. Specifically, black and other minorities comprised only 2 of the 86 sales workers, and 38 of the 707 office and clerical workers. He concluded that the minority participation rate in credit institutions is only one-third of the participation rate observed in banking institutions.

LABOR FORCE PARTICIPATION OF MINORITIES IN BOSTON SMSA: SELECTED AREAS IN 1982

The EEOC has developed one of the most complete data sets for employment of Blacks and other minorities in metropolitan Boston. While space precludes a detailed assessment of EEOC findings, selected examples of those data

demonstrate the magnitude of the white monopoly of jobs and the underrepresentation of Blacks in the marketplace. This underutilization of Blacks in all of these areas, as well as in other occupations of the private and public sectors, lends strong support to endogenous and exogenous theories of discrimination in the marketplace.

Communications: In the field of communications, the underrepresentation of Blacks and other minorities is especially observable in higher-level, upper echelon and higher paying positions. For example, minorities comprised only 124 (3.5 percent) of the 4,864 professional (of this number, 117 or a mere 2.4 percent were black); 151 or 7.8 percent of the 1,935 technicians, and only 24 or 4.2 percent of the 566 sales workers in the communications industry (Saltonstall, 1984).

General Merchandise Stores: In this area, in 1982, minorities comprised only 118 or 2.8 percent of the 4,229 officials and managers; 23 or 2.9 percent of the 784 professionals; 28 or 6.2 percent of the 450 technicians, and 266 or 5.5 percent of the 4,781 office and clerical workers. Like a significant proportion of the types of jobs or occupational categories identified so far, these jobs are likely to be located in downtown Boston (Saltonstall, 1984). In that area, Blacks and other minorities are almost invisible in the labor market structure.

As noted by Bolling (1985), Younger (1985), and Perkins (1985), between 75 and 80 percent of all jobs in the downtown area of Boston, and particularly those with salaries or wages of \$15,000 or more, are held by non-residents of Boston. Hence, there is not only the phenomenon of the white suburbanization of downtown Boston jobs, there is also the refusal of many businesses in that area to hire Blacks in positions of high visibility where they are either

likely to be seen by or have direct contact with white patrons. In fact, even in 1985, and despite substantial efforts by some leaders in the business and social/religious communities to confront head-on the problems of racism and prejudice, some business functionaries still believe that having blacks in high visibility employment areas is "bad for business."

Food Stores: Again, at all levels, whether in managerial, white-or-blue collar jobs, Blacks and other minorities are severely underrepresented among employees in food stores. Specific data show that minorities constituted only 30 or 2.2 percent of the 1,315 officials and managers; 5 of 5.0 percent of the 99 professionals; 6 or 2.8 percent of the 210 technicians; 50 or 2.2 percent of the 2,238 office and clerical workers. With respect to blue-collar jobs in this sector, Blacks and other minorities held only 28 or 4.5 percent of the 617 crafts worker positions; 29 or 10.4 percent of the 278 operatives, and only 24 or 5.4 percent of the 441 service worker jobs.

Printing and Publishing: Boston is the location of several major printing and publishing companies. Further, several newspapers are published in this area, including the Boston Globe, the Herald, and the Patriot Ledger of Quincy. Among the major book publishing companies located in the Boston SMSA are Addison Wesley Publishing Company; Benjamin Cummings Publishing Company; Beacon Press; G.K. Hall & Company; Houghton Mifflin Company; Allyn Bacon Company; and Vantage Press. In fact, the 1983 edition of the NEW ENGLAND TELEPHONE YELLOW PAGES list some 124 publishing companies and about 650 printing companies in the Boston SMSA.

Of the 7,895 persons employed in these companies, only 889 or 11.2 percent are Blacks and other minorities. More specifically, only 63 or 3.0 percent of the 2,072 officials and managers in these companies are members of

the protected groups (Blacks, Hispanics, Asians, Pacific Islanders, and Native Americans). Minorities comprise only 114 or 4.5 percent of the 2,450 professionals. They represent 68 or 5.4 percent of the 1,260 technicians; 42 or 3.1 percent of the 1,331 sales workers; 205 or 5.2 percent of the 3,879 office and clerical workers. Among blue collar jobs in this industry, Blacks and other minorities constitute 86 or 3.1 percent of the 2,718 crafts workers; and 122 or 5.7 percent of the 2,128 operatives. (Saltonstall, 1984).

Sales Workers: Given the existence of a relatively large number of training programs operated by such groups as the federally sponsored Job Corps and Action for Boston Community Development (ABCD), and such agencies as the National Urban League, as well as those operated by the city, one would not expect such gross underrepresentation of blacks and other minorities among clerical workers. Yet, Blacks and other minorities experience extreme difficulty in obtaining employment in this area.

Clerical workers from minority groups have not fared well in their efforts to obtain employment in the Boston SMSA. Again, using 1982 data, the EEOC reported in 1984 that minorities comprised only 62 of 750 (8.2 percent) of clerical workers in eating and drinking places; 159 or 3.6 percent of the 4,361 in electrical and electronic equipment establishments; 144 or 5.0 percent of the 2,852 employed in machinery companies; 418 or 7.2 percent of the 5,771 clerical workers in companies dealing with instruments and related products by only 17 or 4.4 percent of the 384 employees in companies specializing in transportation by air (Saltonstall, 1984). A 1983 EEOC report did not show appreciable gains in any of these areas. In fact, undoubtedly due in part to the increase in the overall employment rate of whites, Blacks and other minorities actually lost ground in the period covered by that

study. For instance, minority participation rate in credit institutions dropped from 5.7 percent of the total workforce in 1975 to 4.0 percent in 1983. In legal services, their rate fell from 3.8 percent in 1975 to 3.5 percent in 1983. During the same period, their participation rate as insurance carriers fell from 13.2 percent in 1980 to 11.7 percent in 1983, and minority participation in business services declined from 14.6 percent of the total employed in this area in 1980 to 11.8 percent in 1983 (Saltonstall, 1985).

In 1982, only 1 of 126 sales workers in the category of insurance agents, brokers and services was a member of a minority group. Among insurance carriers, 70 of their 1,759 (3.9 percent) were minorities. In eating and drinking places, only 5 or 1.3 percent of the 359 sales workers were minorities. Members of minority groups represented only one of 44 (2.2 percent) of the sales workers with real estate firms; 22 or 3.4 percent of 635 in electrical and electronic equipment companies; 29 or 4.3 percent of the 662 in machinery companies; 0 of 66 in the electric, gas and sanitary services; and 58 or 4.3 percent of the 1,323 sales workers in companies specializing in instruments and related products (Saltonstall, 1984).

EMPLOYMENT OF BLACKS IN MUNICIPAL GOVERNMENT

Interviews with representatives of city government in Boston revealed that the city has only recently computerized information about the racial composition and wage/salary distribution of its workforce. Consequently, it is difficult to demonstrate trends in employment characteristics by race. Nevertheless, some understanding of this issue may be gleaned from data obtained from the city in May, 1985. As of that date, Blacks comprised 17.1

percent or 3,224 or the 18,898 persons employed by the City of Boston. This number includes persons hired by the School Department. It does not include employees of the Boston Housing Authority, the Boston Redevelopment Authority, or employees of Health and Hospitals. If this number were included, it is estimated that the proportion of city jobs held by Blacks, in toto, would not change appreciably; however, their concentration in low-paying, non-professional and managerial positions would be considerably more apparent.*

An examination of Table 1 shows that the underutilization of Blacks is quite widespread throughout city government. Obviously, this problem is considerably more severe in some departments than in others. However, the white monopoly of certain jobs is evident in such areas as the retirement board; administrative services; inspectional services; city clerk's office; treasury department; election department; finance commission; law department; real property department; environmental department; the Court House Commission; and the Registry of Deeds.

*Jordan (1985) reported that over 40% of the 3,000 employees at BCH are black and Hispanic. However, they comprise 91% of workers in the two lowest pay categories, while 90% of upper echelon employees are white.

Table 1. Boston Municipal Employees by Race, Number and Percent
May 1985

Department	Title of Department	White		Black		Hispanic		Asian	
		N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%
01	Administrative Services	225	87.5	19	7.4	6	2.3	5	1.9
02	Assessing Dept.	143	76.5	31	16.6	2	1.1	10	5.3
03	Auditing Dept.	25	55.6	13	28.9	3	6.7	4	8.9
04	Retirement Board	31	91.2	1	2.9	0	0.0	2	5.9
05	Traffic & Parking	261	86.4	32	10.6	6	2.0	3	1.0
06	Fiscal Affairs								
07	Inspectional Service	208	90.8	15	6.6	2	.9	3	1.0
09	Veterans Services	22	81.5	4	14.8	0	0.0	1	3.7
10	City Clerks Office	30	90.9	2	6.1	1	3.0	0	0.0
11	City Council	61	82.4	12	16.2	1	1.4	0	0.0
12	Public Facilities	296	74.6	81	20.4	16	4.0	4	1.0
13	Treasury Dept.	49	86.0	7	12.3	1	1.8	0	0.0
14	Election Dept.	64	84.2	8	10.5	4	5.3	0	0.0
15	Finance Commission	41	100.0	0	0.0	0	0.0	0	0.0
16	Fire Department	1,415	82.6	256	14.9	39	2.3	3	.2
17	City Record	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A
20	Law Department	56	87.5	5	7.8	1	1.6	2	3.1
21	Library Department	477	70.5	130	19.2	27	4.0	39	5.8
22	Licensing Board	10	76.9	3	23.1	0	0.0	0	0.0
23	Mayor's Office	246	75.9	59	15.4	21	6.5	3	.9
24	Parks & Recreation	224	83.3	35	13.0	9	3.3	1	.4
25	Police Department	1,987	84.5	294	12.5	55	2.3	16	.7
26	Real Property	120	88.9	14	10.4	1	.7	0	0.0
27	Environment Dept.	14	87.5	2	12.5	0	0.0	0	0.0
28	Public Improvement Commission	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A
29	Fair Hsng. Commission	8	50.0	6	37.5	1	6.3	1	6.3
30	Public Works Dept.	440	80.1	93	16.9	10	1.8	3	.5
40	N.D.E.A.	114	67.9	37	22.0	13	7.7	4	2.4
41	Mayor's Office of Housing	48	70.6	16	23.5	3	4.4	1	1.5
50	Court House Comm.	185	97.9	4	2.1	0	0.0	0	0.0
51	Penal Institutions	148	69.2	57	26.6	8	3.7	0	0.0
52	Jail Records	127	74.7	30	17.6	12	7.1	1	.6
53	Registry of Deeds	43	93.5	3	6.5	0	0.0	0	0.0
85	School-Weekly Cler.	142	33.0	68	16.0	26	6.0	16	3.7
87	Sch. Teachers/Adm.	1,986	71.1	515	18.8	98	3.5	63	2.3
88	Sch. Teachers/Adm.	2,036	67.3	645	21.3	203	6.7	83	2.7
89	Sch. Cafeteria Wkr.	186	35.3	97	18.4	17	3.2	1	.2
93	School per Diem	1,354	77.8	311	17.9	57	3.3	1	.6
95	School per Diems	105	51.2	60	29.3	23	11.2	14	6.8
96	School per Diems	549	57.0	232	24.1	131	13.6	19	2.0
98	School Custodians	78	73.6	25	23.5	3	2.8	0	0.0

Totals 13,517 71.5 3,224 17.1 800 4.2 314 1.7
Total Work Force = 18,898. Note that 33 of all employees are Indian; 1 is
Cape Verdian and 1,009 or 5.3% of total are "uncoded."

N/A = Not Available

N/A - Not Available
Source: Municipal Office of Affirmative Action, City of Boston

Table 2. Total Full Time Employees in the City of Boston
By Salary Category, Race and Sex
(As of 03/31/85)

TOTAL EMPLOYEES	TOTAL		NON-MINORITY		MINORITY		BLACK		HISPANIC		ASIAN		AMER.		INDIAN		
	M	F	M	F	M	F	M	F	M	F	M	F	M	F	M	F	
1. Less Than 6,000	7	133	5	113	2	20	2	16	4	4	10	10	4	1			
2. 6,000 - 9,999	10	8	7	66.67%	3	33.33%	3	3	33.33%								
3. 10,000 - 12,999	549	394	371	274	178	120	141	87	23	22	10	10	4	.53%			
4. 13,000 - 15,999	673	420	556	341	117	79	91	61	17	10	8	8	1	.09%			
5. 16,000 - 19,999	578	412	493	329	85	83	62	64	15	12	6	7	2				
6. 20,000 - 24,999	2,043	283	1,736	186	307	97	251	83	43	11	13	3	.69%				
7. 25,000 - 29,999	1,351	94	1,098	81	253	13	212	9	35	4	6	.42%					
8. 30,000 - 32,999	405	24	392	96.27%	21	13	3	9	2	3	1	1	.23%				

Table 2. Total Full Time Employees in the City of Boston
 By Salary Category, Race and Sex
 (As of 03/31/85)
 (Continued)

TOTAL EMPLOYEES	TOTAL		NON-MINORITY		MINORITY		BLACK		HISPANIC		ASIAN		AMER.	
	M	F	M	F	M	F	M	F	M	F	M	F	M	F
9. 33,000 and Over	398	30	385	26	13	4	12	1	3.04%	.47%	2	1	1	
TOTAL	6,014	1,798	5,043	1,376	971	422	783	142	326	136	66	45	29	.10%

Source: Municipal Office of Affirmative Action, City of Boston

Commonwealth of Massachusetts

FY 1984

Table 3. Statewide Workforce Analysis by EEO-4 Job Category

Job Category	Total	Males				Females				Minority		Females			
		W	B	H	A	N	W	B	H	A	N				
Official/Administration	5163	3174	178	21	5	1574	155	19	12	4	415	8%	1764	34%	
Professional	23373	11975	506	175	262	29	9364	659	198	171	34	2034	9%	10426	45%
Technical	10588	3934	294	86	27	5	5435	621	119	54	13	1219	12%	6242	45%
Protective Services	4169	3463	259	70	10	18	283	62	4			423	10%	349	8%
Para-Professional	9189	2999	467	114	19	4	4831	611	121	19	4	1359	15%	5586	61%
Office Clerical	12206	1166	119	19	33	2	9431	1106	221	77	32	1609	13%	10867	89%
Skilled Craft	4917	4502	173	25	10	17	167	21	2			248	5%	190	4%
Service Maintenance	12725	8135	1210	221	35	23	2568	444	66	16	7	2202	16%	3101	24%
Total	92330	39348	3206	731	417	107	3653	3579	750	349	94	9329	11%	38515	47%

Footnotes: 1. Minorities include Blacks, Hispanics, Asians and Native Americans

2. Females includes Whites and Minorities

Source: 1984 State Office of Affirmative Action's Annual Report to the Governor, p. 17.

Commonwealth of Massachusetts

Table 4. Workforce Analysis by Secretariat for Official/Administrator Job Category
FY 1984

SECRETARIAT	Total	MALES			FEMALES			MINORITY			FEMALES		
		W	B	H	A	N	W	B	H	A	N	MINORITY	FEMALES
Admin. and Finance	376	263	12	2	3	1	77	14	1	2	1	36	10%
Communities & Devel.	74	42	2	1	1	24	3	1	8	11%	8	28	38%
Consumer Affairs	71	54	2	12	3	3	5	5	7%	15	15	21%	
Economic & Manpower	414	276	15	2	109	9	1	2	29	7%	121	29%	
Educational Affairs	108	64	1	1	3	30	6	1	14	13%	39	36%	
Elder Affairs	20	12	3	4	1	4	1	4	4	20%	5	5	25%
Energy Affairs	5	2	1	2	2	1	1	1	1	20%	2	2	40%
Environmental Affairs	323	267	7	2	1	41	3	1	15	5%	45	45	14%
Governor's Office	15	10	4	4	1	4	1	1	1	7%	5	5	33%
Higher Education	1058	663	62	2	4	1	283	33	5	4	1	112	11%
Human Services	2315	1230	61	13	7	1	924	68	7	2	2	161	7%
Labor	46	37	1	7	1	7	1	1	2	4%	8	8	17%
Lt. Governor's Office	3	3	3	1	1	1	30	7	1	0	0%	0	0%
Public Safety	144	104	10	1	27	6	1	17	10	7%	38	38	26%
Transportation	191	147	10	27	6	1	17	9%	34	18%	34	34	34%
TOTAL	5163	3174	178	21	21	5	1574	155	19	12	4	415	8%
												1764	34%

1. Minorities include Black, Hispanics, Asians, and Native Americans

2. Females includes White and Minorities

Source: 1984 State Office of Affirmative Action's Annual Report to the Governor, p. 18.

The impact of this distorted distribution of Blacks and other minorities may be partially gleaned from wage and salary data presented in Table 2. As of March 31, 1985, City of Boston data showed that Blacks comprised 12.8 percent of all reporting departments among persons earning less than \$6,000 per annum. One-third of all persons earning between \$6,000 and \$9,999 were black while two-thirds of them were white. Slightly less than one-fourth (24.18 percent) of persons earning between \$10,000 and \$12,999 were black. In the middle salary ranges, Blacks received income that was significantly below expectations if wage concentration is tied to proportion of Blacks in the city population. Not unexpectedly, few Blacks received salaries in excess of \$30,000 per year. Specifically, while 2.56 percent of all persons who received income between \$30,000 and \$32,999 yearly were black, more than 96 percent of persons in this category were white. Similarly, slightly more than 96 percent of all persons with incomes in excess of \$33,000 were white while only 3.97 percent were black. At all levels between \$13,000 and \$29,999 per annum, more than 80 percent of recipients were white.

While Blacks may be hired in larger numbers in municipal government than has been the case in recent years, it seems evident that a substantial proportion of them are hired in entry level, low-paying positions. The total number of employees included in the date reported in Table 2 does not include employees of such agencies as the BHA, the BRA, and the Department of Health and Hospitals. It is suggested that if these departments which have a significant number of black employees in low-wage scale positions were included, that the profile presented in Table 2 would change dramatically. It is reasonable to assume that the distribution of blacks in the wage structure

would be tilted considerably more toward the lower end of the wage spectrum presented in Table 2.

EMPLOYMENT OF BLACKS BY THE STATE GOVERNMENT*

It is not possible to disaggregate state employment data by city and towns because of the State's method of reporting its public data. Therefore, this analysis does not differentiate between black residents of Boston who hold state-financed positions from black state employees who live in other parts of the State. However, since three-fourths of all black residents of the Commonwealth live either in Boston, Springfield or Worcester, it may be assumed that the majority of black state employees reside in one of those cities. It may also be assumed that within that group, since most state office facilities are located in Boston, the Boston residents will hold a far greater share of such positions.

The Massachusetts State Office of Affirmative Action (SOAA) reported in 1984 that Blacks held 8.36 percent of the entire statewide workforce of 92,310 persons. The percentage of minorities, as a group, rose from 7 percent of the state's total workforce in 1980 to 11 percent in 1984. State data showed that during that interim, minority employment statewide rose to 8 percent in 1981, remained unchanged in 1982, but climbed to 10 percent in 1983 and continued its upturn to 11 percent in 1983 (R. Murphy, 1984:8).

*For purposes of this analysis, the profile of employment among blacks in the State Government is confined to fiscal year 1984 due to the unavailability of trend data.

In 1984, not unexpectedly, Blacks and other minorities were unevenly distributed in the various job categories as well as among the 15 Secretariats of State Government. With respect to statewide distributions by job categories, the distributions are detailed in Table 3. Of the 5,163 persons who held positions as officials or administrators, 178 or 3.4 percent were black male and 155 or 3.0 percent were black females. Among the 23,373 professionals, some 306, or 1.3 percent, were black men and 659, or 2.8 percent, were black women. Black males held 294, or 2.7 percent, of the 10,588 positions of technicians while black females held 621, or 5.8 percent, of all technical positions among State employees. A further examination of this table shows that 1106 black women, or 9.0 percent, were hired in office/clerical positions compared to 119 black males, or 0.9 percent of the 12,206 persons in this category. The underrepresentation of Blacks in skilled craft positions is reflected in the fact that the 173 males and the 21 black females represented 3.5 and 0.4 percent, respectively, of all 4,917 persons who hold jobs in this category. However, the concentration of Blacks in low-paying positions is demonstrated by the fact that of the 12,725 workers in this category, 1,210 or 9.5 percent were black males and 444, or 3.4 percent, were black females.

Within the fifteen Secretariats of the State Government, black males comprised a total of 178, or 3.4 percent, and black females constituted 155, or 3.0 percent, of the 5,163 persons employed in these branches of State Government. Only in higher education, human services, and in the Economic and Manpower Secretariat was the absolute number of black employees in excess of 20 in FY 1984. The highest number of Blacks, 129, or 5.5 percent of 2,315, held positions in the Department of Human Services. The second highest number

was found in Higher Education in which the 62 black males and 33 black females represented a combined percent of 8.9 among the 1,058 positions in this department.

With respect to public-supported higher educational institutions, the 95 Blacks holding executive and administrative positions represented 8.9 percent of the 1,058 persons in that category. Among the 5,711 faculty positions identified in this survey, Blacks held 163, or 2.8 percent, of the faculty positions in several of the state colleges in Massachusetts. For example, Cooper (1983) reported that Blacks comprised a mere 2.5 percent of the 5711 faculty positions in the 35 state colleges and universities.

Among colleges without a single black faculty member were: Framingham State College, Greenfield Community College, Massachusetts Maritime Academy, Middlesex Community College, and Quinsigamond Community College. Among community colleges, the highest concentration of Blacks in faculty positions was at Roxbury Community College where 20 black faculty members comprised 38 percent of the institution's 53 faculty positions.

Among the three branches of the University System, at the University of Massachusetts/Boston with 32 blacks on the faculty, blacks represented 6.8 percent of its 470 faculty positions. By contrast, the 34 black faculty members at University of Massachusetts/Amherst, accounted for 2.9 percent of its 1191 faculty, while the eight blacks on the faculty at the University of Massachusetts/Worcester represented only 2.6 percent of its 306 faculty cohort. Of all 35 institutions, only the University of Massachusetts/Boston has a percentage of Blacks on its faculty that is higher than the national average of approximately 4.4 percent for faculties of colleges and universities in the United States.

In state higher educational institutions, 77 Blacks (3.1 percent of the total of 2,472) held professional-non-faculty positions. A much smaller number of Blacks held positions in the secretarial clerical, technical/professional, and skilled craft, categories. However, the 150 Blacks hired as service maintenance employees comprised 5.6 percent of the 2,668 state employees in these institutions (Murphy, 1984 and Table 5). Private colleges and universities in the Boston area have not been as "successful" as have the public institutions in the recruitment and hiring of Blacks in faculty positions. For instance, Cooper (1983) reported in 1983 that Blacks constituted only 2.2 percent of the 7,252 faculty members in 30 private institutions. In 1985, Blacks represent only 1.9 percent of the 1,079 faculty employed at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology and at Boston College, only 10 Blacks hold faculty positions, about 1.1 percent of the faculty.

Again, success in the recruitment of Blacks to faculty positions is a function of demonstrated commitment by the institution's top-level leadership, financial support of a well-organized recruitment program; unwavering support of affirmative action and consistent implementation of affirmative action policies, a positive institutional climate, willingness to pay competitive salaries, and sincerity in communicating hiring policies throughout the educational community (Blackwell, 1981; 1985b).

The MBTA is another area in which the implementation of a strong affirmative action program has led to increased participation of Blacks and other minorities in the workforce. In 1978, before equal employment opportunity and affirmative action policies were devised, minorities represented 11.2 percent of the workforce. Women comprised a mere 5.8 percent of all MBTA employees. The MBTA then organized a particularly aggressive

Commonwealth of Massachusetts

Table 5. Statewide Workforce Analysis by EEO-6 Job Category for Higher Educational Institutions

FY 1984

Job Category	Total	MALES				FEMALES				MINORITY			FEMALES	
		W	B	H	A	N	W	B	H	A	N	MINORITY	FEMALES	
Executive/Administrative Faculty	1058	663	62	2	4	1	283	33	5	4	1	112	11%	326
	5711	3716	105	47	131	7	1588	58	21	32	6	407	7%	1705
Professional/Non-Faculty	2742	1082	55	21	40	5	1142	67	22	31	7	248	10%	1269
Secretarial/Clerical	3204	186	19	4	11	1	2726	189	38	7	23	292	9%	2983
Technical/Professional	2012	713	33	8	7	2	1183	38	7	14	7	116	6%	1249
Skilled Craft	600	567	11	2	2	6	10	2				116	6%	1249
Service Maintenance	2668	1699	99	58	9	16	702	51	25	4	5	267	10%	787
Total	17725	8626	384	142	204	38	7634	438	119	92	49	1465	8%	8331
													47%	

Footnotes: 1. Minorities include Blacks, Hispanics, Asians and Native Americans

2. Females includes Whites and Minorities

Source: 1984 State Office of Affirmative Action's Annual Report to the Governor, p. 53.

recruitment program in addition to a strong training program which targeted the underrepresented population of Blacks, other minorities and women. It encouraged hiring recommendations from a great variety of social service agencies and universities. It also accepted walk-ins who did not have an agency referral. As of May 1985, more than 130 social service agencies and educational institutions had made hiring recommendations to the MBTA. As a result of this total effort, spearheaded by commitment from key leadership, significant improvements in the hiring of those underrepresented groups occurred in a relatively short time. As of May 1985, the 1,367 minorities employed by the MBTA comprised 20 percent of a workforce of 6,600. Women represented more than doubled to 13 percent or 850 employees. Even as recently as 1973, minorities had represented 11.2 percent while 10.3 percent of the workforce were women (Crockett, 1985:40).

LABOR FORCE CHARACTERISTICS IN SELECTED BOSTON NEIGHBORHOODS

In order to demonstrate racial disparities in employment in Boston, labor force characteristics are discussed briefly for four largely black Roxbury neighborhoods and three almost exclusively white West Roxbury neighborhoods. These data were drawn from a 1983 demographic study of Boston's neighborhood areas which utilized data from the Bureau of the Census (White, Ryan and Ganz, 1983).

In Roxbury neighborhood #1, there were 1,077 employed persons 16 years and over. Of that number, 312 or 28.9 percent held positions in managerial and professional specialty occupations. Some 305 or 28.3 percent held positions in technical, sales, and administrative support occupations. One

hundred and seventy-seven or 16.4 percent were in service occupations, and 195 or 18.1 percent held positions as operators, fabricators, and laborers.

In Roxbury neighborhood #2, there were 1,183 employed persons 16 years or older. Of that number, 182, or 15.3 percent, were in managerial and professional specialty occupation, and 371, or 31.3 percent, held positions in the technical, sales, and administrative support category. In service occupations, 329, or 27.8 percent, of the employed persons held jobs in this category. A fewer number, 248, or 20.9 percent, found employment as operators, fabricators and laborers.

The 2,221 employed persons in Roxbury neighborhood #3 more than doubled the number of employed persons in each of the first two Roxbury neighborhoods. Of the 2,221 employed persons in this area, some 274, or 12.3 percent, were in the managerial and professional security occupations; 806 or 36.2 percent held technical, sales and administrative support jobs, and 514 or 23.1 percent were service workers. However, 409 or 18.4 percent were operators, fabricators and laborers.

Finally, 6,496 persons 16 years and older were employed in Roxbury neighborhood #4. The largest number of employees, 1,982 or 30.5 percent, were in technical, sales, and administrative support occupations. The second largest concentration, 1,769 or 27.2 percent, were working in the service areas of private household occupations, protective service jobs and all other service occupations except private household and protective service organizations. The third largest concentration was found in the category of operators, fabricators and laborers. In this instance, the 1,226 employed persons represented 18.8 percent of all employed persons in this neighborhood. The last group consisted of the managerial and specialty

occupations. In this case, the 1,204 employed persons comprised 18.5 persons of the employed population in this neighborhood.

By contrast, the number of employed persons in the three West Roxbury neighborhoods were 1,613, 7,143, and 6,533, in neighborhoods 1, 2 and 3, respectively.

In West Roxbury neighborhood #1, 702 or 43.5 percent of 1,613 were employed in managerial, and professional specialty occupations. Four hundred and seventy-two or 29.2 percent of employed persons in this neighborhood held positions in the technical, sales and administrative support occupations. An even smaller number and percent, 154 and 9.5 percent, were service workers, and only 149 or 9.2 percent held positions as operators, fabricators, and/or laborers.

In West Roxbury neighborhood #2, 2,331 or 32.6 percent of the 7,143 employed persons were working in the managerial and professional specialty occupations. More of the residents in this neighborhood, 2,821, or 39.4 percent, held jobs in the technical, sales, and administrative occupations. Not unexpectedly, fewer persons, 890, or 12.4 percent, were service workers, and an even smaller proportion, 505, or 7.0 percent, were operators, fabricators, and laborers.

In the last West Roxbury neighborhood, the rank order of occupational categories in which residents were employed were: technical, sales, and administrative support (2,588 or 39.6 percent of 6,533); followed by managerial

Roxbury neighborhoods are: #1, Highland Park; #2, Lower Roxbury; #3, Sav-Mor; and #4, Washington Park. The West Roxbury neighborhoods are: #1, Bellevue Hill; #2, Brook Farm Parkway; and #3, Upper Washington Spring.

and professional specialty jobs (1,589 or 24.3 percent). This group was followed by the 1,084 or 16.6 percent employed in service occupations. The smallest representation was in the area of operators, fabricators and laborers, in which the 710 employees constituted 10.8 percent of the total number of employed persons 16 years and over in this neighborhood.

The data show that residents of West Roxbury are far more likely to be employed in the upper tier of the labor market than residents of Roxbury. By contrast, residents of largely black Roxbury are more likely to be employed in the lower tier of service workers, operators, fabricators and laborers.

UNEMPLOYMENT AND POVERTY IN BOSTON

Since the late 1970s, the City of Boston has experienced a major construction boom and the Commonwealth of Massachusetts has witnessed unparalleled economic growth in many of its industries. Brown (1982), reported that in 1980, the per capita income of Boston residents was \$9,353. This figure approximated the national per capita income of \$9,511 but was significantly less than the \$10,846 per capita income for the Boston SMSA which included more affluent suburbs. Ganz and Perkins demonstrated the extent to which economic growth accelerated in Boston between 1976 and 1985. For example, the "structural transformation" of the city's economy has meant a movement away from large scale manufacturing and wholesale trade to service activities, particularly in communications, money management, business and professional services, higher education and other areas. In 1980, Boston ranked first in the nation with 54 percent of its employment concentrated in office-related activities (Ganz and Perkins, 1985:4). Boston outranked San

Francisco, which had 51 percent of its employment concentrated in these areas, and New York, with 49 percent of employment in such areas.

Between 1976 and 1984, Boston experienced a net gain of 77,000 jobs (Ganz and Perkins, 1985). These jobs were distributed principally in the following areas: business and professional services (14,000 new jobs); higher education and medicine (17,000 jobs); finance (15,000 jobs); communications (7,000 jobs); retail trade (7,500 jobs); and hotels (2,500 jobs). As demonstrated in previous sections of this discussion, many of these areas of net gain for jobs in the city are precisely the areas in which the participation rate of Blacks and other minorities is much lower than warranted. In 1984 alone, Boston experienced a net gain of 18,000 jobs. A significant proportion of jobs created in Boston during this period was in the downtown area, in which Blacks and other city residents have less than a fair chance of equal employment opportunity, despite the promulgation of a Boston Residency Jobs program in 1983.

Nevertheless, as a consequence of the overall economic boom in the City of Boston and in the State, the 4.4 percent unemployment rate experienced by the Boston SMSA in December 1984 was the lowest in fifteen years and the 3.7 percent state rate in early 1985 was the lowest among the eleven most industrial states in the nation.

Data presented in Table 6 showed the magnitude of the economic recovery experienced by the population between the depression level conditions of 1982 for the nation as a whole and the boom that is being experienced since that time. However, the Boston SMSA does not provide a true picture of the unemployment and, ultimately, of the poverty conditions that actually exist within the City of Boston itself. SMSA rates include Greater Boston and 91

cities and towns. When blacks are included in such categorizations, the actual rate of unemployment among blacks within the city itself is grossly under-reported. Hence, it is estimated that the unemployment rate among Blacks in the city is in excess of 20 percent. In 1979, for example, the Bureau of the Census reported that of the 20,596 black families with children under the age of 18, some 6,959 or 33.8 percent were in poverty. Among the 32,786 white families with children under 18, the Bureau reported that 6,416 or 19.5 percent were then in poverty (Cohen, 1985). The BRA reported in 1984 that Boston's per capita income of \$11,072 was the fourth lowest among the twenty largest cities in this region (BRA, 1984:22).

Table 6. Boston SMSA and State Employment by Race and Years, 1982, and 1984 (for Years as a Whole)

RACE	1982 Boston SMSA	State	Unemployment Rates	
			1984 Boston SMSA	State
Total	7.7	7.9	4.1	4.8
White	7.5	7.8	3.9	4.6
Black	10.5	11.3	8.4	9.7
Hispanics	N/A	N/A	13.0	16.4

Source: Daryl Delano, Department of Labor.

Teenage Unemployment: Similarly, teenage unemployment rates that are reported in terms of the SMSA do not reflect the true level of teenage

unemployment concentrated in urban neighborhoods. Sample-based data provided by the Department of Labor indicates that the total unemployment rate among teenagers in the Boston SMSA is 7.1 percent. This rate compares to a statewide teenage unemployment rate of 9.6 percent for the year 1984. The white rate for the Boston SMSA was 6.9 but 9.0 percent for the state as a whole. Blacks and Hispanics had an identical teenage unemployment rate of 25.3 percent in the Boston SMSA but it rose to 35.0 percent for Blacks and 35.7 percent for Hispanics at the state level (Delano, 1985). Again, the Boston SMSA rates disguise the true rates of teenage unemployment within the city itself. Therefore, it is considerably higher than even the 39 percent for Blacks reported by city officials and is more likely to approximate the 60 percent figure estimated by officials at ABCD and other agencies.

Neighborhood Rates of Unemployment: Using 1980 Bureau of the Census date, the Boston Redevelopment Authority reported in 1983 on poverty rates by Boston neighborhoods. The BRA reports that 42 percent of Boston's population has incomes below the poverty line (BRA, 1984:23). Since the focus of attention in this analysis is on poverty in the black community, selected neighborhoods in which Blacks are concentrated are examined. In the Medical Area of Mission Hill, of the 1,125 households, 446 or 39.6 percent had incomes less than \$10,000. This rate compared to a rate of 574 percent for the 580 (1,011) households in the Mission Hill projects, and to the 1,556 or 47.8 percent of the 3,244 households in the remainder of the Mission Hill section of Boston (Top of the Hill, Back of the Hill, RTH, Delle Avenue Terrace) with household income below the \$10,000/annum rate.

By comparison, in the Highland Park area of Roxbury, 649 of the 1,139 households or 57.0 percent had a yearly income of under \$10,000. The

situation was considerably worse in lower Roxbury where the rate was 67.3 percent or 1,001 of the 1,486 households in that area. In the Sav-Mor section of Roxbury, 957 or 49.0 percent of the 2,038 households were in the below-poverty line condition, while in the Washington Park section of Roxbury, 3,583 or 52.0 percent of the 6,889 households had incomes of less than \$10,000. It is evident from these data that a remarkable and sustained recovery is essential to raise a significant proportion of these hardcore poverty households out of poverty. Further, such a gargantuan effort would be necessary among blacks identified in the Boston SMSA figures (White, Ryan, and Ganz, 1983:29).

Another area of Boston that has a significant concentration of the black population is Mattapan. However, this community is considerably more diverse in its racial composition than some previously identified sections. Nevertheless, of the 6,089 households in Southern Mattapan, 1,139 or 18.7 percent had incomes below \$10,000 per year. In the Wellington Hill section of Mattapan with 2,262 households, some 866 or 38.2 percent had incomes at this level (White, Ryan, and Ganz, 1983:28).

The evidence reveals how deeply embedded are the problems of unemployment, low income and poverty in many of the neighborhoods of Boston in which Blacks are concentrated. These problems have enormous and devastating consequences for individuals and families. For example, there is a plethora of evidence to show the spread of soup kitchens to feed the hungry, the homeless, and the poverty-stricken who lack the means to meet their ordinary needs for sustenance. To address these needs, at least 21 new soup kitchens have opened in Boston since 1984. Problems of unemployment, poverty and hunger are manifested in higher rates of family dismemberment, divorce,

separation, and of disunity, anger, frustration, mental illness and imprisonment, as many persons resort to illegitimate means of responding to familial needs (Blackwell; 1985).

Hence, the black community of Boston cannot be and is not as sanguine as are members of the white leadership at both city and state levels in the mid-1980's. Those who live in economically hobbled neighborhoods know very well that recovery and attendant economic advancement have passed by a tremendous segment of the adult and teenage black population in the Commonwealth of Massachusetts. About 200,000 persons living in Boston are existing below the poverty line (Atkins, 1985:77). For many in this group, their situation is so hopeless that they have resigned themselves to its inevitability and permanence.

Further evidence of the extent of the problem can be gleaned from an examination of AFDC and General Relief participation rates by race. Although it has been demonstrated that the majority of participants in these programs are white, a myth prevails that blacks dominate the welfare rolls. In part, that myth is reinforced by the "over-representation" of Blacks in these programs. Despite that over-representation, the "typical" recipient is not black.

Among the 1,476 families and approximately 30,000 individuals who are General Relief recipients in the State of Massachusetts in FY 85, 67.7 percent are white; 16.1 are black; 13.0 percent are Hispanics; and 2.2 percent are Asian while 0.2 percent are "unknown". Approximately 99 percent of these recipients have no other source of income, and are, therefore, compelled to support their families from general relief grants of \$427/month for a family of four. The majority of these families are two-parented; 20 percent are

headed by single women, and about 17 percent of the recipients are children "living with ineligible adults, primarily stepparents" (Atkins, 1985:62-67).

Aid to Families with Dependent Children: The AFDC Program, which provides cash assistance to low-income families, assists approximately 83,000 families and 160,000 children in an average month. More than 88 percent of these families receiving assistance in November 1984, 87 percent were single-parent families and 84 percent were single parent families headed by women. These single-parent AFDC families constitute about 56 percent of all single-parent families in the State whose earnings are below the poverty line. Sixty-four percent of AFDC families in Massachusetts are white; 18 percent are black; 17 percent are Hispanic, while Asians and Native Americans comprise less than one percent of all families on AFDC (Atkins, 1985:40).

The fact of such an extraordinary number of single-parent women recipients of AFDC, coupled with the fact that 93.6 percent of women recipients have no other source of income, is evident of the scope of the "feminization of poverty" in this State.

While this process of "feminization of poverty" is a recent phenomenon in the white community, it, like poverty in general, is not new in the black community. Importantly, poverty has worsened for all racial groups since 1985; however, it is ubiquitous in the black community and, especially, among an expanding number of single-parent black women who are without many of the resources available to single-parent white women.

Such public welfare programs as AFDC and General Relief, as well as assistance provided by voluntary organizations barely enable many poverty-stricken families to sustain themselves. The assistance provided is often inadequate to meet basic needs. Consequently, many never develop the

kinds of coping strategies required for adjustment to their situation, and many become what social workers often refer to as "multi-problem families". Others do in fact make suitable adjustments and manage to terminate their dependence on public assistance after a relatively short time.

IMPLICATIONS FOR MIDDLE-CLASS FORMATION

The economic gains achieved by many black families as a result of affirmative action, expansion of the economic opportunity structure, and educational advancements attained since 1964 enabled a substantial number of Blacks to move into the middle class. This upper mobility, for many black families, was also achieved by the participation of both spouses of a married couple in the labor force. For many families in this group, the loss of a salary by one member of a working couple means downward mobility and loss of middle-class life.

Social class membership is dependent, however, on many factors. The amount of income received is only one such factor. Other important measures of social class identity include occupational status, educational attainment, and family origins. Hence, advances in one or more may result in a significant amount of status inconsistency. Class is also measured in terms of the amount of money accumulated (wealth), the amount of status attained, and the ability to wield power within the community. All three of these conditions are unevenly distributed within any community. Within the black community, the persistence of economic, social and educational discrimination prevent many blacks from ever attaining the higher social rewards associated with middle- and upper-class positions.

In Boston, since Blacks for such a long time have been relegated in the main to low status position, low-income jobs, and have been relatively devoid of community power, the solid middle-class found among Blacks in other major cities has been particularly slow in developing. The migration of a number of Blacks from other cities to Boston into higher status occupations, coupled with the attainments of that small number of middle-class Blacks who already resided in Boston, led to the presence of a more viable and more visible black middle-class in the late 1970's and into the 1980's. Despite the strong probabilities of downward mobility consequent to a high rate of unemployment among blacks in Boston, and the attendant status inconsistency, the black middle-class in Boston is likely to expand. In fact, it appears that the Boston black community is already bifurcated between those who are relatively affluent and that substantial number of Blacks found among the 200,000 families in Boston who are at or near the poverty line. The future of both is intricately interwoven with the ability of the black community to achieve its share of the economic power, monetary gains, and material resources generated by the projected economic growth of the City of Boston between 1985 and 1995.

PROJECTIONS FOR THE FUTURE OF BOSTON

All available evidence points to continued strong economic revitalization of Boston. The essential questions posed by the black community are: how well its members will fare in this development, given Boston's past and current treatment of black Bostonians. Can Blacks be as optimistic about their future as the current Mayor Flynn and current Governor Dukakis appear to be about the future of the City and the State? What are the projections and prospects for job generation in the city?

Ganz and Perkins (1985) report that Boston has gained 77,000 jobs since 1976. They also indicate that as a result of the development boom in Boston since 1979, the city has profited from private development project completions over the 1976-1984 period in the amount of \$4.4 billion. As for employment growth, Boston showed a net gain of 18,000 jobs in 1984 alone. That gain was double the average yearly gain of jobs for the 1976-84 period. They further projected that, at the current growth rate of the economy, Boston will gain 10,000 new jobs in 1985 and again in 1986. It is anticipated that 100,000 new jobs will be gained in Boston between 1985 and 1995. A considerable proportion of those jobs will be generated by "a projected \$6.2 billion in new construction". (Ganz and Perkins, 1985:2). Two-point seven billion dollars (\$2.7 billion) of that sum will be realized from development projects now underway and which are scheduled for completion between 1985 and 1988.

The major areas of expansion are projected to be in communications, money management, finance, and business/professional services. They also anticipate that the high technology industry will continue to thrive (despite the rollback in jobs in at least five technology firms since January, 1985, including the huge Wang Laboratories which announced a cutback of 1,000 jobs in Massachusetts on June 5, 1985). Their projections include a gain of 56,000 office jobs; 10,500 manufacturing jobs; 5,400 hotel jobs, and 9,000 retail trade jobs (Ganz and Perkins, 1985).

Downtown Development: The Flynn Administration has approved ten privately financed downtown projects. It is estimated that these projects will generate \$6.2 billion in private investment and that the city will realize about \$40.76 million in special revenues; "\$30.98 million in new city tax revenues, and nearly \$25 million in low and moderate housing linkage

Table 7. Downtown Projects Proposed For Completion Between 1985 and 1989 by Projected Jobs.

Location of Projects	Projected Jobs Generated	
	Construction	Permanent
99 State Street	859	2,160
Rowes/Fosters Wharf	1,118	1,590
International Place	3,500	7,200
150 Federal Street	1,500	2,170
101 Federal Street	975	2,265
One Franklin Place	800	1,800
99 Summer Street	416	1,200
Arlington/Hadassah	975	620
500 Boylston Street	3,000	5,705
Post Office Square Park & Garage	700	25
 TOTAL = 10 Projects	13,843	24,735

Source: Boston Redevelopment Authority, Downtown Projects: Opportunities for Boston, October 30, 1984.

"payments" (BRA, October 1984:3). Of special importance is the expectation that these ten projects will produce 13,843 construction jobs and 24,735 permanent jobs. However, in order for Boston residents to obtain a fair share of these jobs, the city will have to become considerably more aggressive in enforcing its Boston Jobs Residency Policy and be effective in negotiating with and using all its leverage with the private investors.

In addition, the city must engage in rigorous enforcement of its affirmative action policies and not be intimidated by the recalcitrance and opposition to its policies posed by the craft unions. These unions have had a history of circumventing and failing to comply with the Boston Jobs Residence policy. They have been adamant in their opposition to the inclusion of blacks into their memberships. Whenever they have included Blacks, they often have engaged in the deceptive practices of "checkerboarding" (i.e. shifting Blacks from one job to another in other to create the impression of greater black membership in unions) when their affirmative action practices were questioned. They have been extremely reluctant to accept Blacks into apprenticeship programs, and the few Blacks who did become card members were called last, if ever, for jobs (McMillan, 1983).

This active and sustained opposition by the construction unions is one of the primary reasons why black construction firms are excluded from downtown development projects. If their past practices are an indicator of future behavior, then the City must find an effective strategy for handling union opposition to Blacks.

The Copley Place Project: Perhaps lessons can be learned from events surrounding the development of the Copley Place Project. This project was a \$540 million development enterprise that was constructed on land and air space at the junction of five Boston neighborhoods. The land and air rights were leased by the Massachusetts Turnpike Authority to the Urban Investment and Development Company of Chicago (UDIC). As a result of the Employment Initiative Agreements (EIA) developed by the city's Neighborhood Development and Employment Agency (NDEA), and recommendations made by a special Task Force, UDIC agreed to develop Copley Place under the Boston jobs

requirements. Under the EIA, projects were to hire 50 percent Boston residents; 30 percent minorities; 50 percent females, and 17.2 percent residents of impact areas. The company agreed to make a "good faith effort" to recruit and hire physically handicapped persons (Lung, 1985:24).

The results have been mixed, even though, when appraised collectively, Copley Place employers have met or surpassed almost all their original hiring goals. Specifically, Lung's (1985) study of the Copley Place Project showed that by the end of 1984, of the 3,143 permanent employees hired by the Copley Place companies, 62 percent were Boston residents; 35 percent minorities; 50 percent women; 26 percent from the impact residential areas; 83 percent were persons of low-moderate income and 6 percent (instead of the planned 25 percent) were CETA-eligible persons. She also reported that the largest firms are the Marriott and Westin Hotels and Neiman-Marcus Department Store, followed by the UDIC Management Company. The two hotels and UDIC have exceeded the 30 percent minority hiring goal and the 50 percent female goal. By contrast, Neiman-Marcus has only hired 23.4 percent minority but 63 percent of its employees are female. Of the 953 employees of 72 retail stores in Copley Place, only 17.5 percent are minorities but 59.1 percent are female and 61.3 percent are Boston residents. In effect, the overwhelming majority of the business firms in Copley Place have token numbers of black employees (Lung: 1985:28-30).

Whatever success minority contractors have had in any phase of Copley Place, in construction or otherwise, can be attributed to set-asides, the role of the City in using some of its leverage to enforce compliance, and the persuasive power of the Massachusetts Turnpike Authority in dealing with UDIC on minority contractor-related issues. Williams (1985) reported that 53

percent of the 124 contracts let at Copley Place went to minority contractors but all were sub-contracts. Although minority contractors received approximately \$23 million in jobs on this \$540 million construction project, no minority contractor had a principal contract at Copley Place. It is evident that a significant portion of the limited minority success on this development project is the result of the City's ability to intervene due to the leverage created through its residency policy and its monitoring of compliance activity.

The primary lessons from the construction of Copley Place include: the necessity of negotiating "up-front" (Williams, 1985; Bolling, 1985); concrete agreements for construction and permanent hiring of all members of the targeted population; community involvement in all stages of the planning; use of Community and City-Appointed Task Forces and Liaison Committees for the monitoring of compliance; greater leverage granted through NDEA to enforce compliance with guidelines of all individual units during all phases of construction and post-construction development; and application of the fundamental principles of employment opportunity incorporated in the Copley Place development program as a basis for negotiations with private developers who do not use either federal or city funds in their projects.

These lessons may prove valuable as the projected Dudley Station Development Project continues. Clearly, the Organizing Committee for a Greater Roxbury Neighborhood Authority, led by former mayoralty candidate Mel King, is attempting to persuade the Boston Redevelopment Authority and the City of Boston of this need. It is anticipated that a significant number of construction and permanent jobs will be created when the Dudley Plan is implemented. However, Perkins (1985) notes that the overwhelming majority of

the permanent jobs will be in production: for computer operators, accounting, mid-level managerial positions, and for clerical and service workers. Many of these jobs will require specialized skills which some claim are in shortage in the black community, especially among the young. For that reason, it is imperative to design training programs for minorities as a principal element of this Plan.

JOB CREATION: THE ROLE OF MUNICIPAL GOVERNMENT

Bolling (1985) has raised two important questions: What is the year 2000 in Boston likely to promise in Boston for a child born in 1983? What will be that child's chances for equal educational and equal job or economic opportunity? When one considers the role of the City in creating jobs, one must keep these questions in mind if one is serious about assuring a bright future for all of Boston's citizens. By the same token, Perkins (1985) noted major barriers to the attainment of equal opportunity which the City must recognize when developing its plans for job creation. The first barrier lies in some critical aspects of the demographic characteristics of black and other minority populations. Minorities are generally younger and less skilled than members of non-minority groups with whom they will be competing for jobs in the future. This situation means that the city school system must do a much better job of training public school pupils not only for college but for the world of work as well. A second barrier lies in the continuing need for training in job skills and human relations so that persons hired will have internalized the kind of work ethos necessary to survive in the world of work. A third barrier is the persistence of discrimination in the marketplace. This fact alone means that the City of Boston must become

considerably more aggressive in enforcing anti-discriminatory policies and in enforcing compliance to its jobs residency ordinance. To have any real effect on job discrimination, Cortiella (1985) adds that the City must vigorously enforce its affirmative action policies, and that more specific guidelines for the implementing of an effective affirmative action program in city hiring should be developed.*

One major instrument for accelerating the hiring of blacks and other minorities is the Boston Jobs Residency Ordinance. Without question, that legislation helped move increasing numbers of blacks and other minorities into both temporary and permanent jobs. However, every person interviewed in connection with this study reported some dissatisfaction with the pace of progress in minority hiring and the use of black and other minority vendors and/or contractors. Several respondents claim the city is not implementing the policy vigorously enough and that with the unprecedented development which is now occurring or will get underway in the near future, the City should be accelerating the pace for recruiting and hiring of blacks in all phases of this development.

Bolling (1985), Williams (1985) and Younger (1985) agree that the City has to confront head-on two critical issues. The first is the need to devise a plan whereby the private sector,** not utilizing city or federal monies, can

*In fact, new guidelines were issued in July, 1985. On the surface, they appear to strengthen enforcement; however, their effectiveness will be evident in outcomes of test cases alleging discrimination.

**These suggestions were offered prior to Mayor Flynn's Executive Order issued in July 1985 which extended the Boston Jobs Policy to encompass private sector construction jobs. This action is concrete evidence of the magnitude of leverage at the City's disposal that will expand job opportunities.

be brought into the Boston Jobs Residency Program. This step may be accomplished by negotiating "up-front agreements" with private developers along the same lines as found in NDEA-EIA projects. The city may use a great deal of leverage previously not used.

The second issue arises from the stranglehold of unions over major construction and other services in the city. It is essential for the City to find a method of persuading the unions to actively participate in the Boston Jobs Residency Program. For example, current practices allows union members to circumvent Ordinance requirements by claiming fictitious city addresses, using P.O. Box numbers, or simply falsifying addresses. Among the strategies for enforcing compliance is to devise more effective methods of verifying city residence. The issue of the unions' role is only partly addressed by improving enforcement of existing regulations, however. Other problems arise from union members' opposition to the program's goals. Many union members perceive the jobs requirement in purely racial terms. Those who fear Blacks as economic competitors and who have internalized stereotypes about Blacks bring these attitudes and negative belief systems into the workplace and draw upon them to exclude Blacks from job opportunities. In other words, exogenous patterns have consequences for endogenous behavior in the workplace.

Cortiella (1985), head of the newly created Municipal Office of Affirmative Action, asserts that the City can find more creative ways to guarantee Blacks access to city jobs. For him, overall access is affected by access to the civil service: more precise information about dates of civil service examinations, and knowing the rules of civil service and how to prepare for such examinations. This is information that all citizens ought to have but it's especially important to provide it to those who have no previous

knowledge about its value. Finally, the city can strengthen its training programs so that Blacks and other minorities will always be ready to fulfill new job requirements as new jobs become available.

JOB CREATION: THE ROLE OF THE STATE GOVERNMENT

Similarly, the State has to become much more aggressive in enforcing its affirmative action programs, strengthening its minority business development programs, enforcing its set-aside program, and broadening its training programs. The Governor's Executive Order No. 237 must be carefully monitored and rigorously enforced. Effective in March, 1984, this Order mandates that 10 percent of the state's construction projects; five percent of its procurement, and five percent of its service contracts will be awarded to minorities. As of this point, no systematized data have been collected that will actually measure the degree of its effectiveness. However, data should be routinely collected, systematized, and analyzed to determine how effectively the state has met these goals.

The State currently is embarked upon an Executive Search Project by which it hopes to identify, recruit and hire minorities and women into positions with salaries in excess of \$35,000 per year. The success of this program will depend heavily upon the process of recruitment and hiring. It will also depend upon how widely and in what channels these positions are advertised, upon the kind of setting in which interviews of applicants take place and upon what the interviewer communicates to the applicant about the position and conditions in the workplace.

The Governor has also appointed a special commission on Minority Business Enterprises. One of the first and most important tasks of this Commission

should be to expand the absolute number of minority businesses. This body should also help existing businesses ascertain adequate capital to keep them afloat and flourishing so that they can expand job opportunities in the minority communities, and thus contribute to the overall economic development of these communities.

The State has already demonstrated through its highly effective "ET Choices" program (employment and training) that AFDC recipients want the opportunity to work, and will work if they have sufficient training and employment opportunities. As Atkins wrote:

The success of the ET program is based upon the philosophy (that) welfare recipients want the same job opportunities that exists for other people, and will make use of those opportunities if necessary support services are available. Therefore, ET CHOICES is designed to assist participants in overcoming identifiable barriers to employment by providing skills training, education, supported work and direct job placement (Atkins, 1985:97).

As of January, 1985, this program had placed 11,964 individuals in employment which, in turn, has led to a decline of the numbers of persons on the AFDC rolls, and given its participants a form of economic independence. Individuals have been placed in jobs with a usual starting wage of \$5.00 per hour; 75 percent of those with full-time employment have jobs which pay them more than double the amount of their welfare grants. This program has also realized placement cooperation with the Division of Employment Security, the Job Training Partnership System and the Bay State Skills Corporation (Atkins,

1985). Given the success of this program, it should be expanded to allow more AFDC recipients the opportunity to participate in and benefit from it.

There should be much greater coordination between the City and the State in the training and employment of blacks and other minority groups. At this point, too many loosely organized and under-financed state and municipal programs preclude adequate outreach to target populations. Therefore, more municipal-state joint ventures in training, development and employment should be planned and implemented.

State-supported institutions must be mandated to aggressively recruit, hire, and tenure much larger numbers of minorities for positions as members of the faculty and administration. Since the nation is producing only 1,000 black doctorates yearly (Blackwell, 1985a, b), both public and private institutions must recruit, enroll, and train substantially larger numbers of black students.

JOB CREATION: BLACK ENTREPRENEURS

Black businesses in Boston are not unlike those owned by blacks in other parts of the nation. They tend to be small, under-capitalized, hire relatively few persons, and often have an extremely difficult time surviving for more than three years (Blackwell, 1985). Only three Boston businesses are represented in the Black Enterprise Magazine 1985 list of the top 100 black businesses in the United States (Black Enterprise, June, 1985). The black companies from Boston are Input Output Computer Services (actually located in Waltham, Massachusetts) which had 1984 sales of \$23 million and a staff of 400; Grimes Oil, with 1984 sales of \$22.1 million and a small staff of 25; and Hill Corporation, which specializes in real estate development/construction, and has a staff of 160 and 1984 sales of \$18.8 million. In addition,

successful black entrepreneurs in Boston include: The Monassa Key-Punching Plant in Roxbury, a few hair salons, construction firms and a variety of other small businesses which employ relatively few persons.

As Bisphum (1985) reiterates, capital is the sine qua non for the establishment and survival of black businesses. The Small Business Association, for which he serves as Associate Director for the New England Region, has in 1985 about 100 firms in the Section 8A set aside program. Black firms account for about 31 of them, most of which are located in Boston. Overall, 40 percent of SBA grants/loans go to black businesses. Many of these firms are in construction, such as the John Cruz Construction Company, but some are in such fields as glass installation, meat distribution, security, or such professional services as engineering and architecture.

Most of SBA-assisted companies have not generated a significantly large number of jobs for Blacks. Construction companies provide a fair number of temporary jobs but few permanent jobs. Sometimes construction workers are forced to wait long intervals between jobs and if they are non-union they may become financially impaired. Many of the smaller businesses and individual entrepreneurs survive because more and more black home-owners and black owners of real estate properties are utilizing the services of black craftspersons and artisans for the maintenance of their properties. Hence, black electricians, painters, roofers, masonry workers and janitorial service workers are finding employment within the black community.

Williams (1985) reports that members of Contractors' Association of Boston benefit from various federal, state and municipal set-aside programs. Its members are currently doing about \$90 million in construction business. They have done more than \$50 million in business activity on the Southwest

Corridor Project over a three-year period of time. Its members received about \$23 million in sub-contracts during the construction of Copley Place. Further, CAB has recently completed negotiations with Governor Dukakis that will increase CAB involvement to \$7 million in contracts on the Roxbury Community College Project, and it is involved in the Columbia Point Development Project. Blacks comprise approximately 90 percent of the 232 member companies of the CAB, most of which either are located in Boston or work there.

While most of the jobs generated by the CAB are temporary, many other, more permanent, jobs have followed from CAB's participation in the construction boom occurring throughout Boston. However, not one CAB contractor has any role in construction. One of the problems is the lack of bonding capacity, at a cost of \$25 million, among CAB members. Only one Boston member, the John Cruz Construction Company, can meet the minimum bonding requirement, and his firm has not been successful in bidding on any aspect of the downtown projects. Another problem faced by CAB members, and by black entrepreneurs in general, is the lack of access to information about development projects so that they can bid for participation at their bonding level. Those in control of this information are white and they refuse to share such information with blacks and other minorities until it is too late to participate at the level of bonding capability and staff size.

Unless a larger number of black businesses can be developed and sustained within Boston, and unless they are supported first by members of the black community, and second by members of other racial and ethnic groups, black employers will not be able to provide the number and kinds of jobs needed within the black community. A few jobs will be created, of course, but more

competitive jobs will be slow in developing unless these businesses realize significantly larger success in capital formation.

YOUTH IN THE WORLD OF WORK

Increasingly, job opportunities in Boston require specialized skills and training; office work, accounting, finance, management, and special services positions will open as a result of current development. Since some of these projects will not be completed for three to 10 years, there is sufficient lead time to train black youth to meet requirements. Several organizations in Boston have been involved in such training programs for a substantial period of time. In addition, the city, state, and federal government have funded several job programs for young people in Boston. What follows is a brief overview of some of these programs and, where possible, an indication of their success.

In general, these programs have a great deal in common. They teach basic educational skills, and make young people "job ready" by emphasizing the kinds of attitudes and behavior expected of employees in the business world. Students learn the importance of punctuality, wearing the appropriate attire, and other aspects of presentation of self. As Christmas (1985) stated, many students who enter these programs need to learn how to fill out job applications, how to conduct themselves during an interview, and how to deal with the anxieties involved in looking for a job.

Since 1977, the Urban League of Boston has maintained an Employment Resource Center (ERC) that provides job counseling for young people and for some professionals. Their services include both one-on-one counseling and 6-month workshops in specific job skills (e.g. Resume Writing, Career

Planning, and Interview Behavior). This training is followed by referrals and job placement. In addition to the services provided at the Urban League Office, its counselors have "taken the ERC on the road" to such hard-to-reach people as residents of the Boston Housing Authority properties. The ERC places about 100 persons per year in jobs in banks, hospitals, hotels and a few upper-level positions at federal and state levels. Most job placements are in entry-level jobs.

The JOBS FOR YOUTH program, founded in 1976, attempts to find meaningful employment for the "hardest to place" youth? primarily, school drop-outs aged 16 to 21. This program offers no monetary incentive for participation; rather, it stresses the rewards of eventual employment for applicants with the skills employers are seeking. The average participant enters the program with a 6th grade reading level and a 4th to 6th grade level in mathematical skills. Hence, a great part of this training program is geared toward helping participants earn a GED certificate, develop an understanding of work requirements, and develop self-confidence. About 85 percent of the participants are black and about one-half of them come from the Dorchester community, followed in order by Roxbury and other parts of the city. Pickett (1985) stated that this program has from 150 to 200 jobs available per month. The program serves about 700 persons per year, and, of these, approximately 300 are placed in jobs.

Jobs for Youth participants are usually placed in entry-level jobs in small-to-medium sized companies. However, some graduates have been placed at the Westin Hotel, Medi-Mart, Almy's, the Federal Reserve Bank, Brigham's, Dacca Food Services and other large companies. Typically, they are hired as cashiers, maintenance/message workers, drivers, secretarial assistants,

typists, and food service workers, or for more skilled work such as weatherizing houses. Like the ERC, this program requires its participants to continue counseling after they are employed, to improve their chances for promotion.

In addition, the Jobs For Youth Program, initiated during the Summer of 1985, a YOUTH BUSINESS INSTITUTE which is designed to help young people, aged 16 to 24, to develop their own businesses. The program provides seed money for start-up, planning and development. No data are available on the number of participants in the program.

ACTION FOR BOSTON COMMUNITY DEVELOPMENT (ABCD) targets youngsters between the ages of 14 and 21 who wish to find Summer employment. Its Summer Works Program is divided into three tiers: (1) work experience which involves career development workshops; (2) an educational component which includes 90 hours of remediation in reading, composition and mathematics plus an 18-hour course that helps develop responsible attitudes about sexuality as a means of reducing teenage pregnancy; and (3) the Enrichment Program involving special projects for the handicapped, second-language students, and those interested in health careers.

Participants in ABCD usually work 7 to 8 weeks per Summer and are paid \$87/wk. They are placed in a variety of work settings, primarily in workplaces where they can acquire experience and training in specific job skills. For instance, those placed as workers in day care centers obtain skills in child care and development. Others are placed in hospitals, libraries, local medical centers, the Internal Revenue Service, with State and Federal agencies and the like. During the Summer of 1984, when federal funding was more available, ABCD placed as many as 3,300 young people

(Smith, 1985). However, with Reagan Administration cutbacks, the program could accommodate only 1,915 persons during the Summer of 1985.

Among the many additional worthy programs which continue to help young people find jobs during the Summer and/or after school are the Boston Summer Jobs Program, the Boston Compact and Private Industry Council, and the Opportunities Industrialization Center (OIC), which focusses attention on young adults. The OIC has a computer literacy program as well as a great variety of occupational skills programs. It has enjoyed a long history of successful placements. This program, like the Joint Partnership Training Programs, receives a substantial amount of federal funds. Harring and O'Hanian (1985) state that, despite federal cutbacks, the federally-funded Job Corps Program still places more than 1,000 trainees in its four New England Centers per year.

There is a critical need for additional summer and winter school training programs that will help prepare young people in Boston for successful employment. This is another area which would benefit from special coordination and cooperation between the federal, state, municipal, and community-agency levels and the school system. As the situation now stands, community agencies often lack the financial support to sustain even their most successful programs or are unable to plan projects adequately because of the uncertainty of finances.

Managers of training programs must recognize that many of their clientele will come from multi-problem families--families in poverty, without adequate housing--and that many of their program participants do not have a permanent address because they are compelled by the circumstances of poverty to move from place to place. Many will come from homes without adequate heat; and may

appear to have personal hygiene problems because they cannot take baths at home. Counselors must know how to deal with such sensitive problems without losing a participant who is at risk. Some will have baby-sitting problems and will be in need of day care facilities in order to be a successful program participant. Many will have transportation problems and will need to learn how to work out these problems so that they can reach their jobs on time. Some will have suspicions about people who want to help them because they have never enjoyed the luxury of caring, friendly people. Occupational and vocational counselors will have to have the kinds of skills required to help these youngsters overcome problems emanating from the instability of their home, family or housing situations. Employers must be encouraged to develop the patience and empathy to help provide a chance for these many extremely talented people to demonstrate what they can do for themselves. Further, voluntary agencies in the black community, such as churches, fraternal groups and social service agencies, can be of immense assistance in such endeavors.

LEVERAGE FOR ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT IN THE BLACK COMMUNITY

The central theme of this chapter is how to achieve economic empowerment for the black community of Boston. The discussion has been concerned with the roles that can be played by the public and private sectors and by the community itself. Attention will now be focused on the kinds of leverage the city and the state can bring to bear to achieve the goal of equal employment opportunity. As Bolling (1985) correctly stated, public policy in this area should be based upon commitment to the principle that all Boston residents, regardless of race or ethnicity, will have an opportunity to be gainfully

employed. If the City and the State are committed to the proposition of equal employment opportunity, they have enormous leverage and enforcement powers.

Possible actions that may be taken by the City and the State include the following:

1. Support, without equivocation, NDEA and State Compliance efforts.
2. Grant strong sign-off powers to the affirmative action officers so that the officer can be confident that all necessary steps have been taken to recruit underrepresented groups for available jobs.
3. The Mayor and the Governor must become more assertive in translating positive rhetoric into action. In as much as Mayor Flynn issued an Executive Order on July 12, 1985, which extends the Boston Jobs Policy to the private sector, it is now up to him to establish a sound monitoring mechanism that will assure access of Black Bostonians to their share of newly created jobs.
4. The City can:
 - a) impose standards of hiring and affirmative action on all sub-contractors;
 - b) withhold payments to contractors not in compliance to the Boston Jobs Residency Ordinance;

- c) use its powers to grant zoning variances and building permits as instruments of persuasion when dealing with private developers and contractors to incorporate residency and minority hiring goals in their plans and then monitor and enforce compliance.
- d) close down projects when firms are not in compliance with affirmative action and jobs residency requirements;
- e) utilize its authority to grant service, purchasing/procurements and contracts only to vendors which have a demonstrated residency and minority hiring program;
- f) grant licenses only to firms that have a demonstrated commitment to equal employment opportunity, and
- g) insist upon residency verification among all firms doing business with the City, and take one or more of the steps mentioned in items "a" through "f" to advance equal employment practices.

The black community also shares a major responsibility in this process. An expansion and support of black businesses will enable the black enterprise system to provide more jobs for black Bostonians. In this endeavor, black people must draw upon the experiences of predecessor groups also victimized by prejudice, discrimination and exclusion before achieving a greater degree of

assimilation into certain sectors of the mainstream than is now the case for the majority of black Americans. For instance, viable interlocking patterns of mutual cooperation could be forged between all actors -- black banking institutions lending capital to black manufacturers and producers who then use black distributors and wholesalers who, in turn, use black retailers, all of whom are insured by black companies and patronized by black people as well as by members of the society as a whole. In this manner, not only are goods and services but capital returned and circulated within the black community so that its basic infrastructure can be strengthened. As these businesses mature and grow, their markets and clientele will expand; so will their opportunities for hiring and training a larger array of Blacks.

It is equally important for the Black community to attack a class-linked pattern of behavior which seems normative in some segments of the community. These are behavioral patterns and attitude formations which diminish chances of success among many Blacks seeking gainful employment. In many ways, a significant portion of the training programs mounted by such service agencies in the black community as ABCD, the National Urban League, and the Jobs For Youth Program already addresses such norms. Much more must be done! The norms internalized by many Blacks are in diametric opposition to acceptable standards of social interaction and responsible job performance. That is why it is so imperative to expand training programs which encompass the fundamental skills of coherently speaking and writing Standard English; teaching and inculcating the necessity in the workplace of courtesy, as opposed to obsequiousness -- courtesy both to each other, and courtesy to other persons encountered on the job; punctuality; responsibility; dependability; accountability; and respect for authority. Among many young

Blacks who have been devastated by racism, discrimination and rejection, such programs must strengthen their components devoted to building self-confidence, self-determination, and which help young people and other, older clientele to believe in themselves and in their own ability to successfully compete with people of all races.

While there is strong historical evidence that the black community in the United States has always placed a high premium on educational attainment (Blackwell, 1985a), current efforts to mainstream increasingly larger numbers of Blacks in the world of work are hampered, in part, by the inordinately high rate of functional illiteracy in the community. Without question, this problem is pervasive in American society; however, it is at absolutely unacceptable levels in the black community (Blackwell, 1985a). It is a problem which no longer can be dismissed as the responsibility of school systems. Parents also have a responsibility to cooperate with teachers, principals and supervisors in order to assure that the kind of competencies so vital for normal daily functioning and preparation for the world of work in a highly technological society are learned, practiced and used.

Hence, there is a compelling urgency for a return to those fundamental, traditional values which have nurtured and sustained the black community under substantially more difficult circumstances. These are values of cooperation and reciprocity; belief in the collective will; respect for self and authority of parents and elders; a commitment to achieve even when confronted with what appears to be insurmountable adversities; educational attainment; self-determination; self-discipline; pride in oneself, family and community. Re-socialization into these traditional values requires concerted action by the most basic social institutions within the black community -- the family,

the church and religious organizations, schools, social service agencies, and businesses. It also demands unrelenting and competent leadership at the grassroots level as well as competence and commitment among those identified as experts and professionals. The result will be knowledge, expertise, and economic empowerment within the totality of the black community.

Finally, those residents of the city and state who are optimistic about the future, and who are convinced that progress toward racial justice is being made, must use all their social and interpersonal resources to help realize the ultimate goal of a just society. It is equally important for the more pessimistic residents of the city and state to become even more politically active, and to employ their substantial energies negotiating change and building alliances in order to achieve economic empowerment and social justice for all persons excluded from the opportunity structure.

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BLACK FAMILIES IN BOSTON:
CURRENT SOCIODEMOGRAPHIC TRENDS AND
IMPLICATIONS FOR PROGRAMS AND POLICIES

by

MICHELENE RIDLEY MALSON

J. and M. Mills have two teenaged children and live in Mattapan. Mrs. Mills is a supervisor at the telephone company and Mr. Mills owns a cleaning service. Together they have an income of over \$35,000 per year and are one of Boston's dual-earner black middle class families.

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Ms. Evans is a mother of two young children who is separated from her husband. She lives in Roxbury in a three family house where the other apartments are occupied by relatives. As a full-time secretary she earns about \$10,000 per year and is one of Boston's black families maintained by an employed female.

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Ms. Jones attends English High School where she returned this spring after giving birth to a daughter. She lives at home with her parents but receives AFDC payments for her baby and herself. Ms. Jones is one of Boston's black teenaged parents.

INTRODUCTION

Within the last decade there have been many changes in the sociodemographic characteristics of black families. Black dual earner families and single parent families, for example, the first two families described above, are common functional/structural variances of the white two-parent "normative" family form. While the single parent structure has always occurred in a larger proportion of black families than of white families, there is growing concern over the fact that families with this structure now constitute 47% of all black families (U.S. Bureau of the Census, 1982). The third family described, black families in which the mother is school-aged, is an emerging form that has been getting more attention with the increase in births to unmarried black teenagers and the recognition of teen pregnancy and parenting as social problems among all teenagers.

The purpose of this paper is to describe and document some of the current sociodemographic trends among black families in Boston. The first part of the paper describes black Boston families, emphasizing differences in family structure and composition. It also examines whether the sociodemographic and structural changes these families are undergoing are similar to current national trends. The second part of the paper discusses the implications of these changes for black families and suggests some actions and policies to improve the well being of Boston's black families and youth. One overall goal of the paper is to acquaint policymakers with the diversity among black families and thus to rectify stereotypes and misconceptions about Boston black families in particular and black families in general.

Two main sources of data were used to research this paper. The first source was the demographic background tables from the U.S. Bureau of the

Census for Boston, compiled by the Boston Redevelopment Authority. The second source was the tables from the Boston Redevelopment Authority Household Survey conducted in 1980 by the Center for Survey Research of the University of Massachusetts and the Joint Center of Harvard/MIT. In each case, tables were reconstructed to illuminate the characteristics of Boston Blacks.

Information about Boston black families is organized by three units of analysis: the City of Boston as a whole, Boston neighborhoods, and Boston neighborhood statistical program areas. With these units as a basis, the analysis proceeds from the general to the specific. Roxbury, Mattapan, Washington Park and Southern Mattapan were selected as neighborhoods and neighborhood statistical program areas because of the high concentration of Blacks/black families in each. The description of black families based on decreasing analytical units permits detailed information about smaller numbers of families and substantiates the diversity among black families in Boston, documenting different characteristics even within neighborhoods.

RESEARCH ON BLACK FAMILIES

Black Family Studies is fast becoming a viable area within Family Studies and Sociology. Allen, 1978, summarized three conceptual frameworks used to study black families. The "cultural equivalent" model assumes that black families have cultures equivalent to those of white families and that the two are easily comparable. The "cultural deviant" model sees black families as aberrations of white middle-class families. This model suggests that the cultural differences found in black families are deviations from the accepted normative characteristics and patterns found in white family prototypes. The "cultural variant" perspective, the model on which most contemporary work on

black families is based, sees the differences in black family forms and structure as strengths instead of weaknesses. Where differences are either denied or viewed as abnormal in the first two models, the cultural variant model views them as sensible adaptations to external stresses and forces. For instance, this model interprets variations in role behavior and functioning as attempts to function under extreme economic and social conditions (Billingsley, 1968).

Once plagued by studies focused on problems, dysfunction and deviancy, black families have more recently been the focus of research in a non-comparative mode. Researchers have broadened the empirical basis by which to understand black family characteristics. Some of the most significant work to date focuses on the strengths of black families (Hill, 1972; Billingsley, 1968); on the purpose and functions of black families' social support systems (McAdoo, 1978, Stack 1974; Hill, 1977; Hays and Mendel, 1974; Malson, 1983); and on women's roles within the family (Stack, 1973; Malson, 1983; McAdoo, 1980; Dill, 1980).

In spite of an increase in research and knowledge, stereotypes and misconceptions about black families persist. The existing variation in black family structure and composition is not well known, although in 1968 Billingsley proposed a typology to adequately characterize black family variation in Black Families in White America. Black dual-earner, two-parent families receive little attention although they are the prototype of the dual-earner white family. Our impressions about black single-parent families are based on theoretical concepts and notions formulated over 20 years ago.

In general, there is a lack of research and adequate investigation documenting the heterogeneity among black families. This is particularly

apparent in current discussions of changes in family structure and composition. A recent bibliography of contemporary literature concluded that much of the research on single parent families only inadvertently described or included work on black women heading households (The Support Strategies of Black Women Single Parents Project, 1983). Most research and attention has focused on teenage mothers (Chilman, 1980) and families headed by women receiving public assistance. Consequently, generalizations from these studies are often inappropriately applied to all families headed by women, although the findings are more applicable to specialized subsamples.

Misconceptions and stereotypes arise from an inadequate knowledge base. Without an understanding of the characteristics of black families based on updated information, predictions of long-term consequences of changes in composition and structure and the implications for public policy will be flawed and inaccurate.

Misconceptions and stereotypes that arise from an inadequate knowledge base can be somewhat rectified by papers like this one that describe the current status and sociodemographic characteristics of black families. Although inferential knowledge is limited from descriptive statistics, descriptive knowledge provides baseline data and information about differences and similarities of black families and can therefore provide a basis for further conceptualization and action.

GENERAL CHARACTERISTICS OF BLACK FAMILIES IN BOSTON

According to 1980 Census data, the 126,438 Blacks who reside in Boston make up about one-fourth of the population. Between 1970 and 1980 the white population decreased from 82% to 70% and the black population increased from

16.3% to 22.4%. Black gains in population (+21%) almost equaled white losses (-25%) (Boston Redevelopment Authority, 1981).

Over the last ten years the largest changes in black population occurred in Mattapan/Neponset (+14,610); Hyde Park (+4,025); Allston//Brighton (+1,524); and Jamaica Plain (+1,368). Fewer Blacks live in Roxbury (-2,411) than a decade ago (BRA, 1981).

In addition, the length of time black residents have lived in Boston indicates they are here to stay. Few have lived here less than one year (3%). Only 24% have lived in Boston for less than five years. The average length of residence in Boston for Blacks in 1980 was 21 years (BRA 1982, Table V-2).

Black persons in Boston are primarily young people. They have a median age of 23.9 years, 5 years younger than their white counterparts. Smaller proportions of the black population than the white population are 65 years of age and over, (5.5% compared to 15.6%) or 60-64 years of age (3.2% compared to 4.9%). A larger proportion of the black population consists of children under five years of age (8.6% compared to 3.8%), and children 5-14 years of age (19% compared to 8.6%). (BRA, 1983, Table P-6).

Contrary to popular belief, slightly more black Bostonians 25 years of age and over have completed high school than white Bostonians (38.8% as compared to 34.9%). Fewer Blacks have completed college degrees (8.7% compared to 23.6%).

Seventy percent of Boston's black population is working age, 16 years of age or over; 53.3% of the black persons 16 years of age and over are employed; 5.4% are unemployed. Larger proportions of the black male population than the female population are employed (58.4% and 49.2%, respectively) and unemployed

(6.9% and 4.2% respectively) (BRA 1983, Table P-6).

A more complete picture of the labor force patterns of Boston residents is seen by looking at their occupations. More Boston black residents were workers in 1980 (17%) than in 1970 (13%). When ranked by proportions employed, black Boston residents worked in clerical (27%), service (25%), operative, including transportation (17%) and professional, managerial, and technical (15%) positions more than others. Most gains between 1970 and 1980 occurred in occupations that were professional, managerial (2%) and clerical (5%). (BRA, 1982, Table III-15).

The higher proportion of unemployment among Blacks (5.4% as compared to 3.1%) was reflected in the income and poverty status of Boston black families. The median income of Boston black families, \$11,462 in 1979, was 63% of the median income of white families, \$18,308. More black families (28.6%) than white families (15.7%) had incomes in 1979 below the poverty level. Table 1 describes the numbers of black families earning various incomes in 1979.

Almost equal proportions of the 28,856 black families in Boston are married couples (46.3%) and female householders (47.7%) Black children under 18 years of age are more likely to live with a female parent (77.6%) than two parents (58.7%) (BRA, 1983, Table P-6).

While female householder families make up a smaller proportion of white families than of black families (23%), there are more white female householders in Boston (18,481), than black female householders (13,788). Although more black female householder families have minor children (10,705), the number of white female householders responsible for minor children (7,803) is not dramatically dissimilar (BRA, 1983, Table P-6).

Table 1

Income and Poverty Status of Families by Race 1979

	<u>White</u>	<u>Black</u>
Total Families:	80,332	28,856
<u>Total Family Income</u>		
Less than \$5,000	7,172	6,014
\$5,000 - \$7,499	5,973	3,305
7,500 - 9,999	6,093	3,023
10,000 - 14,999	12,171	5,459
15,000 - 19,999	12,121	3,880
20,000 - 24,999	10,810	2,903
25,000 - 34,999	14,076	2,850
35,000 - 49,999	7,915	1,068
50,000 or over	4,001	354
Median income	\$18,308	\$11,462
Mean income	21,922	14,300
Persons for whom poverty status was determined	367,804	123,120
Income in 1979 below poverty:	57,788 (15.7%)	35,257 (28.6%)

Source: Boston Redevelopment Authority, Boston Population and Housing by Neighborhood Areas: 1980; Demographic Information from the U. S. Bureau of the Census, Table P-6, "General, Social, and Economic Characteristics by Race and Spanish Origin," 1980, p. 31.

Although the rise in the number of black teens having children is well documented, it is less clear whether this trend has dramatically influenced the increase in female householder families. What we know about teen pregnancy and parenting comes primarily from health statistics about birth rates and fertility, and not from household composition and living arrangements. We therefore have precise knowledge about birth and fertility rates by maternal age, but little knowledge about the proportion of teen parents heading households or living as subfamilies within other black households. This is so even if considering only those who receive public assistance.

What is clear is that the number of black teen parents is on the rise. In 1983, there were 8,310 live births in the City of Boston - 2,705 or 32.6% of these were births to black women - a much higher proportion than that of black women of childbearing age in the city.

Contrary to public perception, most of the black children born in Boston in 1983 were not born to young adolescent women. Of the births to black women, the largest proportion (73.6%) were to women 20-34 years of age; 531 births or 19.6% were to adolescent and teenage women, 10-19 years of age. While births to young black women accounted for less than 20% of all births to black women, they accounted for a greater proportion of births to teenagers as a whole (47.8%). This was true regardless of age category: 72.7% of the births to women aged 10-14 years; 51.3% of the births to women aged 15-17 years of age and 47.9% of the births to women 18 and 19 years of age (Boston Department of Health and Hospitals, unpublished data).

Between 1980 and 1983 the number of births to teens in Boston decreased from 1,229 to 1,073. Most of the change was due to a decrease in the number

of births to older teens, down from 775 in 1980 to 615 in 1983. The number of births in other age categories remained, for the most part, at levels recorded in 1980. Most teen mothers are having their first children, but births of second and third children increased with the mothers' age.

Table 2 describes the number of births to black teens, 1980 to 1983.

Table 2
Number of Births to Black Teens in Boston,

<u>Age</u>	<u>1980</u>	<u>1981</u>	<u>1982</u>	<u>1983</u>
17 years	263 (448)	235 (420)	280 (468)	242 (425)
18-19 years	365 (766)	331 (708)	329 (627)	289 (615)

Adapted from unpublished data, Office of Vital Statistics, Boston Department of Health and Hospitals, 1980-1982, and 1983.

Birth rates for young (less than 17 years of age) and for older teens (18-19 years of age) decreased over the three year period. Births among black women teenagers as a proportion of all births decreased slightly during the same time period (Boston Department of Health and Hospitals unpublished data).

CHARACTERISTICS OF BLACK FAMILIES BY NEIGHBORHOOD

Looking at the status of Blacks and black families using Boston as the unit of analysis does not reveal the complexity of the sociodemographics nor describe the true experience of Boston black families. This section will describe black Boston families by neighborhood, focusing on Roxbury and

Mattapan, where the populations are 78% and 81% black, respectively. As the demographics show, these neighborhoods are distinctly different, even though the majority of their residents in both cases are black.

Table 3 describes the racial composition of Boston neighborhoods.

Some neighborhoods have a higher proportion of Blacks than in the city as a whole: Mattapan (81%); Roxbury (78%); Fenway/Kenmore (35%), North Dorchester (26%). Others have negligible black residents: West Roxbury (0%); East Boston (1%); Charlestown (0%); and South Boston (2%).

There have been changes in the racial composition of Boston neighborhoods over the past thirty years. For instance, the nonwhite population in Fenway/Kenmore almost tripled between 1970 and 1980, from 9% to 35%. Similarly, Mattapan's nonwhite population increased from 42% in 1970 to 83% in 1980. The proportion of nonwhites in Roxbury also increased during this time (76% to 83%) while this percentage decreased in the South End. By and large, the increase in nonwhite population occurred where nonwhites already lived. East Boston, West Roxbury, Charlestown and South Boston have a history of racial isolation as indicated by the negligible percentages of nonwhites recorded as living there from 1950 to the present (BRA, 1982, Table I-21).

Although Roxbury and Mattapan have the same types of black families, they are present in different proportions. Roxbury is characterized by single parent families (38%), one person families (38%), and married couple families (23%). Only 13% of married couple families have children present under 18 years of age. Mattapan is characterized by married couple families (49%), single parent families (33%), and few one person families (16%). Thirty-seven percent of its married couple families have children. In general, Roxbury seems to be a neighborhood where most families are single individuals with or

Table 3

The Racial Composition of Boston's Neighborhoods: 1980

<u>Neighborhood</u>	<u>White</u>	<u>Black</u>	<u>Hispanic</u>	<u>Oriental</u>	<u>Indian</u>	<u>Portuguese/ Cape Verdean</u>	<u>Other</u>	<u>Total</u>
East Boston	97%	0%	3%	0%	0%	0%	0%	100%
Charlestown	98	0	2	0	0	0	0	100
South Boston	96	0	3	2	0	0	1	100
Central	78	1	2	18	0	0	0	100
Back Bay/								
Beacon Hill	94	1	2	2	0	0	1	100
South End	40	25	14	21	0	0	0	100
Fenway/								
Kenmore Allston/	65	34	0	2	0	0	0	100
Brighton Jamaica Plain/	79	3	4	13	0*	0	1	100
Parker Hill	53	17	25	4	1	0	2	100
Roxbury	8	78	9	0	2	4	0	100
N. Dorchester	58	26	13	0	0	0	4	100
S. Dorchester	75	18	4	2	1	0	1	100
Mattapan	11	81	6	0	0	1	0	100
Roslindale	97	1	2	1	0	0	0	100
W. Roxbury	100	0	0*	0	0	0	0	100
Hyde Park	88	7	3	1	0	0	0	100
BOSTON	69%	20%	6%	4%	0%*	0%*	1%	100

*Less than 0.5% of the population belongs to this racial group.

Based on 2,623 observations (weighted).

Source: Boston Redevelopment Authority Household Survey, conducted by the Center for Survey Research, 1980.

without children. Mattapan, on the other hand, has a strong presence of two-parent family households.

The family composition in both neighborhoods contradicts the theory that black families are likely to include sub-families or extended families. In both neighborhoods, regardless of family type, few families included other relatives. Single parent families in Roxbury were more likely than other families to include a relative (9%).

Table 4

Family Composition of Household Population of Roxbury and Mattapan, 1980

	<u>Roxbury</u>	<u>Mattapan</u>
<u>One Person Family</u>	38%	16%
<u>Head and Spouse, plus no others</u>	23%	49%

These neighborhoods also differ in marital status of the head of household. As indicated in Table 5, Roxbury has more never-married households than Mattapan (42% as compared to 29%) whereas Mattapan has more ever-married householders than Roxbury (71% as compared to 58%).

While no data was available for number of children by race and family structure, one can make inferences about these characteristics from the general information on the number of children in Boston families by sex and marital status. These families are smaller than expected given the stereotype of black female-headed families containing many children. In families with

Table 5

Percent Distribution of Adult Household Population
by Marital Status for Roxbury and Mattapan, 1980

<u>Marital Status</u>	<u>Roxbury</u>	<u>Mattapan</u>
<u>Ever Married</u>	58%	71%
Married	32%	51%
Divorced	11%	6%
Separated	7%	10%
Widowed	8%	4%
<u>Never Married</u>	42%	29%

Adapted from the Boston Redevelopment Authority, Boston and Its Neighborhoods, "Percent Distribution of Boston's Adult Household Population by Marital Status," Table I-15, 1982.

children that are headed by never-married females, the majority (12% of all families headed by never-married women) consist of the mother and 2 children, while 1% of these families have three children. Of families which are headed by previously married females, those with children (39%) are larger, with 12% consisting of the mother and one child, 14% consisting of the mother and two children, and 8% consisting of the mother and 3 children (BRA, 1982, Table I-20). The average number of children in black families in Boston is 2.1%, not significantly different from white families which average 2.0 children (BRA 1982, Table I-18).

The overwhelming majority (68%) of school-aged children (5-17 years of age) in Boston live in Roxbury (35%), or Mattapan (33%). Some neighborhoods have no black school-aged residents: East Boston, South Boston, and Allston/Brighton. Minority school-aged children are about equally likely to live in two parent and one-parent families, regardless of their age category. Proportionally there are about as many 5-10 year old (elementary school aged), 11-13 year old (junior high school aged) and 14-17 year old (high school aged) children raised in one-parent households as are raised in two parent households. This indicates that single-parent families include families of mothers and teenagers as well as mothers and young children (BRA 1982, Tables II-4 and II-6).

Black families in both Roxbury and Mattapan have median incomes below the \$13,200 median for Boston families in 1979. With medians of \$9,000 and \$12,250 respectively, Roxbury is ranked 12th out of 12 Boston neighborhoods, while Mattapan is ranked 8th. In both neighborhoods family incomes are heavily weighted in categories below \$20,000 (Roxbury, 88%; and Mattapan, 76%). Thirty-nine percent of families in Roxbury had annual incomes between \$3,000 and \$7,000 in 1979.

Forty-four percent of the families in Roxbury and thirty percent of the families in Mattapan have incomes below the low income standard as defined by the Bureau of Labor Statistics. Both neighborhoods have more families in this category than Boston as a whole (27%) (BRA 1982, Table II-12). Low income status results in spite of the fact that 67% of the families in Roxbury and 77% of the families in Mattapan have wages and salaries from earned income as their largest source of family support. Sixteen and thirteen percent of the families in Roxbury and Mattapan, respectively, depend on transfer payments

Table 6
Family Income in Roxbury and Mattapan, 1978

	<u>Roxbury</u>	<u>Mattapan</u>
Less than \$3,000	4%	2%
\$3,000 - 6,999	39	16%
\$7,000 - 9,999	11	21
\$10,000 - 14,999	17	23
\$15,000 - 19,999	17	14
\$20,000 - 24,999	6	12
\$25,000 - 29,999	4	2
\$30,000 - 39,999	0	7
\$40,000 - 49,000	4	2
\$50,000 +	0	0
<u>Median Income</u>	\$9,000	\$12,250
<u>Median Income of Boston</u>	\$13,200	

Adapted from Boston Redevelopment Authority, Boston and Its Neighborhoods, "Family Income by Neighborhood, City of Boston, 1979," Table II-6, 1982

(unemployment, AFDC, SSI, Welfare) as a primary source of support. In spite of a large proportion of single parent families in both neighborhoods, alimony or child support and support from relatives and friends are negligible as a major source of income (2% and 0% respectively).

These findings are true when looking at primary sources of family support for black school-aged children in Boston in general. Seventy-six percent are supported primarily by wages and salaries, 23% by transfer payments, and 1% by

Table 7
Distribution of Families by Largest Source of Income
In Roxbury and Mattapan, 1979

	<u>Roxbury</u>	<u>Mattapan</u>
Wages and salaries	67	77
Rents from property	0	0
Social Security	10	5
Unemployment, SSI, AFDC, Welfare, etc.	16	13
Veterans Benefits	4	3
Relatives, friends, alimony and Child Support	2	0
Pension annuity	1	2
Other	0	0
All sources	\$100	\$100

Adapted from the Boston Redevelopment Authority, Boston and its Neighborhoods, "Distribution of Families by Largest Source of Income Within Neighborhoods," Table II-14, 1982.

alimony, child support, friends and relatives (BRA, 1982, Table IV-8).

The unemployment rate in both of these communities is greater than in Boston as a whole (5.7%). Roxbury's unemployment rate was 7% and Mattapan's 9% in the spring of 1980. Roxbury's labor force participation rate of 56% was lower than Boston's at 62%, but Mattapan's was higher, 63%. While the labor force participation rate of 50% for white teenagers (16-19 years of age) was lower than the employment rate of the city as a whole, the rate for minority teenagers was far worse at 38% (BRA, 1982, Tables III-1 and III-3).

Those who are employed in these neighborhoods work in the same industries but in different proportions. In Roxbury, export services (31%), government (26%), and manufacturing (15%), account for 72% of the employment. In Mattapan, manufacturing (25%), export services (20%), transportation, communications, and public utilities (12%), and government (12%) account for 69% of the employment. These figures seem to reflect that Blacks in these neighborhoods are employed in the primary employing industries of the city, export service and government, which employ 27% and 20% of the work force respectively.

Table 8

Industry of the Employed in Roxbury and Mattapan, 1980

	Roxbury	Mattapan
Construction	1%	2%
Manufacturing	15%	25%
Transportation, Communication and Utilities	6%	12%
<u>Trade</u>		
Wholesale	2%	0%
Resale	5%	11%
Finance, Insurance and Real Estate	6%	8%
<u>Services</u>		
Local	4%	8%
Export	31%	20%
Government	26%	12%
Self Employed in own business	4%	2%
Total	100%	100%

Adapted from Boston Redevelopment Authority, "Industry of the Employed by Neighborhood," Table III-8, 1982.

Service and clerical occupations are held by close to half of the employed workers in each neighborhood. Roxbury workers tend to be clericals (23%) or to work in service jobs (29%). Mattapan workers also tend to work in clerical (28%), or service occupations (20%). One difference in the occupations of the residents in these two neighborhoods is the third ranking occupation of each: 20% of the workers in Mattapan are employed as craftsmen, while in Roxbury, 18% are in professional, managerial and technical occupations.

Table 9

Occupations of the Employed in Roxbury and Mattapan,
1970 and 1980, Percent Distribution

	Roxbury (1970)	Roxbury (1980)	Mattapan (1970)	Mattapan (1980)
Professional, Managerial, Technical	14%	18%	17%	15%
Sales Workers	3%	4%	8%	1%
Clerical	23%	23%	27%	28%
Craftsmen	11%	5%	12%	20%
Operatives	23%	16%	18%	16%
Laborers	5%	4%	4%	1%
Service Workers, Private and Household	22%	29%	16%	20%
Total	100%	100%	100%	100%

Adapted from Boston Redevelopment Authority, "Occupations of Employed Workers by Neighborhood, 1970 and 1980, Percent Distribution," Table III-16, 1982.

A larger proportion of Roxbury workers are in professional and managerial occupations even though fewer have completed 12 years of schooling than in Mattapan (33% as compared to 45%) (BRA 1982, Table III-21).

Births to teen women in Roxbury (25.4%), account for a significant proportion of teen births in Boston. In 1980, the 312 births to teens in Roxbury was second only to North Dorchester in the number of total teen births. Together, the number of teen births in Roxbury and North and South Dorchester in 1980 accounted for 69.1% of all teen births in the city. The fertility rate (births per 1,000 females) of teens in the Roxbury neighborhood (55.3%) is the highest of neighborhoods in Boston, and about twice the fertility rate of 26.9% for Boston as a whole (Boston Department of Health and Hospitals, unpublished data, 1981).

Similar to trends in Boston in general, the bulk of births to black women in Roxbury were to those between 20-34 years of age. In 1982, 70.8% of all births in Roxbury occurred in this age category. Only 286 or 24% of births were to teenaged women; of these, 12.2% were to teenagers 17 years of age and younger. Between 1981 and 1982, the number of teen births increased slightly from 265 to 286 with an increase of 35% in the number of births to teens 15-17 years of age.

While the fertility rate of black teens in Roxbury is high, the rate varies with age. The fertility rate peaks for women 18 and 19 years of age, decreases for women who are 20-34 years old, and is lower for women 35-44 years of age than the fertility rates for Boston as a whole (19.4%). Roxbury's fertility rate of 114.6 for 18-19 year olds stands out among neighborhoods, but other areas also have high fertility rates. Jamaica Plain, Charlestown, and South Boston have fertility rates of 88.7%, 77.9%, and 69.7%,

respectively. Therefore, birth to teens is a city-wide phenomenon (Boston Department of Health and Hospitals, unpublished data, 1983).

WASHINGTON PARK (ROXBURY) AND SOUTHERN MATTAPAN (MATTAPAN)

The heterogeneity of Boston black families can further be illustrated by looking at the characteristics of families in neighborhood areas. Black families in Washington Park (Roxbury) and Southern Mattapan (Mattapan) will be described because they are majority black areas within neighborhoods that are primarily populated by black inhabitants. Census figures indicate that in 1979, 16,947 or 91.1% of the residents of Washington Park were black and 9,279 or 76.1% of the residents of Southern Mattapan were black (BRA, 1983, Tables P-6 and P-1).

In spite of racial similarity the residents and families of these two neighborhood areas are quite dissimilar. Those who live in Washington Park are younger, with a median age of 27.5 compared to Southern Mattapan's 28.8. Southern Mattapan residents are better educated, with 43.6% completing high school and 20.9% completing 1-3 years of college.

In addition, they also differ in the types of family households who live in each area, although families are similar in size (3.28 and 3.41 persons, respectively). Southern Mattapan, as part of Boston's first black middle-class community, has 2,237 black families, 62.4% of whom are married couple families. 43% of the 4,253 families living in Washington Park are married couple families. 31.9% of the black families in Southern Mattapan are maintained by female householders. Black women parent alone in 52.7% of the families in Washington Park. In both areas, children are more likely to be part of single parent households, but in Southern Mattapan almost as many

children live in two parent households. Although Southern Mattapan has more married couple families, this neighborhood is heterogeneous in family type and structure.

In Washington Park, 55.1% of the black persons 16 years of age and over are in the labor force; 90.5% of this number are employed while 5.2% are unemployed. Southern Mattapan has a much higher labor force participation rate of 75.8%. 92.9% of those in the labor force are employed and 6.7% are unemployed. Females 16 years of age and over are more likely to work outside their homes if they are Southern Mattapan residents (72.4% in the labor force).

Table 10 shows the percentages of persons 16 years and over working in various occupations. The percentage of persons in both neighborhoods employed

Table 10

Occupations of the Employed in Washington Park
and Southern Mattapan, 1979, Percent Distribution

	<u>Roxbury</u>	<u>Mattapan</u>
Managerial, Professional and Speciality Occupations	18.5%	18.6%
Technical Sales and Adminis- trative Support	30.5%	34.6%
Service	27.2%	20.3%
Farming, Forestry and Fishing	.3%	less than 1
Precision Production, Craft and Repair	4.6%	8.1%
Operators and Laborers	18.9%	18.3%

Adapted from Boston Redevelopment Authority, Labor Force Characteristics:
Occupation, Table P-4, p. 22, 1983.

in managerial, technical and service occupations is very similar; 18.5% and 18.6%; 30.5% and 34.6%; 27.2% and 20.3% for these occupations in Washington Park and Southern Mattapan, respectively. Operatives account for 18.9% and 18.3% of the occupations in these two neighborhood areas.

In spite of similarity in occupations, these two neighborhood areas are dissimilar in income. Southern Mattapan's median of \$18,187 is higher than Washington Park's median of \$11,368. The mean black family income in Southern Mattapan, \$19,695, is almost half again as great as the average black family income of \$13,666 in Roxbury. It is interesting to note that although there is economic disparity between black families in these two neighborhoods, they are on parity with the white families in their respective areas (BRA, 1983, Table P-6).

Part of the difference in mean family income, given the similarity in occupations in the two neighborhood areas, is explained by the difference in number of workers in the family. Black families in Southern Mattapan are more likely to have two workers and less likely to have no workers than families in Washington Park. 55.9% of the families in Southern Mattapan have two workers while only 34.8% do so in Washington Park. Only 13.9% of the families in Southern Mattapan have no workers while 33.6% of black families in Washington Park have no one who is employed. The number of workers (and the family structure and composition) is associated in each neighborhood area with the number of workers in the family. As the number of workers increases, family income rises. Families with no workers in these areas have incomes of \$5,362 and \$6,918, respectively. Families with two or more workers have more than four times the income as families where no one is employed. In both neighborhoods the mean family income of black families with two or more

working members, \$21,109 and \$26,045, respectively, is above the \$12,530 mean for the area in 1979. Only Southern Mattapan families with 2 or more workers have parity with similar white families (mean \$26,396) (BRA, 1983, Tables P-4 and P-5).

In each neighborhood area there is an association between mean income and the income source. Higher mean income was associated with earned income; lower mean income was associated with income from Social Security and public assistance, the latter accounting for the lowest incomes among families. For instance, incomes in households in Washington Park where there were earnings (\$13,344) differed by almost \$10,000 from those in which income came from public assistance, \$3,455 (BRA, 1983, Table P-5).

Poverty is a fact of life in these two areas. 26.2% of the black families in Washington Park and 14.6% of the black families in Southern Mattapan had incomes below the poverty level in 1979. Furthermore, poverty is related to having children under 18 years of age. 76.4% were families with female heads and children under 18 years of age. Washington Park showed similar trends with 88% and 80.1% in these categories (BRA, 1983, Table P-5).

SUMMARY AND IMPLICATIONS

In summary, these facts stand out about Boston black families:

- o The 126,483 Blacks in Boston represent a 21% increase from 1970 and constitute about one-fourth of the total population.
- o Neighborhoods are undergoing changes in racial composition. Fewer Blacks live in Roxbury than a decade ago, but the black population in Mattapan/Neponset has increased by 14,610 persons.

- o Demographic data contradict the notion that Boston is a transient city for Blacks. The average length of residence for Blacks in Boston in 1980 was 21 years.
- o A higher proportion of black Bostonians, 38.9%, have completed high school than white Bostonians (34.9%).
- o Almost equal proportions of Boston's 28,856 black families are married couple (46.3%) and female householder (47.7%) families.
- o Black children under 18 years of age are more likely to live in a single parent household headed by a female than in a two-parent family.
- o In absolute numbers, there are more white female householders (18,481) in Boston than black female householders (13,788). On the other hand, more black single parent households (10,705) than white single parent households (7,803) have minor children.
- o Roxbury has more single parent families (38%) than two parent ones (23%). The reverse is true for Mattapan, which has 49% two-parent families and 33% single parent families.
- o The family composition in both neighborhoods does not support the sub-family/extended family theory about black families. Few family households included relatives. Single parent families in Roxbury were most likely to include a relative (9%).
- o Contrary to stereotype, families headed by single black women tend to be small, consisting of the mother and one or two children.
- o Both Roxbury and Mattapan have median family incomes, \$9,000 and \$12,250, respectively, that are lower than Boston's as a whole \$13,200 (1979).

- o The black families in these two neighborhoods have incomes that are primarily based on wages and salaries. Only 16% and 13% of the families in Roxbury and Mattapan, respectively, depend on transfer payments (unemployment, AFDC, SSI, Welfare) as a primary source of support.
- o Black teen women account for the largest proportion of women teenage parents, but account for a small proportion of black births in Boston.

What emerges from this description of the sociodemographic characteristics of black families in Boston are two black neighborhoods where families have different characteristics. Roxbury seems to be a neighborhood primarily of single and individual families with and without children, although married couple families also reside there. Mattapan, on the other hand, seems to be a black neighborhood where married couple families predominate even though single parent families are present. One of the questions to ask in future analyses of these two neighborhoods is what circumstances lead to different family structures predominating in different, almost proximal neighborhoods.

Although different family structures prevail in Roxbury and Mattapan, they are representative of the range of black family structures and types that exist in the nation. In spite of structural differences, both black family forms are probably struggling for survival in different ways. In one-parent families the struggle is to do it all, to function as homemakers and childrearers as well as providers responsible for the family's economic support. In two-parent families, the struggle is to maintain middle-class status by sharing these roles and responsibilities within the family.

In the past, black families, both single and two-parent, could rely on relatives for help and support (McAdoo, 1978, 1979; Malson, 1988a). Our data indicate that black families in Roxbury and Mattapan do not have relatives who share living arrangements as a help option. Roxbury's single parent families were more likely than any other family type to receive help through extended family living arrangements, but even these arrangements existed in only 9% of families maintained by women.

While it was not clear from these data whether families had access to relatives living around them, data from other studies of Boston's black families indicate that relatives do play a part in the support systems of black families. One study found that relatives sometimes lived in the same neighborhood or town, often living proximally as part of multiple family dwellings or on the same block (Malson, 1983b, 1984). The length of residence, averaging 21 years for Boston black residents, indicates that some families may have developed support systems of neighbors, workers and friends, as well as family members.

Work on support systems of black single parent families indicates that help is received by single parent women heading families, not only in times of crisis but in an ongoing fashion, easing the burden of multiple roles (Stack, 1974; McAdoo, 1981; Malson, 1983b). One of the significant ways that this has been done is through living arrangements. Although sub-families make up only 6% of all black families, they are overwhelmingly attenuated, consisting of women and young children (Hill and Shakleford, 1978). Most sub-families of women and children live in homes of relatives, usually parents, but often sisters. This is often done to provide child care so that a mother may go to work. These shared living arrangements can provide support to young teenage

mothers whom the family may view as too young or immature to be solely responsible for childrearing (Hill and Shakleford, 1978). Given the rise in the number of black teenage mothers nationally and in Boston, more specific information on teenage sub-families and the nature of support provided to them by their families is needed.

Social support systems are so frequent among black families that they have been recognized as a source of strength and a major characteristic (Hill, 1972; Nobles, 1978). Nevertheless, it must be acknowledged that all Black families do not have social support systems to rely on. The question we must then address is what happens to families who have depended on informal support mechanisms when these means of support are no longer available to them. Do they seek help and services that are formal parts of public and private institutions, or do they go without the kinds of support and aid they need to make their families stronger?

Current socio-demographic trends suggest that both one-parent and two-parent families could be helped by changes in income through employment. Both Roxbury and Mattapan have median incomes that are below the median for Boston. Furthermore, 44% of the families in Roxbury and 30% of the families in Mattapan have incomes that fall below low income standards as established by the Bureau of Labor Statistics. Although one would assume that a large proportion of low income would be indicative of Welfare dependency, this is not true for these two communities where only 16% and 13% of families, respectively, rely on transfer payments as a primary means of support. In spite of a strong work ethic demonstrated by the fact that wages and salaries constitute the major source of support for black families in these two neighborhoods, more families than expected have low incomes. One can infer

that this is because many family workers are employed in low income jobs. A recent study of black low-income working women found that poverty status was attributable to employment in low status and low income jobs, and not public dependency (Woody and Malson, 1984). For both communities, the well-being of families would be improved by programs in schools, agencies and at the work site that emphasize school-to-work transitions for young black men and women and career mobility for those already in the labor force.

These data also cast doubt on two of our assumptions about the size and composition of black families headed by women. There is a tendency to think that these families are large and that children in them are all young. Our data for Boston indicate that these families are more often small, consisting of a mother and one or two children and that children are often school-aged, adolescents, and teenagers. This is consonant with national trends. Census data indicate that 57.7% of black families headed by women had children between 6 and 17 years of age. Only 18.8% had children under six years of age exclusively, and 23.4% had both children under six and children 6-17 years of age (U.S. Bureau of the Census, 1980).

Given these findings we may have to reconceptualize the kinds of children's programs and services needed by single parent families. For instance, adolescents may need programs emphasizing career education, sex education and school-to-labor force transitions. In one study of Boston area families, black mothers in both low income and middle income communities stressed the need for safer and more supervised services and activities for adolescents and teenagers (Malson, 1983b).

More and more black children in Boston live in single parent households. Many of these children have school-aged mothers and fathers. A recent task

force on pregnant and parenting youth in Massachusetts recommended a comprehensive program to address and counteract the negative effects of teen parenting. While adolescent pregnancy and parenting has been seen primarily as a public health and welfare problem, it is also an education, social and employment problem. A program comprising services that cut across these areas of input and support and that includes adolescent fathers is needed. Because of the socio-demographic characteristics of teen pregnancy and parenting in Boston, Roxbury is a prime site for a strategic intervention. Agencies such as Roxbury Comprehensive Health Center could provide health care, English High School might provide school-based education programs and Crispus Attucks Child Care Center could have responsibility for child care and parent support programs.

NOTES

1. The Boston Redevelopment Authority is hereafter referred to as the BRA.
2. Personal communication with Carol Van Duesen Lukas, Director of Evaluation, Massachusetts Department of Public Welfare.
3. Unpublished vital statistics were obtained from Jeanette Valentine, Ph.D., Director of Research, Boston Department of Health and Hospitals.

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LIST OF TABLES

- Table 1 Income and Poverty Status by Race, 1979
- Table 2 Number of Births to Black Teens in Boston, 1980-83
- Table 3 The Racial Composition of Boston Neighborhoods: 1980
- Table 4 Family Composition of Household Population of Roxbury and Mattapan, 1980
- Table 5 Percent Distribution of Adult Household Population By Marital Status in Roxbury and Mattapan, 1980
- Table 6 Family Income in Roxbury and Mattapan, 1979
- Table 7 Distribution of Families by Largest Source of Income in Roxbury and Mattapan, 1979
- Table 8 Industry of the Employed in Roxbury and Mattapan, 1980
- Table 9 Occupations of the Employed in Roxbury and Mattapan, 1970 and 1980, Percent Distribution
- Table 10 Occupations of the Employed in Washington Park and Southern Mattapan, 1979, Percent Distribution

A CHANGING MOSAIC:
BOSTON'S RACIAL DIVERSITY
1950-1990

by

PHILIP S. HART

INTRODUCTION

The City of Boston is approaching a new day in terms of the racial diversity of its population. The changing mosaic of Boston's population suggests that the city has reached a critical point in relations between its races. As people of color grow to a larger proportion of the population, opportunities for building coalitions and changing racial stereotypes will increase.

How effectively we use these opportunities may depend in part on our understanding of how the relative size of the minority group affects the way its members are perceived by the dominant group and how relations within and among minority groups can be enhanced.

The dynamics of this population shift over the 1950-1980 period, with projections to 1990, is the focal point of this chapter. The social, political, economic and institutional implications of this changing racial composition will be examined as well as how these factors affect intergroup and intragroup cooperation and conflict. It should be borne in mind that neither the white, nor black, nor brown communities in Boston can be viewed as monolithic. There are ethnic and social class differences among and between these groups, as well as differences related to place of origin and longevity in Boston.

In addition, the relationship between city and suburb as they address the issues of race relations and racial diversity will be considered. There is a tendency to view urban Boston as a closed system, but it is equally important to consider the role of Boston's suburbs in addressing race relations and racial diversity.

The dynamic state of Boston's racial mix is thus of an intergroup as well as an intragroup nature. This chapter addresses the effect of this evolving mix on the changes in opportunity over the 1950-1990 period. Finally, recommendations which serve to reinforce, and perhaps accelerate, the integration of Blacks and minorities into the power centers of the city will be proposed.

POPULATION TRENDS, 1950-1990

The City of Boston is changing from a predominantly white to a predominantly minority population. Boston's white population has decreased from 95 percent of the total in 1950 to 70 percent in 1980. At the same time, Boston's black and minority population has grown from 5 percent of the total in 1950 to 30 percent in 1980.¹ Clearly, Boston's black and minority population is growing at a faster rate than the white population. By 1990, it is projected that Boston will be nearly 40 percent black and minority. As noted by Slavet (1983), the recent trend toward greater black and minority diversity in the city's population is likely to continue throughout the century. Factors contributing to this trend include: a higher fertility rate among minority persons of child-rearing age; the age and growing number of white elderly residents, whose higher death rate offsets the white birth rate; and the greater mobility and housing choices enjoyed by white nuclear families.

Boston's minority population in 1980 totalled close to 170,000 persons. Boston's white population declined by nearly 25 percent to 394,000 between 1970 and 1980, and the City's total population showed a 12 percent decline over the same decade. Yet Boston's three chief minority groups--Blacks, those of Hispanic origin, and Asians--showed an overall increase of over 42,000 persons, or 32 percent during the same decade. During the seventies, the black population within the central city rose by 21 percent, the Hispanic population by 101 percent and the Asian population by 55 percent. The dramatic increase in the city's minority population and the decline in the overall population between 1970 and 1980 are both attributable to the immigration of minorities, the outmigration of persons classified as white, and changes in household composition (Slavet, 1983).

Recent figures suggested that Boston's population has made a turnaround and in the past three years has begun to grow again. The latest Census Bureau estimates show that the city has climbed to a population of 570,719 in 1984, arresting the steep decline from 641,071 in 1970 to 562,994 in 1980. The Boston Redevelopment Authority (BRA), which conducts a survey of the city's households every five years using different sampling methods, contends that the real figure is 604,000.

According to BRA figures, the white population increased to 417,000 in 1984, accounting for 69 percent of the total. The number of Blacks, which had already been on the increase, rose to 136,500. The fastest growing group was Asians, jumping from 8,443, or 1.3 percent, in 1980, to 19,300, or 3.2 percent, in 1984.

Several observers feel that the lack of housing supply will restrict further population growth, and that the current increase in the number of

Whites is fueled by young professionals who will not remain in the city. At this point, the Census Bureau and BRA estimates should be considered preliminary.

Between 1950 and 1980, the black population in Boston grew by a factor of nearly five from 5 percent to just over 22 percent. The growth of other minorities in Boston from 0.3 percent in 1950 to nearly 8 percent in 1980, or a factor of 25, was even more pronounced. During this same 30-year period, the white population declined by a factor of 1.4.

The significance of these population shifts is most evident in the change in racial proportions among the school-age population over the 1950-1980 period. In 1950, as in the population as a whole, whites made up 95 percent of the school-age population, while Blacks and minorities made up 5 percent. By 1980, the white school-age population had dropped to 52 percent of the total, while the black and minority proportions increased to 48 percent. Thus, between 1950 and 1980, the black school-age population grew from 5 percent to 36 percent, or by a factor of just over seven. The other minority school-age population during the same thirty-year period grew from 0.3 percent to just under 12 percent, or a factor of close to 40. On the other hand, the white school-age population decreased by a factor of close to 2. These figures suggest an erosion of the white population generally, and the school-age population specifically, while the black population is growing significantly, and the other minority population even more rapidly.

As the foregoing discussion and Table 1 make clear, Boston is becoming increasingly more black, brown, and yellow. Over the 1950-1980 period, and particularly from 1970-1980, an increasing number of white households have moved from the city to the surrounding suburbs. Boston's suburbs have

remained overwhelmingly white, yielding a metropolitan landscape with an increasingly multi-racial urban area surrounded by a sea of white.²

Table 1

Trends in Racial Composition
in the City of Boston
1950-1980

Year	White	Black	Other
<u>Total Population</u>			
1950	94.7%	5.0%	0.3%
1960	90.2	9.1	0.7
1970	82.0	17.1	0.8
1980	70.0	22.4	7.6
<u>School-age Population^a</u>			
1950	94.7	5.0	0.3
1960	88.8	10.5	0.7
1970	76.1	22.3	1.6
1980	52.3	36.0	11.7

Source: 1950, 1960, 1970 Censuses of Population, Detailed Characteristics; tabulations of 1980 Summary Tape File 1 provided by Massachusetts State Data Center, as reported in Future Boston (p. 130).

a. Includes 5-19 year-olds except in 1980 when base is 5-17 year-olds.

As noted in Future Boston (1982), the migration of households with children to the suburbs, which is common for white families but rare for nonwhite families, reinforces the population patterns caused by differences in black and white fertility. To halt the decline in Boston's school-age and total white population would require a reversal of migration patterns: that is, a greater shift of nonwhite households to the suburbs. However, given long-standing patterns of housing segregation this change seems unlikely in the metropolitan Boston area.³

The growing black and minority population in Boston suggests that the social, political, economic and institutional climate in the city is in a dynamic state. The black-white relationship is undergoing change in Boston, as is the black-minority relationship. Indeed, the Hispanic-white relationship is also undergoing a change in definition. In addition, there is increasing pressure on Boston's suburbs to open up to the burgeoning minority population in Boston.

A CHANGING MOSAIC

The changing relationships between racial and ethnic groups in Boston, where the black and minority populations are growing at a faster rate than the white population, suggest both opportunity and challenge. Particularly, this is a time of opportunity for Blacks, and perhaps to a lesser degree for Hispanics in Boston.

Because of their numbers and their relative longevity and influence in the city, Blacks are likely to be more favored for available opportunities than are other minorities. Recent examples of this likelihood include the selection of a Black superintendent of public schools over an Hispanic candidate. In both the public and private sectors, there is a tendency for white leadership to think of Blacks first when considering the widening of opportunities. Because of this tendency, it is important that the black and brown communities in Boston fashion a strong working relationship. The leaders from each of these communities have exhibited a willingness to work together in the past and should expand their cooperative strategies in the future.

The Future Boston (1982) report notes Boston's history of shifts in its majority population: Anglicans replacing Puritans, Irish supplanting the old New England stock, and Italians supplanting the Irish. Most recently, Blacks have taken the place of Whites in some neighborhoods, while Hispanics have replaced Blacks in others.

Further, the racial minorities in Boston face more restricted employment opportunities, lower incomes, and higher unemployment rates than white workers.⁴ These common problems stem from poor educational backgrounds, discrimination in the labor and housing markets, lack of training and job-hunting skills, and weak institutional responsiveness to the unique problems associated with being a Black or minority in Boston.

Due to the segregated nature of the activities and living patterns in Boston, in combination with the viability of the informal social network among employees, Blacks and minorities are often prevented from gaining information about available jobs. The informal social network among Blacks and Hispanics has yet to reach the level of sophistication and clout to significantly affect social, economic, and political benefits to these communities.

The fact that Blacks and Hispanics are only recently of significant numbers in Boston suggests that an empowerment process is now underway. It wasn't until 1970 that Blacks made up over 15 percent of Boston's population. As of 1980, other minorities are not yet 10 percent of the population.

It has been noted (Fowler, 1982), that in the 1950's and 1960's, most of the growth in the black population in the Boston area could be traced to black people moving into the Boston area from elsewhere in the United States. Since the 1970's, such movement has been significantly curtailed. In the past 10-12 years, migration into the Boston area by Blacks has been mainly from the West

Indies, not from other regions of the United States. This suggests that Boston's black population should not be considered a monolithic group. Rather, the black community is heterogeneous in background and need.

The Hispanic, Asian, and white communities are also heterogeneous. To illustrate, a 1980 breakdown of the ethnic background of white adults over 21 reveals that 22 percent are Irish Catholic; 10 percent are Italian Catholic; 22 percent are other white Catholic; 11 percent are white Protestant; 7 percent are Jewish; and 4 percent are other white.⁵

The proportion of racial and ethnic groups within a particular population provides an approach to understanding discrimination. Examining the size of the minority group in relation to the dominant group with which it interacts, some social scientists (Allport, 1954; Blalock, 1967; South, 1982) claim that larger numbers threaten the political, economic, and psychological security of dominant group members.

On the other hand, Kanter (1977) developed a "theory of tokenism" through which she argues that, although minority group size is salient in interactions with dominant group members, the way minorities are treated by the dominant group depends upon factors more complex than the threat posed by the size of the minority group. Kanter divides minority group size into four distinct levels, each of which is perceived differently by the dominant group: (1) uniform; (2) skewed; (3) tilted; and (4) balanced.

Until 1970, the black population in Boston fell into Kanter's skewed category (which includes minorities who number 1.5% or less of the total population). Members of skewed or token groups tend to be regarded by the majority as symbols and are therefore not valued for their own individuality. Besides these barriers to dominant group acceptance, Kanter argues that

individual members of token groups are handicapped because they do not represent a critical mass within which adequate mutual support can be provided.

While Hispanics and Asians are still of token numbers in Boston's population, the black minority has now moved into Kanter's tilted category, which includes the 16-35% range. As of 1980, Blacks were just over 22 percent of the city's population. In tilted groups, pressures and barriers to dominant group acceptance still persist. However, because of a greater numerical representation than found in token situations, members of tilted groups may regard their critical mass as an instrument for building coalitions with other groups and thus begin to forge changes in power relations (South, 1982).

Some time between 1990 and 2000, Blacks and minorities will equal nearly 50 percent of the city's population. This would be a 'balanced' group situation in that minorities and dominant group members would approximate each other in size. It seems an opportune time for Blacks to engage in coalition-building with other racial and ethnic groups in the city.

Farley (1979) and Blackwell(1975) suggest that in relation to the issue of housing, Whites are uncomfortable with Blacks beyond a certain tipping point. According to Farley, when the proportion of black families is raised to twenty percent in a neighborhood, fully one-half of the Whites studied said that they would find such a neighborhood unacceptable. Boston's black population first exceeded twenty percent of the total in 1980. Generalizing from Farley's findings to the city as a whole, is it accurate to presume that half of Boston's white population finds this situation unacceptable? Following the same logic, can we also assume that the other half of Boston's

white population finds this same situation acceptable? If so, then a critical mass of Whites exists around which effective coalitions can be built between blacks and whites.

Farley's (1978, 1979) work also suggests that Blacks are not advocates of housing segregation. He found that more than eight out of ten Blacks studied stated preference for integrated neighborhoods, while slightly more than one of every ten Blacks expressed a preference for housing in all-black neighborhoods. In a recent survey in Boston's Roxbury section (BRA, 1985) which is overwhelmingly black, more than eight in ten were in favor of more Whites in Roxbury but not as a majority. Seemingly, Blacks would prefer less segregation.

Blacks in Boston are in a key position. They are no longer tokens. The potential for forging alliances and increasing influence is within their grasp. However, Blacks should not be hesitant in identifying their own interests and then building coalitions with other minorities and non-minorities who share these interests. As exemplified by the civil rights movement in the 1960's, Blacks have interests which, if addressed, stand to benefit the society as a whole.

This situation also implies that the black leadership needs to be more attentive to issues of identifying and nurturing a younger group of civic and business leaders in the city. As noted by Blackwell and Hart (1983), there is only so much power and access to distribute. This has led to a tendency on the part of the institutional elites to hoard power. To a great extent, leadership in the black and minority communities has contributed to this lack of a sharing of power by its reluctance to identify and include new faces in the political and economic processes of the community. One can generally

predict who among the black and minority communities will be called for service in civic affairs of the city. Black and minority leaders must be willing to open up and share power and influence in the same way they want the institutional elite of the city to open up and share power and influence (Blackwell and Hart, 1983).

Greater Boston is overwhelmingly white. There is a serious problem of access to housing by Blacks and minorities in most of Boston's suburbs. Blacks and minorities are still token members of the majority of suburban Boston communities. It has only been recently that suburban policies and practices relative to access for Blacks and minorities have been under scrutiny. For the foreseeable future, Blacks and minorities will continue to be of token representation in the suburbs. Among the issues that should be addressed by such a coalition is access to housing in Boston's overwhelmingly white suburbs.

BOSTON AS A FRONTIER

Blackwell and Hart (1983) note that given Boston's history of rigid segregation at the neighborhood and institutional levels, the city can now be viewed as a "frontier" for blacks and minorities. That is, these groups that have for so long been largely excluded from participation in the centers of power are now gaining access to a variety of fields in which new opportunities will abound.

In the public sector, district representation has the potential to open up the political arena to Blacks and minorities. There are more Blacks and minorities serving on the Boston City Council and School Committee than at any time in the city's history. A black mayoral candidate was the first of his

race to reach the final election in Boston's history in 1983. The Flynn Administration has Blacks and minorities in key decision-making positions, such as City Auditor, City Treasurer, and Senior Adviser on Equal Rights. However, despite the presence of key minority decision-makers, blacks and minorities remain a token group in public sector employment numerically. This token status is evident in the numbers of black minorities contracting for various city services such as sanitation, construction, bond counsel, et al.

In the private sector, progress is slowly being made in boardroom representation and business and economic development. Major firms such as Affiliated Publications, New England Telephone, Shawmut Bank, and a handful of others, have at least one Black or minority member on their boards. However, for the most part, Blacks and minorities are either tokens or invisible at the policy-making level of major corporations and banking institutions in the city. Racial diversity has yet to be realized either in the boardroom, or at the managerial and professional ranks, in Boston's private sector.

In business development, Blacks in Boston have some leverage if we take into account Black-owned operations. According to Black Enterprise (June, 1985), four Boston-area firms are in the BE Top 100 Black Businesses. Of these firms located in Boston, one is an oil company founded in 1940 with 1984 sales of \$22.1 million. The other is a real estate development and construction firm started in 1966 with 1984 sales of \$18.9 million. Neither of these firms has succeeded in cracking the downtown Boston market. That is, one does not see the oil company making deliveries on Beacon Hill, or in Back Bay, or in downtown Boston. Similarly, the real estate development firm has not shared in the building boom in Boston's downtown.

The other two firms on BE's list are based in Boston's suburbs. One is a computer software and systems business begun in 1969 with 1984 sales of \$23.0 million. The other is an automobile sales and service business begun in 1977 with 1984 sales of \$17.7 million. Despite their relative success, neither of these firms have shared in the economic upturn in Boston to the extent that one might expect given the success of similar White-owned businesses.

In terms of banking and venture capital, Boston also has strong representation among Black-controlled organizations. For example, Boston's black bank stands thirty-fourth among the nation's black banking institutions. With 1984 assets of \$16.3 million, the Boston Bank of Commerce is carving out an important role for itself in the city's Black and minority population. In addition, the country's largest Black venture capital firm is located in Boston and has proven to be an important source of capital for Black and minority businesses throughout the nation.

Economic development opportunities in Boston also stand to benefit Blacks and minorities. Boston has experienced a building boom in its downtown and waterfront areas over the past decade. For the most part, Blacks and minorities have not benefitted from this activity either as developers, owners, or employees. According to the Boston Redevelopment Authority,⁶ Boston's development boom is strengthening, while those in other parts of the nation are weakening. Investment underway and planned in private major development projects over the 1983-86 period total \$3.7 billion. Further, development investment is creating expanded opportunity throughout the neighborhoods of Boston. According to the BRA, neighborhood projects account for nearly half the \$3.7 billion projected to be invested between 1983-86. All of Boston's neighborhoods are taking part in the new wave of expanding

opportunity. The BRA estimates that one out of eight private investment dollars is going to the neighborhoods of the South End, Jamaica Plain, Roxbury, North Dorchester and Mattapan. In the case of housing, more than one out of every three investment dollars is being channeled to these neighborhoods.

These neighborhoods are the areas where Boston's Black and minority population is concentrated. Among key development projects in these areas are the Southwest Corridor Development Project, the Dudley Station revitalization, Crosstown Industrial Park and the Boston State Hospital site. The extent to which black and minority developers and businesses participate in design, construction, and ownership in those projects will go a long way toward bringing these excluded groups into the city's economic mainstream. These projects also offer the city a unique opportunity to include Blacks and minorities in economic life and to reduce chronic unemployment among those groups.

It is important that both the public and private sector address issues related to: the role of minority developers and businesses; the need to balance real estate appreciation, gentrification, and retention of current residents; and the need for economic betterment among Blacks and minorities. Boston can now combat economic inequality through the strong real estate development and business climate. The extent to which these issues are successfully addressed will go a long way in determining the quality of life which will be available to Boston's changing mosaic in the years ahead.

As Lester Thurow (1980) points out, economic growth also means that we must fully utilize the skills and talents of the economic minorities that are now kept out of the mainstream of economic activity. To reach the levels of

productivity enjoyed by other nations, Thurow argues that we have to eliminate bigotry. Further, he states that our society has reached a point where it must start to make explicit equity decisions if it is to advance. This statement is of specific import to the changing structure of opportunity in Boston.

Thurow (1969) further argues that white males monopolize power. It is this monopolization of power that is so critical to discrimination since, without it, less racial prejudice would be directed toward racial minorities. Thurow wonders how can we go about organizing a society where everyone gets to play the same economic game as that of fully employed white males (Thurow, 1980).

Finally, Thurow notes that we have to stand ready to prevent income gaps between the rich and poor from increasing. This concern is of particular importance for the nation's black citizens, both in relation to the economy as a whole and within their own community. As noted by economist Andrew Brimmer,⁷ income differentials within the black community are widening at a faster rate than are income differentials in the white community. Steps need to be taken in the nation, and in Boston, to reduce the black income differential. In Boston there is a growing black elite. This is the group that will primarily benefit from expanding economic opportunities in the city. Their task will be to control, and share, these opportunities to include the non-elites in their benefits. Otherwise, a social class conflict will manifest itself within Boston's black community, as the "have-nots" retaliate against the "haves".

RACIAL GROUP RELATIONS

As noted by Blackwell and Hart (1982), prior to the implementation of the public school desegregation court order in the mid-seventies, many Americans outside Boston regarded the city as among the most liberal and egalitarian in the United States. Most non-Bostonians had no conception of the deep-seated racial antagonisms and ethnic separation which governed day-to-day relations in Boston. Even some Boston residents operate under the false notion that prior to court-ordered busing in September 1974 there were minimal racial problems in the city.

In fact, the events surrounding desegregation in Boston in 1974 merely brought further to the surface a problem which has been with the city for over 200 years (Blackwell and Hart, 1983). As John Stack (1979) notes, ethnic conflicts are an integral part of Boston's history. Since 1974, there have been enough incidents of Whites attacking Blacks and Blacks attacking Whites to bring into question the civility of the city. The problem of race relations in Boston had been allowed to fester and grow until it exploded in the mid-seventies.

Fowler's (1982) data show that both Blacks and Whites in Boston clearly agree that race relations are not good. However, Blacks are significantly more likely to characterize the situation as "poor" than are Whites. Further, it is difficult not to conclude that Blacks in Boston feel disadvantaged in comparison to Whites; the quality of race relations is clearly more a problem for Blacks than Whites. Fowler goes on to note that white discussion groups avoided almost totally the topic of race, except when discussing the schools. In comparison, black discussion groups quickly turned every topic regarding living in Boston to race-related matters.

Although the situation is improving, it is not inaccurate to characterize Boston as a city fraught with intergroup tension. One mechanism suggested to reduce this tension is economic improvement (Farley, 1978; Blackwell, 1982). When times are good, people seem more willing to share or less disturbed by competition. When times are bad and there is more competition for limited jobs and resources, scapegoating and conflict increase. Currently, Massachusetts, and Boston in particular, is experiencing good economic times. This fact should help reduce intergroup tension, but for some reason prosperity has not had the predicted effect. Perhaps one reason is that the black unemployment rate remains nearly double that of Whites.

Another strategy for reducing prejudice is to increase intergroup contact. According to contract theory, the tendency to discriminate may be lessened when people get to know and understand persons against whom they harbor negative sentiments and beliefs (Blackwell and Hart, 1983). Evidence shows that this strategy is most effective when the interactions are between persons of equal status, do not involve threat to the participants and are based upon cooperation in task-oriented situations (Gittler, 1957; Stouffer, 1949; Williams, 1947; Farley, 1982).

Given the increase in Boston's minority population, intergroup contact is likely to increase significantly. Again, the potential exists for reducing intergroup tension. However, if the interaction is consistently of unequal status, involving a threat to the participants, and not of a cooperative task-oriented nature, then the changing mosaic will only portend more conflict as the local economy goes through an inevitable downturn.

In addition to issues of intergroup conflict and cooperation. Blacks in Boston need a better understanding of white intragroup relations. Although

the tendency is for Blacks to view Whites as an undifferentiated group, in reality considerable intragroup conflict is the norm. Boston has seen conflict between the Brahmins and the Irish, between the Irish and Italians, and between Catholics and non-Catholics. Antagonism toward Blacks and minorities is perhaps the one issue that has united the various white ethnics in Boston.

Among the black population there are also intragroup tensions. These tensions grow out of differences in social class, place of origin, and longevity in the city. Immigration from the South spurred the growth of Boston's black population in the 1950's and 1960's. During the 1970's, the black immigration was primarily composed of those of West Indian descent. In addition, there is a longstanding black community in Boston that has grown accustomed to its role as tokens. Among the elite of this group, there has developed a sense of something akin to "black Brahmins". This group has reinforced a chilly social atmosphere for newcomers in Boston, and has been less than eager to share their hard-fought gains with the newcomers.

RELATIONS WITH OTHER MINORITY GROUPS

Because Blacks are the largest minority group in Boston, they are often perceived, rightly or wrongly, as the favored minority in the city. This perception is not new among the nation's minorities. As noted by Barbaro (1977), minority group members commonly expressed the view that the 'Camelot-Great Society' programs of the 1960's were designed primarily for Blacks. And, in fact, Blacks did reap most of the benefits from these programs.

The motivation for initiatives taken by the executive branch in responding to black demands in the 1960's was clear; first political, then social pressure shaped policy. In contrast, the history of minorities such as Puerto Ricans illustrated how initial hopes of alleviating the misery of poverty turned bitter as other minorities became involved in an anti-Black competitive drive to receive their share of Kennedy-Johnson program resources.

The perception by other racial minorities that Blacks are the favored minority group persists today and is evident in Boston. This perception creates resentment and conflict between Blacks, Browns, and Yellows in Boston. In light of this perception, it becomes difficult to develop cooperative strategies which can serve to unite the various minorities in Boston. This inability to form viable coalitions among Boston's minorities has retarded advancement and has played into the hands of the dominant group.

The challenge for black elites and non-elites in Boston in a time of social, political, and economic change is to effectively pursue intergroup and intragroup cooperative strategies. If such a route is not taken, then the dominant group will benefit through the division of the city's minorities.

Perhaps one of the more enduring coalitions for Blacks in recent history has been with the Jewish community. Of late, this coalition has experienced strains in the relationship both in Boston and nationwide. For years, the Jewish leadership has been ahead of the nation in preaching tolerance and justice (Barbaro, 1977). Thus, for many years, Jews have given generously of their time and resources in support of the civil rights movement.

The Black-Jewish coalition around the civil rights issue achieved significant accomplishments in securing access to public accommodations and

voting rights for Blacks. The latter feat has in turn served to provide for the election of a significant number of black officials nationwide.

There are continuing efforts in Boston to re-develop the black-Jewish coalition. Clergy from both communities have taken leadership roles in this effort. However, it remains to be seen whether this coalition can operate with the same degree of effectiveness as exemplified during the civil rights era.

A key element in coalition-building on the part of Boston's Black community is the degree of trust this group enjoys with potential allies. The lack of an enduring political culture among Boston's Black community makes coalition-building problematic. The lack of significant political culture among Blacks in Boston is partially attributable to the fairly recent history of widespread participation in the political affairs of the city by the Blacks. This lack of a political culture has resulted in a significantly greater distrust of the power structure in Boston than in other major urban areas.⁸

In order for Blacks to coalesce effectively with other groups in Boston for social, political and economic advancement, cooperative strategies and a consensus model must be aggressively pursued. However, black leadership needs to articulate the value and payoffs for coalition-building to the black community, and to the city as a whole. Such articulation is essential because many non-Blacks are of the opinion that enough has been already done for Blacks,⁹ or that Blacks are only looking out for their own interests.

RECOMMENDATIONS FOR ACTION

At the institutional level, both in the public and private sector, more aggressive efforts should be made to hire and promote Blacks and minorities in Boston. In nearly every major institution in the city, Blacks and minorities are still of token representation. The higher up one goes in the hierarchy, the fewer members of these groups one will see. This is true in banks, corporations, educational institutions, insurance companies, brokerage houses, city or state government, and virtually every other institution.

Aggressive, risk-taking action is called for on the part of the institutional elites of the city toward the goals of hiring and promoting minorities. The economy of the city and state are expansive enough at this juncture to reduce the perception of economic competition.

Given the changing racial mix in Boston and resultant re-definition of intergroup and intragroup relationships, there needs to develop an institutional approach to managing these changes. The Boston Committee, which was created in 1980 to help reduce racial tension, should have its mandate expanded to include the management of changing intergroup and intragroup relations. The Boston Committee is now "merging" with the Corporation for Boston and perhaps this consolidation can develop a program to manage the changing racial mix of the city in a positive direction.

Action needs to be taken to open up the suburbs of Boston to Blacks and minorities. For too long, realtors, residents, and elected officials in the suburbs have conspired to keep Blacks and minorities out of their communities. Therefore, the burden of solving the intractable problem of race relations has been on Boston's shoulders, while the suburbs have remained relatively unscathed. The Massachusetts Commission Against Discrimination (MCAD) has

begun taking steps against several Boston suburbs in an attempt to increase access. The Commonwealth should increase funding support for MCAD in order to further the agency's work in opening up Boston's suburbs to Blacks and minorities.

Within Boston, work needs to continue to change attitudes and behavior toward racial minorities. There are still problems of mobility for Blacks and minorities in Boston. Certain neighborhoods are still considered off limits to racial minorities. The relative lack of mobility within Boston, in combination with lack of suburban access, severely restricts choices for the city's racial minorities. It also makes it difficult to recruit racial minorities from outside Boston because they perceive the city as racially discriminatory.

The Southwest Corridor Development Project, the Dudley Station re-development, the Crosstown Industrial Park and the Boston State Hospital site signal a unique opportunity for job-creation and wealth-creation in Boston's black and minority communities. The City, the Commonwealth, the private sector, and responsible neighborhood residents, need to collaborate in such a way as to maximize this opportunity. Again, aggressive, risk-taking action is needed by public and private sector elites in order to facilitate a re-development process that can benefit Blacks and minorities, and the city as a whole.

The power elite needs to exercise aggressive, risk-taking action to bringing more Blacks and minorities into the centers of power. The black and minority communities need to continue exploring the nature of their relationship to each other. Concerted efforts should be undertaken to open up Boston's suburbs to Blacks and minorities for residential housing.

CONCLUSION

The potential exists for strengthening the role and influence of the black and minority communities within Boston. The racial mosaic is changing in Boston and gaining more color. Attention needs to be devoted to managing the changing racial and ethnic relationships.

Collaboration and cooperative strategies are needed in Boston. For too long a conflict model has governed intergroup relations in the city. The corner has been turned in Boston's racial composition. Now the corner needs to be turned to understand the implications of these demographic changes. Consensus, not conflict, needs to be the byword. Policies and practices which are rooted in consensus are more likely to move the city forward to realize its potential.

Leadership which is going to be effective and electable will come from those individuals who emphasize harmony over disharmony, cooperation over conflict, and racial tolerance rather than racial prejudice. Boston is indeed poised to become a multi-racial, world-class city. The actions of key institutions and individuals in the public and private sector from now until 1990 will go a long way toward determining the quality of life in Boston at the turn of the next century.

Blacks and minorities must clearly articulate their social, political, and economic needs, and a program to address these needs. In a real sense, Boston is now a 'frontier' for Blacks and minorities. They have been systematically excluded until the recent past. There is now a growing sense in the public and private sectors of the city that these groups need, and deserve, access to the institutional life in Boston. We are now seeing, and will increasingly see, more black decision-makers integrated into the city's

power elite. To a lesser extent, we will see more Hispanic decision-makers brought into the centers of power.

Being on the 'frontier' implies a great degree of responsibility for Boston's racial minorities and for majority group members. Blacks and other minorities need to be resolute in demanding access to the political, social, and economic life of the city and region. They also must be serious in securing appropriate benefits from such access and participation. In addition, Blacks and other minorities must begin addressing problems in their own communities in a more honest, forthright manner. For too long now, racial minorities have failed to address problems internal to their own communities, and have used the scapegoat of racism as a catch-all for explaining away community problems.

Social institutions in the minority communities need to be strengthened. Several institutions in these communities have disappeared altogether, or retrenched significantly, over the past decade. At the same time, those community institutions that survive the 'shakedown cruise' brought on by the policies and programs of the Reagan Administration¹⁰ will emerge stronger and more resilient.

This is a challenging time to be a racial minority in Boston. The city is opening up to try and include those previously excluded. The opportunity structure is changing and it is a challenge to all concerned citizens to harness these changes and create a truly liveable, multi-racial, world-class city.

NOTES

1. As noted in Future Boston: Patterns and Perspectives (The Joint Center for Urban Studies of MIT and Harvard University, 1982), analyzing the shift in racial mix is problematic because of a fundamental weakness in census data. This weakness is related to a procedural difference used by the Census Bureau in 1970 which differed from 1980 in classifying the Spanish-surnamed population.
2. As of 1980, only Cambridge among Boston's suburbs had a black population greater than 10 percent. Among other selected suburbs in 1980, Brookline had a black population of 1.9 percent, Framingham was at 2.3 percent, Lynn was 3.9 percent black, Medford was at 2.8 percent, Quincy was 0.2 percent black, Randolph was at 3.0 percent, Watertown was at 0.5 percent, and Wellesley, 1.1 percent.
3. See "Boston's suburbs off limits to Blacks," The Boston Globe, Sunday, May 20, 1984, for Jonathan Kaufman's journalistic perspective on the role of racial discrimination in frustrating the dreams of blacks to leave the city. The article notes that until very recently, little attention was paid to housing discrimination in Boston's suburbs.
4. See Future Boston (1982), p. 57.
5. See Floyd J. Fowler, Jr., Black and White Perceptions of Quality of Life in Boston, Center for Survey Research, March 1982, p. 9.
6. John Avault, "Boston's Development, Economic, Fiscal and Neighborhood Impacts; Private Investment Projects Completed, 1975-82, Scheduled 1983-86, and Planned 1987 and Later," Boston Redevelopment Authority, June, 1984.
7. Based upon a conversation the author had with Brimmer when he was a guest speaker at University of Massachusetts-Boston on April 11, 1985.
8. See James E. Blackwell and Philip Hart, Cities, Suburbs and Blacks: A Study of Concerns, Distrust and Alienation (New York: General Hall, 1982), where in a study of five cities it was found that Blacks in Boston were 13 times more likely than Blacks in Los Angeles and Atlanta, and twelve times more likely than Blacks in Houston and Cleveland, to be distrustful of the power structure. In addition, according to Fowler (1982), Blacks in Boston feel that the Mayor and City Council have not done as much as other city institutions to make Boston a better place to live.
9. See Fowler (1982), Hart (1983) in remarks at The Boston Committee Policy Seminar, "In the Public Interest" at the JFK Library, February 23, 1983, and Blackwell and Hart (1983).

10. See Blackwell and Hart (1982), Ch. 8, "The Reagan Administration and Black Americans," pp. 181-210, in Cities, Suburbs and Blacks, for a comprehensive assessment of the programmatic and policy impacts of the Reagan Administration on black communities.

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A TEN-YEAR PERSPECTIVE ON THE ROLE OF BLACKS IN ACHIEVING
DESEGREGATION AND QUALITY EDUCATION IN BOSTON

by

CHARLES V. WILLIE

INTRODUCTION

In recent years, public education in the United States has undergone a massive change in social arrangement from legally sanctioned segregation to court-ordered desegregation. The change has been ordered largely by the court for the purpose of enforcing the Constitution's guarantee of equal protection of the law to all who participate in state-controlled activities. Public schools are agents of the state. The Supreme Court found segregated public education to be inherently unequal and required those school districts guilty of operating dual systems to make a prompt and reasonable start toward full compliance with the law.

The 1954 and 1955 Brown I and II Supreme Court decisions were similar to the 1896 Plessy v Ferguson decision in that the court did not provide specific guidelines for implementation. Without guidelines for achieving equal access to and equity in the use of segregated facilities, the 1896 ruling was never properly implemented. If it had been, segregation in public education would have ended long before the Brown decision, simply because separate-but-equal school facilities would have been too expensive to maintain. Failures to enforce the Plessy v. Ferguson decision resulted in the continuation of dual and unequal education for different racial populations within single school districts. This practice was found to be unconstitutional in Brown v. Board of Education (1954).

The turbulence experienced in public education since the middle of this century is directly attributable to the fact that we did not make the changes required by the Court during the first half of the century; that is, we did not make separate facilities for the races equal. We have reaped a whirlwind because of our failure to implement the requirements of the Supreme Court's Plessy decision.

The nation is faced with another Supreme Court requirement during the latter half of the twentieth century. This ruling requires each locality to achieve a unitary desegregated school system in which access to education is equal for racial populations and educational resources are distributed equitably. Once again, the court has provided no clear guidelines for implementation. If the nation ignores this requirement as it did during the years following the Plessy decision, by the year 2000, plus or minus a decade, we will again reap a whirlwind.

Robert Dentler, who has worked as a court-appointed expert in several school desegregation cases, including the Boston case, states that "judges . . . are generally ill-equipped by training or by staff limitations to undertake [the] task [of developing planning proposals to achieve unitary desegregated school systems]" (Dentler, 1976:127). In line with the Supreme Court order in Brown II (1955), judges have asked school authorities to develop these desegregation plans. This is tantamount to asking the fox that has been found guilty of stealing chickens to develop a plan to secure the chicken house against further theft. As Dentler states, the agents of the existing system "are themselves products and defenders of the status quo" (Dentler, 1976:127). For these reasons, school systems have not been forthcoming with effective school desegregation plans.

Ralph McGill said that the "careful and wise phrasing of the [Brown] decision rationally anticipated that the knowledge and skills of educators, of school psychologists and of the social sciences, would assume direction of the processes of desegregation" (McGill, 1964:249). Instead McGill found that most school desegregation plans have been created "not by educators, but by political office-holders and lawyers." As Dentler has noted, many of these lawyers ". . . have had professional experience with school desegregation, but very few . . . are knowledgeable urbanists or students of public education." (Dentler, 1976:127). As early as 1964, McGill noted that "history . . . is drawing a harsh indictment of those political leaders who . . . took a decision delineating the rights of children . . . and dishonestly distorted it . . ." (McGill, 1964:246).

As we move into the final decades of the twentieth century, this indictment of dishonest distortion may be applied to some citizens at large, including educators and social scientists as well as politicians. In some instances, the distortions derive not so much from deliberate dishonesty as "from a base of ignorance about objectives" of court ordered school desegregation (Dentler, 1976:127). Even so, the civil rights of individuals are violated when they are not guaranteed equal protection of the laws. And, of course, ignorance of the law is no excuse. Thus, the time is at hand to do what is right. "Desegregation," according to Dentler, "communicates to children and youth that the rule of law continues and is extended to include them" (Dentler, 1976:133).

THE RULE OF LAW

This is precisely what Federal District Judge W. Arthur Garrity did in Morgan v. Kerrigan (1974). In 1972, plaintiffs sought declaratory and injunctive relief in the federal district court against discrimination in the operation of the Boston Public Schools, in violation of the Thirteenth and Fourteenth Amendments of the United States Constitution. The trial began in 1973; the court issued its opinion regarding the liability phase of the litigation in 1974. According to court findings, Boston's School Committee had intentionally operated a dual school system; the city's students, teachers, and school facilities had been systematically segregated by race. Such segregation resulted in overcrowding of some school facilities and underutilization of others, incoherent grade structures, discriminatory admission procedures for students, and discriminatory assignment practices for students and teachers by race. These and other actions created unequal and inferior educational opportunities for black and other minority children in Boston.

The court directed the School Committee to develop and file a desegregation plan for Boston schools. Two plans--one approved by the School Committee and one not approved--were presented. The black plaintiffs also filed a plan and so did the Boston Home and School Association in behalf of a group of largely white parents. The Home and School Association plan was declared constitutionally inadequate by the court. The court then appointed a racially integrated panel of four masters to assess the adequacy of the alternative plans and to develop a plan of its own if none of the alternatives was sufficient to satisfy constitutional requirements of redress. The masters were assisted by a racially integrated panel of two experts, also appointed by

the court. The masters held hearings on the adequacy of the proposed plans, and eventually submitted their own plan, which included concepts and ideas from the other plans and their own innovative desegregation strategies. The goal of the masters' plan was to completely desegregate Boston schools and to enhance their educational quality. The masters also sought to defuse hostility between black and white communities that had been generated by the school desegregation issue.

The court modified the masters' plan but incorporated many of its innovative features into a final plan issued in 1975. The remedy was comprehensive: The Boston school system was unified organizationally so that all constituencies could understand the chain of command. A student-assignment plan consisted of eight racially heterogeneous community districts and a ninth citywide magnet-school district. Within community districts, students were assigned to schools by geocodes -- small area units each comprising two to twenty blocks. Some geocodes are predominantly white and others have predominantly black (or other minority) residential populations. By assigning students to schools from a balance of minority and majority geocodes, the educational planner can ensure that each school has a desegregated student body. Students not wishing to attend an assigned community school may volunteer for a desegregated magnet school. A comprehensive curriculum of academic, vocational, business, and general courses was ordered for all high schools (except the Occupational Resources Center), and a uniform grade structure was required so that all high schools in the community would be accessible to all students in lower-level schools. Bilingual programs for several lingual minorities were initiated. Three college preparatory high schools to which entrance is based on competitive

examination were retained, but these schools, whose minority enrollment had been less than one-sixth before court-ordered desegregation, had to accept one-third or more minorities in each entering class. The administrative and teaching staff of the school system was racially diversified, with blacks and other minorities having a critical mass of not less than one-fourth. Affirmative action in the recruitment of students for extracurricular activities was also required.

Other provisions of the court's plan improved the services offered to students of all races. Unsafe and unfit structures were closed; repairs and renovations were ordered. Students with special needs due to various handicaps were mainstreamed when possible, and special educators were mandated in schools they attended. The city's first complete system of student transportation was instituted as a result of the school desegregation plan; the proportions of students who use this system are equitable among the racial groups. A more elaborate discussion of these desegregative and quality-enhancing strategies is presented by Robert Dentler in "The Boston School Desegregation Plan" (1984) and Schools on Trial (Dentler and Scott, 1981).

Beyond these changes, Boston Public Schools have improved in educational quality through the development of system-wide curriculum objectives, promotional standards, and school-based management. Moreover, teacher-incentive grants are available and an Institute for Professional Development has been created. Community and parental involvement have increased too. Boston schools and area businesses have entered into an agreement known as the Boston Compact. Businesses have promised to place at least four hundred graduating seniors a year in good entry-level jobs and to

increase the number of summer jobs offered to Boston students by threefold. Each city high school has a corporate partner. Boston has also experienced a unique relationship with its many colleges and universities as a result of school desegregation. Initially, twenty-three institutions of higher education were paired with a Boston school or a community district. Judge Garrity gained the cooperation of these institutions in the hope that these colleges would support and participate in the development of educational excellence within the public schools in Boston. Many of these pairing arrangements have remained, and the program of cooperation has escalated into a Higher Education Agreement that has, as one of its objectives, to increase the number of Boston graduates admitted to colleges and universities in the metropolitan area (Spillane, 1985:19-23). These changes are extraordinary and represent significant improvements in public education in Boston.

The Superintendent of Boston Public Schools reported in 1985, a decade after implementation of the court-ordered remedy, that "Black, white, Asian and Hispanic students are going to school together, becoming sensitive to each other, and developing an appreciation of pluralism and learning to judge individuals on the basis of their character and not on the basis of race, religion or ethnicity" (Spillane, 1985:22). This was the goal not only of the black plaintiffs when they filed the court case in 1972, but has been the goal of the many people who have worked to achieve school desegregation over the years. This goal was articulated by Martin Luther King Jr., who said that "All . . . are caught in an inescapable network of mutuality, tied in a single garment of destiny" (King quoted in Hoskins, 1968:79). His dream was that the sons and daughters of former slaves and the offspring of former slave owners would be able to sit down together at the table of love and respect (King in

Hoskins, (1968:2). At the March on Washington for Jobs and Freedom, August 28, 1963, King said, "I have a dream that my four little children will one day live in a nation where they will not be judged by the color of their skin but by the content of their character" (King quoted in Franklin and Starr, 1967:146). In speaking of his children, King articulated his dream of equality for all children -- in Boston and elsewhere in the nation.

VIOLENCE THAT COULD HAVE BEEN AVOIDED

The state of mutual respect among the races that is beginning to appear in Boston emerged out of a history of violence that could have been avoided. Two years went by after the court found that the Boston School Committee had by official action, created and operated a segregated school system before Mayor Kevin White told the citizens of his city that "desegregation will continue, . . ." that "it must be enforced . . ." and that "violent resistance will [not] succeed." While the mayor shared these sentiments with the public in a televised address on June, 1976, he also told the public that he understood and shared "the general discontent" in Boston "with compulsory busing" for desegregation.

There may have been discontent in South Boston, Charlestown, East Boston, Hyde Park, and Dorchester with the court order to desegregate the public schools, but not general discontent throughout Boston as claimed by the mayor. While slightly more than half of the white population (56 percent) in 1982 could not identify any specific positive outcome of school desegregation, only one-third or less believed it was harmful to bus children away from neighborhood schools or that desegregation exacerbated racial tensions (Boston Globe, 1982b:24). Actually, there was not general discontent in Boston with

court-ordered school desegregation, at least not among Blacks. In the early 1980s the Boston Globe commissioned a poll by Social Data Analysts, Inc., in which 73 percent of black parents expressed concern that an end to court-ordered student assignments would be a setback for Blacks. Moreover, 71 percent said that if they had a choice of sending their child to either of two schools equal in quality, they would choose an integrated over a segregated school. When asked directly about court-ordered busing, Blacks were about equally divided between those who thought it was a good idea and those who thought differently or had no opinion (Boston Globe, May 12, 1982:41). By 1982, a poll taken by the Center for Survey Research for the Boston Committee, Inc., revealed that crime and problems associated with housing and municipal services were ranked as more important than school-related problems among Blacks. The same was true for Whites (Boston Globe, 1982b:24).

Earlier, when decisive action by Mayor White could have avoided violence, he in effect "abdicated his own responsibility for providing leadership." This is the conclusion of Pamela Bullard, Joyce Grant, and Judith Stoia who note in their study of resistance to desegregation that when the court order was handed down, the mayor "indicated that implementation of the court order was the School Committee's responsibility and that his responsibility as mayor was to protect public safety" (Bullard, Grant, Stoia, 1981:38). A few years later, during the Bicentennial year, when White appeared to be rallying community support for acceptance of the court order, he again refused to assume full responsibility for the unconstitutional segregation in Boston and the requirement to dismantle the dual school system. He called the federal court order to guarantee the constitutional rights of black and other minority children "an intrusion into the lives of the neighborhood." Then, he declared

in his 1976 televised address that "Desegregation is, first of all, a federal responsibility. The constitutional policy which is being enforced in Boston is a federal policy imposed by federal courts. And it is the duty of the federal government to help make that policy work."

POLICIES FOR MAINTAINING THE PEACE

The absence of forthright support by the mayor for the school desegregation court order is mentioned because studies of school desegregation in other communities indicate that "desegregation . . . is only loosely correlated with . . . attitudes or prejudices of the population," and that "successful public school desegregation has been carried out in places where supposedly the prevailing attitudes favored segregation" (Williams and Ryan, 1954:241). Moreover, these studies have found that "a clearcut policy, administered with understanding but also with resolution, seems to have been most effective in accomplishing desegregation with a minimum of difficulty . . . [that] fluctuating policies appear to have maximized confusion and resistance" (Williams and Ryan, 1954:242). Fluctuation is an appropriate description of the mayor's pronouncements. While declaring that desegregation is an order of the Supreme Court and that the court order must be enforced, he called it an intrusion into the neighborhood, an intrusion that was unacceptable by some neighborhoods, and a federal responsibility. The mayor projected his role as that of a victim who had tried against great odds to hold his city together.

To his credit, the mayor did attend kaffeeklatsches in several sections of the city "in an attempt to gain peaceful compliance with the court order" (Bullard, Grant, Stoia, 1981:37). Alan Lupo has recorded the conversation in

one of these sessions in Dorchester. The mayor was in a home with his fellow white Catholics sitting at one end of a long table in a small playroom-bar in the basement drinking coffee:

"There'll be a black mayor someday," he tells them, "and the city won't fall apart."

'It won't be our city anymore,' says a young woman.

'That's what the Yankees said about the Irish,' he tells her.

The group erupts in protest. 'The Irish weren't dangerous.'"

(Lupo, 1977:19).

CRITICISMS: PRO AND CON

Bullard, Grant, and Stoia report that "the kaffeeklatsches took place in every section of the city except South Boston." "Mayor White," they said, "avoided South Boston because it was the heart of [City Councilor] Louise Day Hicks' constituency" (Bullard, Grant, Stoia, 1981:37). South Boston also was the home base of State Senator William Bulger and State Representative Michael Flaherty. Bulger and Flaherty, together with Louise Day Hicks, issued a Declaration of Clarification during the early days of school desegregation which was an "analysis of why resistance to busing was justified" (Bullard, Grant, Stoia, 1981:41). To his credit, State Representative Raymond Flynn, also from South Boston, who became mayor of Boston in the 1980s, refused to sign the Declaration because "he viewed the statement as incendiary" (Bullard, Grant, and Stoia, 1981:41). Beyond justifying resistance to desegregation, the statement claimed that "crime was so rampant in Roxbury that it was unsafe for Whites to enter that community" (Bullard, Grant, Stoia, 1981:41). The facts are, however, that Roxbury has always accommodated Whites as residents.

The 1980 census reveals that ten out of every one hundred individuals in predominantly black Roxbury are white; but less than one out of every one hundred individuals in predominantly white South Boston is black or Hispanic (Kaufman, 1984:19). Moreover, Roxbury High School peacefully desegregated and enrolled black, white, and Hispanic students without violence. South Boston High School was the setting of greater danger. After the stoning of a school bus carrying black students in South Boston and the absence of any condemnation of the violence by the mayor or other elected officials, Jerome Winegar, South Boston High School headmaster, leveled what was labeled by the Boston Globe as a "scalding criticism" at the city's establishment for their silence in September of 1979. Winegar was "particularly shock[ed]," said the Globe, "that the silence was . . . so nearly universal." The Globe observed that "the business and religious leaders, and the press, too, are culpable for not having spoken out . . . in unequivocal opposition to violence and racism" (Boston Globe, 1979a:12).

An interesting sidenote is that James Kelly, President of the South Boston Information Center -- a group that publicly opposed school desegregation -- had a job with the city administration during the period when some of the violence occurred (Boston Globe, 1979b:2). There was no evidence that the South Boston Information Center was involved in the incident after which Winegar criticized city officials' silence. However, some observers believed that some politicians failed to publicly condemn the violence which they did not condone because the administration wanted to carry South Boston neighborhoods as well as black voters in the 1980 election (Boston Globe, 1979b:2). The observation that politics makes for strange bedfellows plays itself out daily and from year to succeeding year in Boston. In a later

interview, Mayor Kevin White explained his philosophy about hiring neighborhood people: "If I want clowns, I should be able to have them. But I consider [some neighborhood people] good talented people, who keep me informed about the neighborhoods, who represent me" (Boston Globe, 1981:26).

BENEFICIAL EFFECTS OF SCHOOL DESEGREGATION

By June of 1979, some beneficial effects of school desegregation that had been seen in other schools were appearing in South Boston High School, too. Members of the Citywide Parents Advisory Council visited the school and spoke approvingly of its "positive climate." Three years earlier, Judge Garrity had found the school "in turmoil" with constant "racial fights among students." He placed the school in receivership, ordered the administration removed and recruited Jerome Winegar from St. Paul, Minnesota. South Boston, the high school that had experienced the most traumatic changes under court-ordered desegregation, was written about glowingly by the education editor of the Boston Globe under the caption "Turn Around at Southie" (Boston Globe, 1979c:1, 6).

Actually, systemwide positive effects had been noted by veteran school desegregation watchers shortly after the remedy was ordered. Taking stock the second year of court-ordered school desegregation, Muriel Cohen of the Boston Globe said, "the Boston schools are on their way up. Slowly. Reading scores are holding the rise of last year. The news story continued, "Preliminary reading test results for the year . . . show improvement in a number of district high schools, gains for minority children but no loss for whites" (Boston Globe, 1976:56).

PERCEPTION OF COMMUNITY LEADERS

In 1977, Susan Greenblatt, Paul Schindler and I received a grant from the Blanchard Foundation to study the response of selected community leaders to school desegregation. Our purpose was to record the observations of middle-range leaders -- those in charge of citywide and neighborhood associations or organizations representing various constituencies. About one hundred and eighteen names of leaders in the political, voluntary, economic, educational, and religious sectors were obtained from newspaper articles and from nominations by the leaders themselves. A total of thirty individuals returned our mailed questionnaires. However, these individuals seemed to be fairly representative of the total population of middle-range leaders in our sample. The leaders were asked to respond to six open-ended questions such as: What effect did school desegregation have on the quality of education in Boston? How could the desegregation process be improved? Who contributed most or least to disruptions in the community associated with school desegregation? The leaders also supplied demographic data about themselves: 80 percent were male and 20 percent, female; 73 percent were white and 27 percent, black or other minority; 68 percent were thirty to forty-nine years of age and 18 percent, fifty to fifty-nine; 57 percent lived in Boston and 43 percent in the suburbs; 57 percent had school-age children, and 43 percent did not.

Regarding the quality of education in Boston, about half of the community leaders (48 percent) believed it had improved since school desegregation; only one-fourth (24 percent) said it had deteriorated. The features that these community leaders believed had contributed most to improving the quality of education in Boston were (from most-frequently to least-frequently mentioned)

magnet schools; the pairing arrangement between schools and community agencies such as businesses, colleges, and universities; and parental participation in school policy making.

When asked what contributed to the disruptions in the city associated with school desegregation, a majority of the community leaders identified a generalized negative community attitude. About a third of the respondents also attributed disruptions to inadequate community leadership. However, the proportion who referred to negative community attitudes as a significant contextual factor was substantially higher than the proportion of those who blamed inadequate leadership for community disruptions. It is interesting to note that the court-ordered desegregation plan itself or its coverage by the media were mentioned least as events that triggered disruptions. thus, Mayor White's opinion that the remedy ordered by Judge Garrity in 1975 "guaranteed a continuation of . . . tension and hostility throughout the city" was not shared by most of the other community leaders whom we studied (Bullard, Grant, Stoia, 1981:49).

The number of Blacks and other minorities among the community leaders in our study was small. Nevertheless, the proportion who felt that education had improved since school desegregation was almost twice as great as the proportion of Whites who had this feeling. The 1982 survey commissioned by the Boston Committee found that a similar ratio of Blacks to Whites felt that "busing [had] improved educational opportunities [in Boston]." In that survey, the proportion of Blacks was slightly more than twice as great as the proportion of Whites who believed there was improvement. And conversely, almost twice as many Whites believed that busing had reduced the quality of education in Boston as Blacks who held this view (Boston Globe, 1982b:24).

Thus, when the mayor asserted that a general discontent existed in Boston about busing, he was not reflecting the attitudes of Blacks.

DESEGREGATION BURDENS OF A BLACK AND BROWN MAJORITY

While Blacks in Boston generally continue to support school desegregation and see more good than bad in it than Whites do, those who have been pioneers have mental and physical scars to show for their perseverance. Blacks now make up 47 percent of the students in Boston public schools. Whites are 28 percent. And other minorities, including Hispanics, Asians and Native Americans, are 25 percent. The people of color clearly are a majority. Being a minority may be of concern to Whites but neither minority nor majority status is of concern to Blacks.

Toward the end of the 1970s, School Superintendent Robert Wood made the return of Whites and of middle-class families to the public school system a high priority (Boston Globe, 1979d:16). West Roxbury, which the Phoenix newspaper has described as a "name . . . synonymous with white and middle-class" has schools that "offer good programs to those who do attend. But these are half-empty," according to the Phoenix "and for all practical purposes, segregated." This assessment is not entirely accurate. The Morris school in West Roxbury, for example, enrolled one hundred and thirty-three multicultural students, 18 percent of whom were white, in 1979 (Phoenix, 1979:6). With nearly one-fifth of the school's population white, there is almost a sufficient critical mass to guarantee that Whites as a specific population will have a cultural impact on the learning environment. When Whites are only one-fifth of a school's population, the media are inclined to call such a setting segregated. But when people of color are one-fifth of a

school's population, the media are inclined to label the school integrated. Because Whites were outnumbered in the Morris School, horror stories circulated in the neighborhood concerning the conduct of children in school. A white parent visited the school one day to check out the stories and "found a quiet, disciplined environment" (Phoenix, 1979:7). Yet, one should have expected a disciplined environment even though a majority of the students in West Roxbury schools are people of color. This also is the experience of South Boston High School, which has turned around from initial turmoil and become a genuine learning environment, with a majority of its students people of color.

DESEGREGATION: A BLACK, WHITE, OR MUTUAL BENEFIT

However, since Whites have increasingly abandoned city schools, Blacks who formerly were willing to accept the hardship of busing and serve as pioneers for desegregation are increasingly asking why they should not have more of a choice in the schools their children will attend. When asked if they would prefer to choose the school their children attend rather than have a school assigned, 79 percent say "yes." This does not mean that Blacks have given up on desegregation, but that, since they are likely to be a majority in any school to which they are assigned, Blacks would prefer wider latitude in choosing schools.

For example, by court order, Boston Latin School or Boston Latin Academy should accept at least 35 percent of its entering class from black and other minority applicants. Before school desegregation, less than one-sixth of the students in these schools was minority. While Blacks and other minorities must be offered more seats in these prestigious learning environments than

they were offered before the court case, practices for these two schools are still inequitable in comparison with enrollment practices in other magnet schools. The court mandated that enrollment in magnet schools, in general, should be strictly in accordance with the proportions of Whites, Blacks, and other minorities in the city system. Since Blacks are 47 percent of the students in the total system, they are eligible for 47 percent of the seats in magnet schools and Whites are eligible for 28 percent of the seats. The enrollment in magnet schools is a self-adjusting ratio, with the proportions of students in the various racial populations citywide as the standard for admissions goals or guidelines.

LATIN SCHOOLS AND WHITES

Since Boston Latin School and Boston Latin Academy are magnet schools, the court, in effect, violated its own rule by exempting these schools from the requirement that student bodies strictly reflect the citywide population. "Don't tamper with the examination schools" (the name the Latin schools are also called), was the prevailing attitude in the Boston community when the court-appointed masters were designing the desegregation plan. The court and even some politicians were willing to support the rights of minorities to equal access to educational opportunities, as long as the racial equality movement did not substantially encroach upon the opportunities to which high status white families believed they were entitled. Their disproportionate access to the most prestigious educational resource in the city -- the Latin School and the Latin Academy -- is their entitlement designated by their own group which the court partially respected.

Recognizing the unfairness of their arrangement, the plaintiffs in the mid-1980s petitioned the court to treat the Latin schools like all other magnet schools. Again, a chorus of high-status leaders in state government and in education responded: "Don't tamper with the examination schools." Boston University's president, John Silber, allegedly said that the plan of the plaintiffs to reduce white enrollment at Boston Latin School would destroy the school. Governor Michael Dukakis opposed the proposed enrollment plan, too (Boston Globe, 1985a:38). All of this indicates that Blacks in Boston have fewer choices than Whites in obtaining extraordinary educational opportunities. For this reason, Blacks want more choices. Clearly, Whites have occupied a disproportionate number of seats in the Latin schools. This means that they have disproportionately more choices regarding whether they will attend such schools. In 1984, Whites were 28 percent of the student body in Boston public schools but 57 percent of the student body in the Boston Latin School. The Whites' proportion in the Latin School was twice as great as it would have been if Whites had been enrolled in terms of their citywide proportion. Moreover, Blacks in Boston Latin School would be over one thousand students instead of between five and six hundred students if they were enrolled in accordance with their proportion of the citywide student body.

LIMITED BLACK EDUCATIONAL OPPORTUNITY

Public opinion polls reveal that in many cities throughout the nation, including Boston, two out of every three Blacks feel that they do not have the same educational opportunities as Whites, even after school desegregation. Recognizing that the present court-ordered desegregation plan has not achieved all of the hoped-for educational outcomes (such as, for example, equal access

to the excellent education that the Latin schools provide) some black parents in Boston have opted for something different. The preference by 79 percent for freedom-of-choice in school enrollment is simply a preference for something different in the hope that it might be better than what currently exists. Actually a substantial proportion of Blacks probably would opt for any plan different from the present one if they believed it would improve their educational opportunities, which a majority believe are less than they should be despite court intervention. This opinion is offered because of the nature of the question asked of Blacks in the Boston survey: "Would you prefer to have [the] court-ordered student-assignment replaced with a system allowing parents to choose [the] school their child attends?" It is not clear whether a yes response to such a compounded question is against the court-ordered student assignment plan, against the way that plan had been administered by the Boston School Department, or is for a freedom-of-choice plan or some other unnamed alternative.

FLEXIBLE ATTENDANCE ZONES

Actually, the disappointment expressed by some Boston black parents about the court's student assignment desegregation plan may be misplaced. Desegregation planning expert Robert Dentler, who had advised the Federal District Court in Boston, tells us that the court-ordered attendance zones were designed to be self-adjusting as a way of maintaining heterogeneity but that the Boston School Department always resisted revising attendance zones in the name of maintaining stability. According to Dentler, the School Department's resistance to adjusting the zones gave their implementation of the court order a "grotesquely rigid character" that defeated the intention of

the court. In the process of exalting stability, Dentler said, the Boston School Department created a condition in which "each year, the number of segregated schools . . . will increase . . ." (Dentler and Scott, 1981:72).

PREFERENTIAL TREATMENT FOR BLACKS OR WHITES

Judge Garrity proposed a ceiling of 80 percent on the proportion of students from one race that could be assigned to a school to prevent schools in Dorchester, Hyde Park and Mattapan from becoming 90 percent or more black. The School Department's chief desegregation officer allegedly said, "enforcing the ceiling could require giving preferential treatment to black students from these neighborhoods who apply to citywide magnet schools" (Boston Globe, 1985:32). It is strange that a school official in charge of desegregation is concerned about a proposal that would prevent any school in Boston from becoming, in Dentler's words, "monoethnic" (Dentler and Scott, 1981:72). Even stranger is this officer's concern about the possibility of Blacks receiving preferential opportunity to attend magnet schools while he does not question the preferential opportunity to attend the examination magnet schools that is an actuality for Whites. This is the kind of contradiction that causes black parents to believe that the school desegregation student assignment plan has been implemented more for the benefit of Whites than of Blacks, even though Blacks were the plaintiffs in the class-action suit and even though they won the case.

That the welfare of Whites had been the first concern of leaders in the Boston School Department was revealed in these further remarks by its chief desegregation officer. An additional reason why he opposed a cap on the proportion of Blacks enrolled in a school (even if the absence of a cap might

result in all-black resegregated buildings) is that "Whites from Dorchester and Hyde Park might also be at a disadvantage when they apply to magnet schools." Their disadvantage, of course, would be due to the overflow of Blacks from district schools more than 80 percent black, who would be sent to other schools, including magnet schools (Boston Globe, 1985b:32). Magnet schools are popular with Whites, especially high-status Whites, and school administrators apparently try to make as many seats as possible available to Whites. Dianne Dumanoski of the Phoenix said that some white, middle-class parents in West Roxbury do use Boston public schools selectively: "Their children attend the public-school kindergarten, the exam schools (like Boston Latin), and the Chapter 766 programs if they have special needs. Some families are still willing to use the public schools if their children are lucky in the assignment lottery and get places in a magnet school." (Phoenix, 1979:6).

BLACKS' REQUESTS RESPONDED TO FOR WHITES

A further irony in the Boston school desegregation case is that innovations first proposed by Blacks are made available first to Whites, if they seem to be of educational value. In the early 1980s, a split developed among the plaintiffs. Some Blacks, represented by Attorney Larry Johnson of the Center for Law and Education, asked that the 1975 court-ordered student assignment plan be replaced with one that is more flexible. Specifically, they proposed that free choice replace mandatory student assignments. The Superintendent of Schools, Robert Spillane, acknowledged that more flexible options could be considered, but he opposed a freedom of choice plan (Boston Globe, 1982a:41).

By 1985, however, the Boston School Committee had developed a more flexible proposal "to give parents in part of the city more choice in the assignment of their children to elementary schools" (Boston Globe, 1985b:18). "The new approach would allow parents to apply, in preferential order, to as many as five grammar schools in the district." The irony is that the experimental district embraces West Roxbury, Roslindale, Hyde Park, and parts of Dorchester (Boston Globe, 1985b:18). These communities, according to the 1980 census, are 98, 93, 86, and 67 percent white, respectively.

The Blacks who first proposed a modification in the student assignment plan are concentrated in Mattapan, Roxbury, and the South End, with populations that are 81, 78, and 41 percent black. Since Blacks were the first to propose a modification in the student assignment plan, it would seem appropriate to experiment with a more flexible plan (even though it is not exactly what Blacks proposed) in one or more districts that embrace a higher proportion of Blacks. However, the School Committee decided to experiment with the more flexible plan in two communities where Blacks are 13 to 25 percent of the total population and in two other communities in which they are 1 percent or less of the total population. Such activity by official bodies in Boston causes Blacks to wonder who won the school desegregation case and whether the outcome was worth the effort.

Blacks are particularly disappointed that the court did not order the examination schools open to Blacks in the same way that other magnet schools are open to them. Their main reason for bringing suit against the School Committee was to improve the quality of education available to black children. "The priorities indicated by minority education planners focus

primarily on educational benefits and secondarily on desegregative or student assignment strategies" (Willie, 1984:44).

FREEDOM OF CHOICE

Attorney Larry Johnson eventually withdrew from the Boston desegregation case, and was replaced by the earlier attorney of record, Robert Pressman of the Center for Law and Education. The lead attorney after Johnson withdrew was one who had been involved before, when he was a National Association for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP) staff member -- Thomas Atkins. Atkins reentered the case when Johnson and some of the plaintiffs' parents began to advocate scrapping the court-ordered student assignments and using a freedom-of-choice approach. Atkins was aware that freedom of choice school desegregation has not worked in the past and offers little opportunity of working in the present. As explained by desegregation planners Larry Hughes, William Gordon and Larry Hillman: "school systems must have some form of attendance boundaries for each school . . . in order for a student to choose a school he or she is not assigned to." Moreover, they say, "the choice must improve the racial balance of both the sending and receiving school". Finally, they observe that "though volunteerism and freedom of choice have a democratic ring to them, and appeal to the emotional needs of local citizens, they tend not to work, or if they work, they involve an insignificant portion of the total school population" (Hughes, Gordon, Hillman, 1981:18). Besides this evidence from past records which does not support the freedom-of-choice approach, Johnson had difficulty winning acceptance for this desegregation method precisely because it displaces Blacks' primary concern for educational considerations with an approach based more on method. Among Blacks, the

method of achieving school desegregation has always been secondary to the quality of learning outcomes. Johnson's emphasis on method violated this priority. Moreover, it confused the public by suggesting that Blacks had given up on school desegregation, an assumption clearly contradicted by the 6,000 Blacks waiting to participate in the METCO program that buses 3,000 Boston students a year to suburban school systems. (Boston Globe, 1977:31).

This analysis has revealed that Whites, including many in the population at large as well as some educational planners, have had difficulty fully embracing desegregation. The approach of Johnson and the plaintiffs he represented was more closely akin to the orientation of these Whites than to that of most Blacks. Yet controversy between attorneys Larry Johnson and Thomas Atkins and the plaintiffs they represented indicates that Blacks are not a monolithic community with a stereotyped point of view.

A DIVERSIFIED DECISION-MAKING COMMITTEE

The Boston school desegregation case dragged on for years largely because the duly constituted school authority in Boston, the School Committee, resisted the court and most of its orders. This resistance began with many missed opportunities to take affirmative administrative action to redress the grievances cited by Blacks. One might guess that the School Committee would have been more responsive to Blacks and other minorities over the years if representatives of these groups had been involved in making decisions about issues that minorities had presented.

To guarantee diversity in the highest decision-making authority for schools, Boston has given up on electing its School Committee and City Council at-large. Because of the expense of running a citywide election and the

tendency for provincial Bostonians to vote for their own kind (Baltzell, 1979:143-175), the city has developed nine voting districts from which most School Board members are elected with a few elected at large. The School Board now has black and white members and one Hispanic. This is the first time that the School Committee has had this kind of diversity. When Morgan v. Hennigan was filed in the federal court in 1972, the School Committee was all white. The function of the minority is to be a self-correcting element in the society.

LESSONS FROM THE PAST

Derrick Wong, who studied with me when he was a student in Harvard College, prepared a succinct statement about the role that minorities have played in reforming public education in the Commonwealth and particularly in Boston. This is what he found.

Beginning in 1798, the first school for black children was established in Boston. Ironically, the school was established at the behest of black parents. These parents believed that their children would best learn in schools where sympathetic persons would respond to their children's particular needs. Yet even more importantly, these parents felt that their children could not attend the public schools because the schools' overwhelming racial prejudice would obstruct, if not obliterate, their children's chances of gaining an education. The black parents had little choice but to create a separate school. They established such a school with the support of white friends and the contributions of white philanthropists. For the city of Boston had refused to incur

the school's expense. Not until 1812 did Boston begin financial assistance to the school. Boston finally incorporated the school into the public school system in 1820. The school system required all black children to attend the school (then called the Smith Grammar School), while forbidding all white children from attending the school. Of the 117 primary public schools, the Smith Grammar School on Belknap Street had been the only one set aside for exclusive use of black children. Already Boston had developed a dual school system predicated upon racial discrimination.

Yet this time period was also an age of social reform. A center of mid-nineteenth century social reform, the city of Boston eliminated many racial injustices. Laws prohibiting racial intermarriage were rescinded. Railroads were forced to abandon their Jim Crow cars. Even Boston's schools, segregated since 1798, came under attack. Boston's black citizenry took the initiative in 1848, petitioning the School Committee to abolish racially segregated schools. The issue of school desegregation then quickly developed into a major controversy. White citizens joined black citizens to protest segregation in the public schools. Led by the black writer and historian William C. Nell, these citizens demonstrated their opposition to racially exclusive schools through the use of petitions, newspaper articles, mass meetings, and pickets. Their efforts failed, however, to persuade the school committee. The Boston School Committee voted to maintain segregated schools. Even during the heyday of social reform, Boston still refused to integrate its schools.

Undaunted, the citizens' group channeled their energies away from the school committee and towards the courts. Unable to procure school committee reform, the group sought judicial redress. One of the group's activists, Benjamin F. Roberts, brought suit against the city of Boston on behalf of his five-year-old daughter, Sarah C. Roberts. Sarah had been assigned to the Smith Grammar School for Negroes that was set aside for Boston's black children. Although most children attended their neighborhood schools, Sarah was denied admission to the five white schools which were closer to her home than the Smith School. She had been discriminated against solely on the basis of her race. Her case eventually came before the Supreme Court of Massachusetts in 1849. The Massachusetts Supreme Court, however, decided against the plaintiffs, ruling in favor of the School Committee's authority to maintain segregated schools.

Defeated in the courts, the citizens' groups then sought legislative enactment of its goals. Riding on the sentiments of Boston's growing Abolitionist movement, these citizens convinced the legislature to ban racial discrimination in the public schools. On April 18, 1855, a new legal statute declared that "in determining the qualifications of scholars to be admitted into any Public School or any District School in the Commonwealth, no distinction shall be made on account of the race, color, or religious opinion of the applicant or scholar." Complying with the law, the School Committee began desegregating the public schools in the fall of 1855 (Wong, 1976, pp. 2-4).

Such was the initiative of the minority more than a century ago to free the majority from the prison of racial prejudice and discrimination. But the majority would not listen and learn from the wisdom of the minority. The majority would not say, "I will go with you and you may come with me. Your desegregation will be my integration and we shall all prosper together." Instead, most Bostonians hardened their hearts against school desegregation during the mid-nineteenth century and won the court case of Roberts v. the City of Boston in 1849. The ruling in that case was one that would undermine enforcement of the 1855 antidiscrimination law even before it was passed. In the Roberts case, the Massachusetts Supreme Court found that segregated schools were "in the best interests of both Blacks and Whites." The School Committee was required to act "reasonably" in assigning pupils to schools. "By 'reasonable,' the court simply required that School Committee policies be in keeping with the dominant customs and traditions" (Wong, 1976, p. 17).

Only a partial victory resulted from the efforts of the nineteenth century, in part because reluctant and perfunctory enforcement by the School Committee offset legislative reform. More than one hundred years later, the minority once more assumed the responsibility of freeing the majority from racial discrimination. This time the case was filed in the Federal District Court in 1972 and was listed as Morgan v. Hennigan. Morgan and other plaintiffs were black or racial minorities.

Because of the pattern of more than a century of resistance to the moral and legal responsibility to desegregate the schools, education for everyone began to suffer. Thus, in 1974, Judge W. Arthur Garrity, Jr., of the United States District Court in Boston found that the Boston School Committee "intentionally and purposefully caused or maintained racial segregation in

meaningful or significant segments of the public school system in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment" of the Constitution. Further he found that the segregated schools were a deficit model of education, not only for Blacks but also for Whites. For example, several schools were found to be overcrowded during the 1971-72 school year. These were schools in Dorchester, South Boston, Hyde Park and Charlestown. With the exception of Dorchester, a majority of the students in these schools at that time were white. The court found that school officials "did not consider assigning students from overcrowded white schools to black schools with available space . . ." Thus, Whites were forced to endure the "educational damage" of overcrowding because school officials wished to maintain segregation and thought that white parents would object to race-mixing in the public schools, even if this meant that the "adverse education effects" of overcrowding could be overcome. The court found this to be an act of intentional racial segregation. The segregative sins of white mothers and fathers during the mid-nineteenth century were visited upon their children's children one hundred years later in the form of overcrowded public schools.

In a song book entitled Ye Olde New England Psalm Tunes that is published by the Oliver Ditson Company of Bryn Mawr, Pennsylvania, there is a collection of songs of the Revolutionary period.. One, written in 1788 and set to music by William Billings, is called "Lamentation Over Boston." One line from that song written nearly two hundred years ago is the present anticipated by the past: "A voice was heard in Roxbury which echoed through the continent; weeping, weeping, weeping, weeping for Boston, weeping for Boston, weeping, weeping for Boston because of their danger." Truly the past is prologue for the future. Blessed be the Blacks and Browns of Roxbury, Mattapan, the South

End, and North End today. They are the minority who continue to attempt to redeem the majority.

A REPENTANT SCHOOL COMMITTEE

The final act of redemption came during the summer of 1985. Judge Garrity decided it was time "to take the final steps to close this case" (Boston Globe, July 6, 1985^a:22). The judge's final order prohibited discrimination and segregation on the basis of race. He intended this as a "permanent injunction" (Boston Globe, July 6, 1985^b:22).

Judge Garrity took these steps because of his finding of "willingness and ability" by the School Committee to maintain desegregation in Boston (Boston Globe, July 6, 1985^c:22). Evidence of this willingness and ability was revealed on the final day of the month of July 1985, when the School Committee in a nine-vote majority decision elected Laval S. Wilson superintendent of schools. Wilson becomes the twenty-first superintendent of Boston schools since the office was created in 1851, according to the Boston Globe (August 1, 1985^d:1), and the first black person to serve as chief school officer. By its vote, the School Committee indicated willingness to share high-level decision-making power with an individual who, like the plaintiffs in the desegregation suit, is black.

The School Committee's election of Wilson, a talented administrator with an outstanding professional record, signals more than just the end of discrimination in employment at all levels of the system. Wilson's election also represents the action of a repentant Boston that realizes it must give compensating advantages to the group it has harmed. To award the position of

chief school officer to a representative of that group is indeed an act of contrition by the School Committee.

CONCLUSION

Blacks in Boston have continued to make education the keystone in their house of values. However, getting their interests and desires on the community agenda has been difficult. The Boston School Desegregation Case filed in federal court in 1972 was related in many ways to the unresolved issues that Blacks placed before the court in 1840. While the City of Boston technically won that case and dealt with Blacks as the all-white leaders wished, Boston as a city actually lost because it effectively excluded minorities from involvement in educational policy. Any society, including a school committee, can benefit from the self-correcting presence of minority groups.

The educational authority, the School Committee, has been unable to take appropriate affirmative action in behalf of Blacks and other minorities over the years because, having no Blacks and other minorities among its members, the Committee probably has not fully comprehended the issues that these groups have presented. Thus, issues that could have been resolved around the conference table have been taken to court for lack of another arena of conflict resolution. For blacks and other minorities, the court is the agency of last resort.

Judge Garrity's decision to assemble a racially diversified panel to help develop a desegregation plan was a break with custom. Most decisions pertaining to the education of Blacks and other minorities in Boston had until that time been rendered by Whites only.

This panel of masters and experts developed some innovative strategies for overcoming the liabilities of racial segregation in education, many of which were unique to the Boston scene, such as the pairing of twenty-three colleges and universities with individual schools or school districts. Moreover, the Boston schools were divided into eight district attendance zones and a ninth citywide magnet school zone. Students can volunteer to attend a magnet school; and, if accepted, they are guaranteed a desegregated education in a school with a special emphasis and racially desegregated student body. District schools are comprehensive and students who are not accepted by magnet schools must attend the district school to which they have been assigned.

The provincial orientation of Boston causes some neighborhoods to resist receiving students of a race different from the majority. Those who disliked the desegregation court order thought they could resist it through violent activities. Political and other leaders did not provide the enlightened leadership necessary to keep the peace. Consequently, Boston experienced much turmoil. But the court order held and desegregation has proceeded.

Meanwhile, after ten years, some changes have been requested in school desegregation. Invariably, if the changes appear to have educational merit, they are made available to Whites first even when Blacks have been first to request the changes. This has been the case with the new arrangement of assigning students to district schools. While not all Blacks agreed, it was black parents who requested a freedom-of-choice arrangement [flexible student assignment plan that permitted elementary students to choose at least five district schools. While the student attendance zone is determined by the student's residence, the school one must attend within an attendance zone is not fixed, although transfers from one school to another must enhance

desegregation. This is an experiment and is a departure from the old method of assigning students by geocodes.] But the School Committee decided to determine the efficacy of this new approach in communities with the least number of Blacks.

Likewise, Whites have been favored in occupying a disproportionate number of magnet school seats in the prestigious Latin School and Latin Academy. By court order only 35 percent of the seats in the Latin schools must accommodate black and other minorities who are 73 percent of the contemporary student body in the total school system. The student bodies in other magnet schools are strictly balanced in terms of citywide percentages of students in the various racial population. Thus, the Latin magnet schools are treated differently and the difference favors whites.

When the court proposed a cap on the proportion of any one race that can attend a school so that it does not resegregate, the desegregation officer of the public school system opposed the cap because the students diverted from the district school to avoid resegregating it may have no other options for school attendance except enrollment in a citywide magnet school. The Boston desegregation officer opposed the cap, not because such a move would protect a school against resegregating, but because additional black students barred from the school might have to receive preferential treatment when they apply to magnet schools and this in turn might jeopardize the opportunity for some Whites to enroll in magnet schools.

The Boston school administrators appear to be unaware that they have supported educational policies that give preferential treatment to Whites but oppose educational policies that may give preferential treatment to Blacks. This contradiction is evident in the failure to devise a plan to racially

balance the Latin schools and in the failure to accept the cap of 80% on any one race on a school. In each case, the right of black students to equal opportunity has been sacrificed for fear of jeopardizing white privilege.

Such discriminatory policy implementation causes some Blacks to wonder who won the school desegregation case and others to question whether the outcome has been worth the effort and sacrifices. Most Blacks, however, continue to believe in desegregation, although they would like to experience some of the special opportunities that appear to be reserved for Whites. Thus, in a fit of anger they declare that they have lost faith in the court-mandated procedures, especially those having to do with student assignment. Despite these feelings of disappointment, such alternatives as freedom-of-choice have a history of ineffectiveness as desegregation tools in many communities. Moreover, Blacks brought the school desegregation case largely as a way of enhancing their quality of education. Therefore, they are more concerned with the quality of education they received than with the methods by which they are assigned to schools. Thus, the emphasis on freedom of choice that some blacks have advocated rather than court-mandated student assignments introduces a theme into the desegregation discussion that is more akin to the concerns of many whites than to those of most Blacks.

Finally, the school desegregation case in Boston has revealed the court to be a useful institution for redressing legal grievances but less useful in dealing with the full range of educational issues. Still the educational authority in the community, the Boston School Committee, must be held accountable. It can be held accountable for accommodating the interest and concerns of minority as well as majority students only to the extent that it is diversified. At-large elections are not likely to yield heterogeneous

decision-making structures. Consequently, Boston has returned to election by single-member districts for the School Committee. The beneficial effect of this new election procedure is already apparent. There are white, black and Hispanic members on the School Committee that was elected by single member districts with a few at-large members. This is the first time in the history of the Boston School Committee that it has manifested this degree of diversity. Diversity of course is linked with survival. So the new composition of the School Committee bodes well for its survival, although it may be more cumbersome and may experience more confrontations and consequently more tension.

By any measure, the Boston schools have improved during the past decade. They also better serve a wider range of students, including poor Whites, handicapped students, bilingual students as well as Black students. The improvements in the public schools in Boston are direct outcomes of the court-ordered changes that resulted from the school desegregation litigation initiated by Blacks. Thus, the entire City of Boston and all of its racial populations are indebted to Blacks for the educational reform they have encouraged.

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HOUSING, NEIGHBORHOODS AND DEVELOPMENT

by

PHILLIP L. CLAY

The City of Boston and its entire metropolitan area have undergone a tremendous physical change in the four decades since World War II. The city's housing stock has been augmented to meet the needs of its doubled population. The central business district has been rebuilt with new economic functions. Substantial development in the suburbs reflects the growth of the population there, due both to the flight of more than a quarter of the city's 1950 population and to immigration to a region whose economic functions have become much more diverse and upscale. The Boston region has shown a vitality and success in its development that is unlike that of other large cities in the Frostbelt (Golden & Mehegan, 8-13).

This success story would be a real comfort were it not for the old problems that have not been solved and the new problems that have been created by this development. This paper is about housing and development issues in Boston's black community. It assesses the present and future housing opportunities for Blacks. While the focus of the paper is on housing and neighborhoods, related issues of development and redevelopment will also be addressed.

It was not until the mid-1960s that the black presence in Boston became substantial. As recently as 1940, Blacks were less than 10% of the population of the city. By 1970, as a result of migration from the South and from the West Indies, the black percentage had increased to 16%. The proportion increased more slowly during the 1970s so that by 1980 the percentage was

only 20%. However, it seems likely that the percentage will increase further as black population growth rates exceed rates for Whites.

As to where Blacks live, the pattern of settlement in this century shows the black population concentrated mainly in the South End and Lower Roxbury until after WWII. In the period after the war, large numbers of Blacks started to settle in the rest of Roxbury, North Dorchester, and later, in Mattapan (Keyes, Chapter 5). Blacks also live in small concentrations in other parts of Dorchester and in insignificant numbers in a few other neighborhoods. Black presence in the South End has declined proportionately as that neighborhood has gentrified. Other immigrant groups, including Latinos, have moved into neighborhoods that Blacks partly vacated as they moved southeastward. Central Roxbury has been the major area of longterm black residential persistence. The question that has long been asked has now become critical: "Where will Blacks live?"

There are many reasons why this question is compelling. The vacancy rate in the city is critically low. The cost of housing is high, significantly beyond the financial reach of the city's black population, which is more than one-third poor. The housing needs in recent years have been met mainly by public and subsidized construction, which is now at a standstill and is likely to remain so for the foreseeable future. Moreover, some of the areas where Blacks live are under great pressure--either from upscale redevelopment (in the South End), speculation (in Jamaica Plain) or disinvestment (in Lower Roxbury and North Dorchester). Little affordable housing is being produced and critical losses to the black-occupied stock have already occurred.

Even without these threats to the status quo, the issue of where Blacks will live would still arise. The age structure of the black population is

such that further growth in the number and percentages of black households is expected. (This particular reduction is not due to white flight, but to Whites' lower fertility rate.) Moreover, demographic changes will mean that more white households will be small--the elderly, the divorced, and yuppies. These small households will require more units than their numbers might indicate (Doolittle *et al.* p. 27-38). With the exception of the elderly, most households in this group will be more upscale than most Blacks can afford.

Finally, these are important questions because the housing vacated by white ethnics (i.e., in Charlestown, South Boston, etc.) is not yet open to Blacks, and the areas where yuppies will compete for housing are not affordable to Blacks. The black population will have to live somewhere but the question has become critical because there are fewer options. This proposition points both to conserving and developing housing within the existing black community and to gaining access for Blacks to housing that exists or might be developed elsewhere. The rest of this paper addresses these goals.

The Supply of Housing

One key to understanding Boston's housing trends is found in the ways the housing supply has changed (Goetze 1980). Despite what appears, at times and in particular neighborhoods, to be substantial residential development, there is not a corresponding net increase in the supply of housing, either in Boston as a whole or in the particular neighborhoods where Blacks live.

In 1960, there were 239,000 housing units. This number declined during the 60s so that by 1970, the total stock had declined to 232,000 units. Lower income areas like Roxbury and Dorchester experienced a disproportionate share of the losses, through both urban renewal and disinvestment. Increased

construction activity in the early 1970s meant that by 1975, a net 8,000 housing units had been added to the city's stock, yielding a total of 240,000 units. By 1980, this number increased by only 1,000 units to a total of 241,000.

The overall changes in the stock between 1970 and 1980 are summarized in Table 1. The table is organized to display changes in the stock of private rental housing, subsidized rental housing (including public housing), and owner-occupied housing. (Figures for the period 1980-1985 are not available, but it is unlikely that the number of units has decreased. More likely, recent development will have added a small number of units.)

In the private rental stock, there were net decreases of 18,000 units between 1970 and 1980. While a little more than 3,000 units of new construction were added (almost all luxury housing), 11,000 units were demolished. More than half of those lost were in minority areas. Condominium conversion of rental to owner-occupied units reduced the city's stock of rental housing by another 7,000 units, yielding the 18,000 net reduction. More rapid conversion in the last year has probably reduced private rental units even further.

The increase in the number of subsidized rental units more than made up for the loss of private rental units between 1970 and 1980. However, this is not meant to suggest an even match since many of the units lost were occupied by people who were not eligible for subsidized units. Even so, for most of the 1970s, low and moderate income populations were not seriously affected by an overall problem with supply. There were plenty of units; in fact, the overall vacancy rate in the early 1970s was more than 6 percent.

In 1970, there were 22,000 subsidized units in the city. The Section 8 program added 2,700 units and other subsidy programs (including the MHFA programs) and public housing added an additional 17,000 units, for a net increase in that decade of about 20,000 units. In 1980, Boston had a total stock of 41,700 units.

As indicated above, the number of subsidized units added to the stock was slightly greater than the number of private rental units removed. This does not mean that supply was sufficient to meet demand. The housing stock is continually depleted by attrition as units fall into disrepair. The number of private rental units boarded up or abandoned continued to grow even in the 1980s. Vacancies in public housing doubled between 1975-80, from 14 percent to 27 percent. Only in the last two years has the vacancy rate in public housing declined, and then only moderately. In some assisted projects constructed in the early 1970s, units were lost due to poor construction, poor management, or financial distress. The largest single group of these (2100 units)--the Granite Properties--is now 25% vacant.

By the late 1970s, the combination of gentrification and vacancy decontrol of rents for private units had raised rents in many areas to levels unaffordable to many tenants or led to condominium conversion. These developments no doubt contributed to the substantial squeeze on low and moderate income renters that we currently witness. Blacks have been particularly affected by this process in the South End, while in other areas the vacancies resulting from disinvestment have been substantial.

The owner-occupied stock increased by 8,000 units during the 1970s, but less than 1,000 of these units are accounted for by new construction, mergers or conversions.⁵ Rather, almost 45 percent of these units were the result

of condominium conversion and a comparable share result from an increase in owner occupancy units of previously rented. (Actenberg, 1982) Many of the condominium conversions displaced renters, often in areas like Allston-Brighton where moderately priced rental units had been plentiful. In addition, condo conversion reduced the rental in these neighborhoods, causing rents to be raised for the remaining units. Displaced renters sought housing in other neighborhoods, contributing to demand and price in those places. By 1985, no section of Boston has a soft market or excess units available.

What these changes in the inventory show is that during the 1970s and into the 1980s there was a substantial decline in private rental housing and a substantial growth in the reliance on subsidized rental housing. Vacancies also declined--from 6% to 3.7%.¹ Any new non-subsidized rentals were priced beyond the reach of low income households. Subsidized rental housing increased its share of total occupied stock from 9.4 percent in 1970 to 17.4 percent in 1980; almost 1 in 5 Boston households currently occupies a subsidized or public housing unit.

The changes set in motion in the late 70s have continued in the 80s. Luxury rental units, condo conversion and abandonment of low rent units all continue to grow. In addition, we have experienced a decline in construction of subsidized units. What subsidy funds have been available have gone largely to rehabilitate or support existing housing. Unlike the 70s, subsidized housing today is not a supply safely met.

For Blacks these supply trends have had several implications. First, there has been little real growth in new housing opportunities. Second, new housing opportunities in the city have been unaffordable to Blacks (as well as inaccessible because of discrimination). Third, resources for investment have

been so scarce and the return for investment in non-luxury rental housing has been so poor that private market response has done little to add to supply. Increasingly, the economic incentives call for conversion of units to condominiums. Finally, although erosion in public housing has been stemmed by BHA redevelopment, private subsidized stock has become more troubled, with over 3000 units in the black community in financial distress and physical decline. Saving these units and redeveloping the approximately one-quarter of them that are vacant are important goals.

Housing Consumption

Three factors account for major changes in the pattern of housing consumption. First, demographic changes yield household types with different lifestyles and housing needs. For example, people's propensities for forming households and for renting tend to vary with age. The second factor is the cost of housing; the third is household income. The interaction of cost and income becomes a major indicator of what households can actually consume. (Ganz, et al., 1982)

The major demographic trend in Boston is the substantial change in the size of households. In particular, the 1970s brought significant growth in the number of one- and two-person, mainly young, white, and elderly households, and a decline in the number of families, especially families with children. (Doolittle et al., 1982) The net growth in the latter category is almost all minority.

Another significant demographic change was the substantial increase in the number of female-headed households, a disproportionately larger number of which are black. Since the home ownership rate for this group is low and did

not increase, and because this group is poorer than the rest of the population, they are largely occupants of the subsidized units added to the stock, and need low cost private opportunities that are becoming more scarce.

The cost of housing, the second factor in the analysis of consumption, increased dramatically in Boston as well as in other communities in this area and across the country. According to the 1980 census data, Boston rents increased 91 percent between 1970 and 1980, while home values increased 84 percent. Inflation increased overall prices by 112% during this decade so the increase in housing costs was not a serious problem. But the increase has been much faster in the 1980s, with a 23% rise in the last 2 years--more than 3 times the rate of inflation. In some neighborhoods, cost increases have been even larger.

How might we describe the position of Blacks in Boston as consumers of housing? The numbers in Table 2, based on 1980 census data, show that Blacks have considerably fewer resources than Whites. Boston Whites have a median income of less than \$16,000, while Blacks earn about two-thirds as much. The median income for the SMSA was \$23,000, which underscores the poverty of Bostonians relative to suburbanites, as well as that of Blacks compared to Whites.

It is not surprising, therefore, that so many are poor enough to be Section 8 eligible, or that 20 percent of black households live in public or subsidized housing. This profile suggests a population that is both poor and unable to benefit financially from the increase in property values that accompanied higher rents and values.

TABLE 2
 Selected Housing Characteristics for Black
 and White Households in Boston: 1980

	Black	White
Median Family Income (1980)	10,750	\$15,700
Percent Renters Section 8 eligible	79%	72%
Percent of Households in Subsidized		
Housing	20%	6%
Percent of Subsidized units		
occupied by	44%	42%
Percent of Household who own		
their own home	25%	34%
Percent of Renters who rate housing		
as Good or Excellent	44%	65%*

*for Boston, not just Whites.

Source: U.S. Census

The pressure of this increasing rent burden is also reflected in increasing and changing demand for public housing. The waiting list has grown in recent years to include more than 7,000 people. Moreover, the growth in new applications comes from the working poor, whereas, until recently, most applicants were from non-working (Welfare) families. Because BHA units have only very recently been subject to modest upgrading, we must assume that the rising demand for public housing reflects shrinking opportunities in the private market for the poor, including the working poor.

We cannot make a specific quantitative projection of housing demand in Boston because such a projection necessarily would be based on demographic projections and other factors for which data are not presently available. On the basis of what we do know from available data, however, we can make some observations. The first is that the recent slight growth reported by the census of households in the city will likely continue. The result of smaller households, maturation of the baby boom population, and some immigration, this growth in demand means that competition for housing will increase. With fewer affordable units added to meet this increasing need, the black population faces a shrinking number of areas in which to compete, and perhaps some pressure in areas where they have been safe from competition in the past.

The second point is that the minority share of the demand for housing in the city will continue to grow, and may even grow substantially. This can be inferred from the age structure of the populations in the city (the median age for Blacks is 23 versus 29 for Whites). In the remaining years of the century, the minority share of the total population and total demand for housing will increase, perhaps to 40 percent by 1990 (from 30% in 1980). Again, assuming that the income of these minority groups remains lower than

white income, housing demand will increasingly exert a real squeeze on the black poor with the result that many households will not be able to find an affordable unit. They will have to double with others, become part of the growing legion of homeless, or pay a great deal more of their income for rent.

We can also expect continued demand during the 1980s for ownership by such groups as young professionals and other small households. This demand will spread to black areas as the black middle class finds that it is necessary or preferable to buy housing in the black community and rehabilitate it for owner-occupancy. In neighborhoods where so few households own their homes (less 25 percent in Boston's black community), such trends always mean a decrease in rental units, and higher rents for those units that remain.

Housing Investment

In the recent decade, construction costs have increased almost 200 percent, more than twice as fast as rents. Financing costs are up at least 50 percent. Since finance costs represent a significant part of the cost of development, this increase obviously affects type, prices and rents in new development and rehabilitation. Moreover, the availability and cost of refinancing pose a real problem for some owners of rental properties. The inability to refinance at competitive terms limits rehabilitation and discourages investments where low incomes will prevent rents from making such private investment profitable.²

Despite these problems, however, one would expect that the low vacancy rate and the prospects for moderate growth in short and midterm demand might lead to some expansion in the supply of housing, especially the rehabilitation of vacant, but sound, housing. In fact, much of Boston, including its black

neighborhoods, has been victim to speculation, but the outlook for private investment leading to improvement in the quality of housing for the vast majority of Blacks who rent seems remote. A major part of the problem is the high cost of rehabilitation. The cost of substantial rehabilitation in the city now averages over \$65,000 per unit, including market rate acquisition. Assuming 13 percent interest rates, and including operating costs and profit, this translates into a market rent of nearly \$1000 per month. To afford such a unit, a household would need an income of more than \$40,000 per year. This explains why only luxury or subsidized residential redevelopment takes place.

Moderate (as opposed to substantial) rehabilitation will yield rents that are lower, but not nearly as low as the \$200-230 per month that the average black household can afford. Rents required to amortize almost any new mortgage or second mortgage would be much higher than the current rent which, as we have already suggested, is burdensome for many low and moderate income tenants.

Up to this point, we have focussed on the city of Boston. Patterns of consumption and trends in supply in the suburbs are also related to housing opportunity for Blacks, though not in the way one might normally expect. In other cities, the last twenty years have been marked by a modest increase in black suburbanization (Clay, 1978). Blacks as a percentage of the suburban population have increased nationally from less than 4 percent in 1960 to more than 6 percent in 1980. Looking separately at the 12 SMSA where more than three quarters of the nation's black suburbanization has occurred, the phenomenon appears even more significant, with some larger (and mainly older) suburbs having 10 percent or more Blacks and several reaching black majority.

In Boston, no such pattern has developed. Blacks continue to make up less than 3 percent of the Boston suburban population. (Doolittle *et al*, 1982) Blacks in Boston suburbs are concentrated in some older communities in Cambridge, West Medford, etc. and much smaller proportion in a few older middle class suburbs such as Brookline and Newton. Black presence in working class and middle income suburbs (such as Quincy or Framingham) which we might predict based on house prices and income, is still rare.

There appears to be a clear pattern in black middle class movement. Either the movement is to middle, even upper, middle class suburbs, or Blacks do not move from Boston at all. Unlike in cities like Washington or Los Angeles, where there is significant black presence in selected older, lower-middle class, and even working class suburban communities, there is no evidence in Boston that this pattern is emerging.

More and more it is clear that as prices continue to escalate, changing Boston's pattern of black suburbanization will be difficult. And options are further limited because of another way that Boston is different from other cities. Most cities have an old established black middle class community. There is no such place in Boston. At present, Mattapan comes closest in this regard but Blacks have been there less than twenty years and the neighborhood is far from being entirely middle class.

It is hard to predict what the resolution of this situation will be. There are several possibilities. One is that part of Roxbury will come to play this role. The "Sugar Hill" section was a solidly middle class black community until urban renewal caused dislocation. Another possibility is that new housing development might expand the population of an existing black middle class community. Mattapan is a prime candidate for such development.

A more likely possibility is that the black middle class will not have a significant geographical concentration but that there will be several enclaves and that some of them may be suburban. This seems to follow the current pattern and, to the extent that desegregation results, this is a positive trend. To the extent that the black community fails to have a stable, resident, homeowner, middle class presence, the chance of stagnation in neighborhoods may increase given the trends discussed above and in the rest of this paper.

What does all of this mean for the state of black Boston? The future? What it seems to mean is that the position of the black community, always tenuous because of limited black homeownership and control of capital, is facing erosion, more slowly in some places than others. The resources that average Blacks have for private investment are becoming progressively less adequate for playing, much less winning, the housing development game.

The larger community of Boston is increasingly interested in heretofore unnoticed black neighborhoods for economic and residential development. (Boston Redevelopment Authority, 1984 and Gaston & Kennedy, 1985.) The anxiety and urgent concern about the possible loss of some neighborhood turf which pervade the black community seem entirely justified.

What this means for the future is harder to figure. On the one hand, the discussion above suggests very real obstacles to housing development for and by Blacks. Many of these obstacles are political and institutional, but black poverty also contributes. On the other hand, the renewed interest by Blacks in the future of their community and by others in the development potential in black areas could well combine to provide leverage to share more equitably whatever resources are available and to have a process which gives Blacks more

control of the destiny of their community. It is much too soon to know whether such a resolution is likely. However, recent developments and the current state of affairs give little reason to be confident that the "hidden hand" will be so just or generous.

TABLE 3
 1980 Population in
Key Minority Neighborhoods vs: Other Boston Neighborhoods*

Neighborhood	Total Population	1980 Minority Population	% Of All Minorities In City 1980	% Of All Neighborhood Population 1980	% Of All Neighborhood Population 1970
Dorchester-North	32,206	17,764	10.5	50.5	31.8
Dorchester-South	65,665	23,922	14.2	36.4	10.1
Downtown (Inc.)					
Chinatown	5,550	3,702	2.2	66.7	46.7
Franklin Field	17,221	16,678	9.9	96.8	82.6
Jamaica Plain	37,384	11,684	6.9	31.3	10.6
Mattapan	18,531	16,073	9.5	86.7	25.9
Mission Hill/					
Med Ctr	17,092	6,784	4.0	39.7	19.4
Roxbury	38,911	36,214	21.4	93.1	83.5
South End	24,061	12,732	7.5	52.9	46.7
SUBTOTAL	259,621	145,553	86.1	56.1	41.3
Allston/Brighton	65,264	8,019	4.7	12.3	4.2
Back Bay/Beacon Hill	30,622	1,952	1.2	6.4	3.8
Charlestown	13,364	246	0.1	1.8	1.4
East Boston	32,178	614	0.4	1.9	1.1
Fenway/Kenmore	29,222	5,269	3.1	18.0	9.5
Hyde Park	32,526	5,045	3.0	15.5	1.4
North End/					
Waterfront	11,340	272	0.2	2.4	0.4
Roslindale	27,962	841	0.5	3.0	0.5
South Boston	31,311	457	0.3	1.5	1.7
West Roxbury	28,793	648	0.4	2.3	0.6
SUBTOTAL	302,582	23,363	13.9	7.7	2.7
TOTAL CITYWIDE	562,203	168,916	100.0	30.0	18.1

* Neighborhoods underlined designated as "Key Minority Neighborhoods" as their 1980 non-white population exceeds the 30.4% citywide average.

Source: U.S. Bureau of the Census, Census of Population and Housing, 1980-P.L. 94-171 Counts, Suffolk County, MA., 2/21/81 and Census of Population and Housing, 1970, Census Tracts, Final Report PMC (T)-29, Boston MA. SMSA, May 1972.

NOTE: DISTRICT BOUNDARIES AND POPULATION TOTALS SHOWN ARE AGGREGATED FROM CENSUS TRACTS AND ONLY APPROXIMATE OFFICIAL NDA NEIGHBORHOOD BOUNDARIES AND POPULATION TOTALS.

NEIGHBORHOOD TRENDS

Boston is not a single housing market. The state of black Boston, while largely explained by what is happening in a few neighborhoods (see Table 3), is also affected by trends in other areas of the city. Given the likely growth in black demand for housing, the future of Blacks in the city will be defined by housing trends in all neighborhoods.

Two concerns guide our assessment of neighborhoods. The first is affordability and second is access for Blacks in what is a highly segregated city. The former issue is easy to deal with. Since 1982 Boston has been hit with an explosive round of housing inflation that has made affording a home an even greater problem than is indicated by the data presented earlier in this paper. Prices have increased all over the city in both rental and sale housing. There is no likely short term relief, since private rents have long been repressed and declining interest rates will continue to put upward pressure on home prices. Even if the rates of increase level off, housing prices and rents are safely on an unreachable plateau for Blacks.

The problem of black access (or fair housing) is a function of the well-documented racial discrimination in Boston (Feins et al. 1984). The evidence that discrimination exists is overwhelming, and there is very little evidence that the problem is declining. No area of the city is immune from this problem. While there are some areas where a few Blacks have been able to gain inroads, these more often represent a selective steering of Blacks into areas abandoned, perhaps only temporarily, by Whites who will reclaim the area when the market dictates. In other cases, poor black and other minority

tenants are used to milk profits from properties the owners have no intention of maintaining. In still other neighborhoods, a small number of black pioneers wait for others to come.

What follows is a summary of principal issues and trends in Boston neighborhoods.⁴

Allston-Brighton

Allston-Brighton has traditionally been a strong family neighborhood with a good housing stock divided between apartments and frame houses. The apartments, especially in the Commonwealth Avenue corridor, have been the focus of attention in recent years because they represent an area of strong real estate activity. About 2000 rental units have been turned into condominiums (this represents 15% of the neighborhoods multifamily housing stock).

Between 1970 and 1980, major changes in the Allston-Brighton area included an increase in the number of one- and two-person households and an overall decline in the number of families (down 18 percent). Total population declined about 1 percent but the number of households increased dramatically. There has been no significant shift in racial composition. The increase in black residents from 2 to 4 percent between 1970 and 1980 is largely accounted for by black presence in public housing.

Between 1970 and 1980, the ownership rate in the neighborhood decreased from 35 to 21 percent, largely reflecting the continued out-movement of families and the conversion of owner units to rental units for students and others in the area. (Many of the newly converted condominiums are

investor-owned rental units.) Home prices in the neighborhood have increased substantially from a median \$20,000 in 1970 to \$63,000 in 1980 (a 217% increase); median rents increased from \$120 to \$335. Official figures for 1985 are not available, but home median prices are estimated to be above \$100,000 and rents, above \$500. The neighborhood has an extremely tight market.

For Blacks the extent of future opportunity in Allston-Brighton turns on both cost and access. Several fair housing audits have identified this as one area where discrimination is active. Fighting racial bias in this neighborhood is important because as its population continues to age and turn over, housing opportunities will open, especially for middle-income families and small one- and two-person households who want to take advantage of the high quality housing and excellent location. Since costs are rising in the area, the outlook for poor Blacks is not good except in the roughly 750 units of public housing in the neighborhood. The Allston-Brighton area has little in the way of nonprofit subsidized housing.

Back Bay-Beacon Hill-Downtown

These neighborhoods near the downtown section of Boston have historically been middle and upper middle income areas with small households. They continue as such. Apartments make up the largest portion of the stock though owner occupancy of these units has increased significantly in recent years with the conversion of apartments to condos.

Blacks make up 3% of the population, up from 2 percent in 1970. Overall population decreased by 18 percent between 1970 and 1980, but there was no

decline in housing demand since smaller households required more units.

Housing in these downtown neighborhoods is virtually all luxury with Chinatown as a shrinking exception. The issue for Blacks and others who cannot afford luxury housing is whether non-luxury alternatives will be constructed in the area. Currently there is little prospect of such construction. The other possibility is that the non-residential development in this community will generate "linkage funds" (payments from developers to mitigate the housing consequences of their commercial development) which can be used to support housing development elsewhere in the city.

The North End-Waterfront

Over the years the North End has been home for generations of newcomers, providing low-cost housing and a medium for the perpetuation of ethnic culture and commerce. Currently, Italian-Americans are the major immigrant ethnic group residing there.

In recent years, the ethnic population in the area has declined and has been replaced in part by a non-ethnic, upper income, white community on the Waterfront. This Waterfront community has crossed Atlantic Avenue and thus achieved the gentrification of part of the North End. Blacks represent one percent of the population of this community.

The neighborhood is composed mostly of apartments and condominiums. Prices and rents have increased dramatically. Other than a few subsidized units, housing is not affordable by Blacks on the Waterfront side, and not accessible to Blacks in the North End. There is a long history of violence against Blacks in this area and as a result no penetration has occurred.

There are two major questions for the future. The first is whether a low and moderate income presence will survive in the area. If the answer is yes, the second question becomes how Blacks can obtain access to it. A strong fair housing effort as well as careful selection of sponsors for subsidized housing are key. If the answer to the second question is no, then only Blacks who have very high incomes can move in.

The South End

The South End is historically one of the most ethnically and racially diverse sections of the city. Built as a middle class townhouse community in the 19th century, the South End deteriorated badly between 1950 and 1970. It also lost a large share of its population which had become largely low income and minority.

Since 1970, however, the community has made a dramatic turnaround. Substantial private and public reinvestment has taken place as a result of urban renewal. In addition, its population has increased 30 percent, the number of households has increased 34 percent, the number of occupied units has increased 33 percent, and vacancies have declined by 12 percent.

Socioeconomic change also occurred. Once a largely lower-income and working class neighborhood, the South End has re-emerged as a mixed-income community with a substantial number of upper-income residents. Many low income households were displaced in the process. While Blacks have consistently made up about 30 percent of the population, they represent a much lower percentage of new resident homeowners. Many former residents were unable to return after rehabilitation occurred.

While some subsidized housing was built in the South End and the neighborhood is effectively mixed-income, the balance is shifting increasingly away from development that could benefit the poor. Fewer development opportunities remain. Competition for these reduces the degrees of freedom. The major trend now is to convert luxury townhouses to a larger number of luxury condos. Moreover, there are threats to displace the poor from subsidized housing that HUD may attempt to sell.

In many ways, the South End captures the essence of the struggle for shelter in Boston. Historically, it has been a mixed community. Now all of the pressures of urban development are coming to bear on it. Gentrification and condo conversion put the rich and poor in competition for space. The scarcity of housing so close to downtown increases pressure on already-high prices and rents. Blacks and poor people are holding on because they have protected status (that is, they have been owners for many years, or they live in subsidized or public housing units which have contracts). Only those with official protection seem secure though recent efforts by HUD to dispose of some of the subsidized units in financial trouble are a matter of deep concern to subsidized tenants.

There are few policies in place by which the stock of affordable housing can be increased. One of the few sites remaining is "Tent City" which is expected to include subsidized housing. However, the area is such a hot market and the competition so strong, significant additional units are unlikely. For the near future, the South End will continue to be a model of desegregated living in Boston, but holding on to the present mix will take some commitment, effort and luck. Gaining affordable new opportunities will require extra special effort and deep subsidy pockets. The long term

prospects are for the South End to become similar to the downtown neighborhoods, different only by virtue of the poor who are in the subsidized housing that survives the financial and political shakeout.

South Boston, Charlestown and East Boston

These are solidly working class, mainly Irish-American communities. Hardly any Blacks (less than 1%) live in any of these areas. Between 1970 and 1980, consistent with other older neighborhoods in the city, their populations declined by about 15-20 percent; the number of households remained almost stable over the decade. The number of elderly persons was up slightly; the number of dependent children was down to almost a third. There was no major change in the proportion of families in the population. There has been no significant shift in the number of units in either owner or rental tenancy. Vacancies in these communities are about 20% higher than in the rest of the city. Overall, these neighborhoods have continued their traditional role as communities for the Irish working class. The only changes reflect the gradual aging of the population. The only real effort to reverse this rule has been the very small and very quiet effort to introduce Blacks to public housing. This effort has been successful, but trivial. Fearing for their safety, Blacks do not attempt to penetrate the private market in any of these neighborhoods.

These areas represent the crux of the question: where will Blacks live as they increase their share of the city's population? Based on type and cost of the housing, these would be natural areas, as turnover occurs, for Blacks to make inroads. However, this appears unlikely unless the racial climate

improves dramatically. These areas seem "well protected"; their geographic isolation reinforces their racial isolation. We have yet to invent the legal or social means by which these places will become options for a significant number of Blacks.

There are, however, some possibilities in these areas worth noting. At least two large publicly-supported development projects, while not presently designed to offer much access to Blacks, might be redesigned. The Charlestown Navy Yard development, designed as an upper-income enclave, could include more affordable housing, and Columbia Point (near South Boston) could have a better mix than current proposals call for.

While neither of these developments is in the midst of its respective community, they represent important opportunities for black access to housing if current proposals are changed. Indeed, the racial isolation and turf consciousness are so serious in each of these communities that only in the creation of new housing opportunities will it be possible to introduce a significant number of Blacks without violence or the serious threat of violence.

Roxbury-North Dorchester

In the last half century, this neighborhood has served a variety of ethnic, income and racial groups as a kind of "zone of emergence" from which individuals launched themselves into the suburbs. Each time one group departed, a new group would succeed it. While these transitions produced temporary periods of instability, it wasn't until the late 1950s that the area fell prey to widespread undermaintenance and decline. This occurred at a time

when there were no more groups large enough to occupy all the units left by departing white households. The area was majority black by 1960. The new groups, in addition to being smaller, were also much poorer. Blacks were the major group moving in. Many of these residents were to leave over the years (replaced successively by poorer Blacks). The Hispanic succession augmented demand for awhile, but Hispanics partially dispersed as well, leaving some areas (the lower end of Blue Hill Avenue, for example) with much lower populations and widespread abandonment. There were no new groups to fill the successive voids. However, there are areas in the neighborhood that have blossomed in recent years--often just a short distance from vacant blocks. The markets in these areas are now strong and reinvestment is occurring. Public housing has stabilized and a small number of new subsidized units have been added or rehabbed.

The population for this overall area declined between 12 and 28 percent during the 1970s; the number of households declined between 5 and 17 percent. Also during the 1970s, husband and wife families declined by a quarter and female-headed households (the source of greatest poverty) increased to nearly 40 percent of the total households. While some enclaves of high owner occupancy remain, the overall pattern is that absentee ownership is extremely high. Less than 25 percent of households own their units.

Despite these mixed signals, the mode in the community is clearly more positive than at any time in recent years. This optimism is based in part on the fact that since housing opportunities elsewhere in the city are limited, it makes sense to gain control of and improve the home turf. There is also recognition of the great strategic value of the community as the city continues to renew itself. Whatever the course of integration in Boston, this

neighborhood will continue to be home for the largest share of the black population. Blacks will share this area with a growing Latino population and with new immigrants.

There are several developments now in the planning phase that underscore both the potential for the community and the marginality of black control of their community. These include: the redevelopment of the Dudley neighborhood, the development of the Southwest Corridor land, the disposition of more than 4,000 units (2,300 of which are located in Roxbury/North Dorchester) that are under HUD control, and the modernization or redevelopment of several large public housing developments. There are also development issues that are smaller, but still critical to the area's sub-communities. In each of the larger projects, several hundred housing units and a variety of other physical and community services issues are at stake. Also at stake is the role the black community has in shaping its neighborhoods.

There are other issues as well. This area is home to middle class and poor Blacks. There is already evidence of tension between these groups about the nature and course of development and about whose interest will be reflected in community decisions.

South Dorchester

South Dorchester is one of the largest neighborhoods in the city. It consists of several sub-neighborhoods with substantial contrasting physical and social features. It is an area that is largely white, Irish, and working class, with enclaves of middle class gentry (on the "7 hills of Dorchester") who have purchased homes in recent years. Indeed, the gentrification of some

of these areas is the major development in Dorchester in the past decade. There are also several black enclaves. Blacks are 31 percent of this area, up from 10 percent in 1970.

When the total area is considered, however, South Dorchester has lost population as well as households, though the loss was not nearly as dramatic as in the other areas of the city. In recent years, the population has stabilized and investment exceeds disinvestment.

The increase in black residents in this part of Dorchester (outside of areas like Codman Square where Blacks have lived for some time) has come on the edges as part of the process of racial transition. This transition continues and makes this one of the active frontiers of racial change in Boston neighborhoods. This transition will continue, not only for Blacks but for Latinos and Asians. Selective areas will continue to experience middle class resettlement.

The challenge here is to make the racial transition smoother. The transition is unavoidable. Opening the market in a way that exploits neither incumbents nor newcomers will be an important test for fair housing efforts in the city and a model for other communities, such as South Boston or Charlestown, where the task is far more difficult. Because the cost of housing in this area is still moderate compared to other neighborhoods and the housing environment is suitable for families, South Dorchester is an important part of the answer to the question of where Blacks will live.

Jamaica Plain

Like Dorchester, Jamaica Plain is a varied neighborhood. It has

undergone significant change in recent years. Between 1970 and 1980, Blacks increased their share of the population from 9 to 14 percent. The Latino population increased there as well, so that Jamaica Plain's population closely mirrors in percentage the population of the city. There is substantial subarea segregation, however. The Egleston Square is nearly all minority while Pondside and Moss Hill area are nearly all white. The minority population dominates public housing in the area and new private housing opportunities are preempted by middle class and upper class Whites.

But in a large part of the community, Blacks have been able to find good housing which, until 1980, was available at reasonable cost. The issue now is that there are few vacancies for anyone as the neighborhood has become attractive to all types and classes of household.

The future for Blacks depends on access to both turnover units and new housing that will be built (in the Southwest Corridor, in vacant schools and other surplus public facilities, and on the vacant sites scattered throughout the community). There is strong advocacy of this prospective development and strong competition from the private sector to develop upscale housing in these properties. The high prices of housing for sale and the shrinking number of rental units mean that the future for Blacks hinges on the success of this advocacy and the capacity of nonprofit or public sponsorship of affordable housing options.

Hyde Park, West Roxbury and Roslindale

These three neighborhoods on the southern edge of the city are the newer more middle class sections of the city from which Blacks have been

traditionally excluded. The few Blacks who live in these areas are clear exceptions. Blacks live in the public housing developments in Roslindale and on the Mattapan edge of Hyde Park. In both cases, this is a development of the late 1970s. In both cases, there was violence or resistance to black presence.

Unlike other white communities in ethnic Boston, these neighborhoods are strong and continue to play the role they have played for the last 40 years--as the place where upwardly mobile white ethnic families move when they don't move out of the city. During the 1970s they gained households, the market strengthened and prices and rents increased. This trend has escalated in the 1980s.

Fair housing studies point to discrimination that is active in the community. It is expected that resistance will continue, depriving middle income Blacks of the considerable benefits of this neighborhood; a suburban environment within the city at prices more affordable than comparable suburban units.

Mattapan

Block-busting and other exploitative techniques in the late 1960s were major factors in changing the population of Mattapan from less than 5 percent black in 1960 to predominantly black (86 percent) in 1980. The increased black demand rose because of displacement from urban renewal projects and restricted opportunities elsewhere. Mattapan became the major new locus of middle income and homeowner Blacks. Housing in Mattapan shares some features with that in nearby West Roxbury and Hyde Park. A significant proportion was

built after 1940, its densities are low, and it has many of the qualities of suburban housing.

The future issues in Mattapan will be those that arise from stabilizing and strengthening a neighborhood that has a lot going for it: black middle class ownership, a reasonably sound housing stock, and strong sense of pride. In some parts of the neighborhood, where renters dominate and housing is held by outsiders, rehabilitation is needed to forestall the decline that is already beginning. Such action is important to preserve a supply of private and affordable rental housing in the black community.

SUMMARY

The sketches above highlight some of the characteristics of neighborhoods in Boston and how they are changing. Such brief sketches cannot, however, capture the diversity and complexity of Boston neighborhoods. Moreover, the future of individual neighborhoods depends substantially on outside forces, including financial markets, subsidy programs, public service levels, the investment markets, and others.

Discrimination and Fair Housing

Up to this point we have alluded several times to the presence of discrimination in the housing market. Every recent inquiry documents the pervasiveness of racial discrimination in the Boston housing market. Moreover, antagonisms, fears and uncertainties characterize development activities in most of the city, including those neighborhoods on the frontier of racial change (like Dorchester) as well as neighborhoods such as

Allston-Brighton or Charlestown which are not on the frontier but where large-scale development can be expected in the future.

While some Blacks do venture outside the areas of black concentration to find housing, discrimination limits the extent and nature of this search. The problem is complicated by escalating prices in both the rental and sales market that now limit Blacks in neighborhoods where they have not been limited in the past.

The question for us to ask in this section is whether the fair housing machinery--both public and private--is sufficient. Second, we have to ask whether open housing is still a primary goal for the black community.

To the first question, the answer is no. While the city has created a fair housing agency, the agency is funded on soft money, has no enforcement power and has no jurisdiction over the 40 percent of the housing stock that is owner occupied or in small buildings. While some of the activities of the agency are helpful, they are dwarfed by the enormity of the problem. The city's fair housing agency has been deliberately hobbled by a City Council bent on making sure there is no effective fair housing effort in the city. The home rule petition that would give strong enforcement power is going nowhere in the Massachusetts Legislature. Such weakness in the city and the only slightly greater effort at the state level offer little encouragement for private action or black confidence. The major force for change is the active pursuit of fair housing goals by some community, church and neighborhood organizations. This advocacy is important resource but not sufficient either to ensure fair access to Blacks or to right the wrongs of past discrimination.

The second question is whether Blacks still hold fair housing at a high priority. Surveys still show black support for integrated communities.

Blacks have responded positively to housing opportunities when they are offered in non-minority areas of the city. The only issue still unresolved is whether scarce production resources should be allocated within existing black communities, where such development is clearly needed, or whether they should be allocated to develop integrated housing in locations where black access would contribute to fair housing goals. There is now consensus for the proposition that the needs of the black community should not be sacrificed for integration, but that resources be shared, with a major effort to assure affirmative marketing that is performance-oriented. Recently, there has been so little new construction that it is not possible to test the strength of this consensus or to evaluate the effectiveness of a more active marketing effort to which both city and state agencies have committed.

The Development Process

The foregoing sections of this paper have focused on issues of supply and demand. This section examines how the local government manages the housing development process. Our analysis is based on two questions: whether the housing and community development process in this city is likely to address the concerns we have raised and whether if it does address these problems, the city will be able to use its resources effectively for their solution. This consideration raises a third question: whether Blacks themselves are involved in shaping and managing their community.

Our answer to each of these questions is no. The first question is one of problem definition and program design. There is a general understanding in the city that affordable housing is in short supply, and that Blacks, because of discrimination, have special problems in negotiating the private market.

What is missing is any evidence that the city is taking the next logical step and analyzing the submarket implications and strategic and policy implications of this problem.

These are elements of any plan for housing that the city has yet to develop. Such a plan is necessary to deal with housing issues not only for Blacks, but for the various other population groups in each neighborhood. Everyone would benefit if the city were to adopt a strategy rather than its current disjointed approach.

The city itself has little capacity to deliver housing because it controls little of the housing stock. The exception is Boston Housing Authority, which administers what amounts to 10 percent of the units in the city. After years of substantial and deliberate neglect, the BHA in the last 5 years has been on the road to reform which will greatly expand its capacity and effectiveness. The scarcity of such capacity in the city is not in itself a serious problem, because Boston is fortunate in having a large number of community-based development and private organizations that are quite capable of building and managing housing. The responsibility of the city is to provide a framework and to channel resources--both fiscal and other types--so that these organizations can do what they do best. After some years of having a very mixed record in this regard, the city is now doing a much better job with the prospect that the organizations, with city support, can be the source of a respectable volume of housing, perhaps 700-1000 units per year in the near term.

The city might expand this effort to include supporting small private developers, including, especially, black developers, who represent an additional, now underused, resource.

These planning and capacity issues point to the creation of a superagency that is responsible for the public role in all matters related to housing and community development. Such an agency would report only to the mayor, would be accountable for progress towards goals that are clearly and specifically spelled out, and would seek public input through community participation. Citizens can only be involved effectively if the administrative structure has the capacity to be responsive. The present system is disorganized and cumbersome: almost two dozen agencies in Boston are involved in housing and community development and no one of them can by itself deliver on the commitments required to do a housing project. In such a situation, cynicism has fertile soil; the winners in the development game are not Blacks or other resident groups but organized interests who have the time and resources to run the City Hall gauntlet. Lacking such leverage, Blacks are effectively shut out of important housing and physical development issues in their community and in the city generally. Currently, no Blacks are in senior positions with line responsibility for the city housing or development agencies.

CONCLUSION: WHERE SHALL THEY LIVE?

There are several final points to make about the outlook for Blacks in Boston. Our summary of the city's housing situation shows that during the 1970s and early 80s a great deal of confidence returned to the city's housing market. This was reflected in reinvestment--both residential and commercial--in various parts of the city. We also found new evidence of weakness in the market, especially as it relates to meeting the needs of Blacks and other low and moderate income renters in the city. The declining

federal role in local and housing policy creates both a problem and an opportunity for Boston. The major problem is a loss of resources and the uncertain flow of assistance which is likely to follow. The major opportunity is that housing will become a larger political issue, spurred not only by local government's increased exposure to housing policy decisions but also by City Council redistricting, which gives neighborhoods the opportunity to vote on matters of particular concern to them. Blacks have more political leverage than ever before. There is a need to use this leverage in a way that leads to change and that promotes empowerment of residents. There are lots of new and good ideas but the challenge is not analytical. The challenge is to get a formal and active commitment to using public resources and power to ensure justice in housing opportunities and in the development of communities.

NOTES

1. The vacancy rates as used here refer only to units that are available for sale or rent. It does not include units which have been on the market for more than 6 months, which are open to the elements, or which are abandoned.
2. The basic point here is that the revenues generated by rents are too small to sustain an investment; that is, net income, including income from tax benefits, is less than the sum of debt service, operating cost, and a profit that in recent years would have had to be greater than 15 percent.
3. The Boston Housing Partnership is a public/private initiative to rehabilitate run-down housing in Boston. Most of this housing is in neighborhoods with high concentrations of Blacks. The first phase will rehabilitate more than 700 units at an average development cost of less than \$40,000. They are able to do this because of heavy subsidy from CDBG funds, foundation grants and a state rental subsidy program. The Enterprise Foundation is attempting to develop more routine methods to develop affordable housing for low income households.
4. For an extended analysis of Boston neighborhoods, see Doolittle et al. (1982), pp. 69-74.

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THE COMMUNITY OF BLACK ARTISTS IN BOSTON

by

EDWARD STRICKLAND

In the spring of 1984 a group of young artists, members of the Boston Collective, gathered to celebrate the birthday of Allan Rohan Crite. They organized an exhibition in the Alchemie Gallery including works by this elder statesman of Boston's community of black artists. The symbolic possibilities of life's chances brought these artists together with Theodore Landmark, the director of the Alchemie Gallery.

In the spring of 1976, Landmark, a young black lawyer, crossed City Hall Plaza in the city where, two hundred years before, Crispus Attucks had shed his blood at the hands of the British army of occupation. Landmark ran into a violent reminder that that heritage is not part of the consciousness of large segments of Boston's population. The weapon thrust into Landmark by a youthful racist was the American Flag.

It was a low point for the spirit of Blacks in Boston. Electronic and print media around the world spread the Bicentennial shame of the city. But Landmark did not die, nor was his spirit shattered. He now holds the position of Dean of Graduate and Continuing Education at the Massachusetts College of Art, as well as being director of the Alchemie Gallery. He is now on the Board of Directors of the Institute of Contemporary Art and has served on the Board of the Artists Foundation. What he held in common with members of the Boston community of black artists in 1976 was a vulnerability to the effects of racism. Racism could take the form of excluding them from the

mainstream of the city's cultural life, or in its more violent manifestations, could take their lives.

The members of the Boston Collective are but a small segment of the approximately 250 black visual artists in Massachusetts. Among its members--Susan Thompson, Crite, Dennis Didley, Paul Goodnight, Napoleon Jones-Henderson, Reginald Jackson, and Aukrum Burton--some are also participants in the Afro-American Master Artists in Residence Program (AAMARP) at Northeastern University.

In an interview in his office at Massachusetts College of Art, Theodore Landmark discussed the route that brought him from the field of law to his position as dean of the nation's only publicly-funded art school:

It's true that my primary training is in law, but I also have a Masters of Environmental Design from Yale School of Architecture, and as an undergraduate I studied photography as well as political science...I got into this largely because...five or six years ago I realized I was doing a lot of stuff at the edges of the arts...I was on the board of the Artists' Foundation...I had been doing my own photography...I was doing all this legal work and...I really enjoyed doing my art. I sought to find a way of testing myself at what...(I was) doing...and so I went off to the Maine photographic workshop up in Rockport...and I decided that I really did like what I was doing in...photography and that I should do more of that.

I took a studio over in Fort Point Channel over in Southie.

At the time, Fort Point Community Artists, Inc., was looking for office space to consolidate their search for housing and service for their 200-300 members. Landmark, who acted as their attorney, was able to secure gallery space in a building being renovated by a developer with a unique concept. In the Fall of 1982, Landmark "suddenly found [him]self developing and running a gallery in the middle of downtown."

Until Landmark became involved, the Fort Point Community Artists, Inc., was not an interracial group: "I guess I was the only Black involved with

them. You know, they represented the artists who were in the neighborhood rather than being city-wide in nature. Since I was the only black guy, I guess I was it...They were like any tenants' group. They worked with the tenants who were there."

The Alchemie Gallery is run on a non-profit basis. Its policy is to show work by artists of all backgrounds, as long as it is exciting and would not ordinarily be shown in commercial galleries. The staff varies during the year and includes interns and temporary staff. The gallery has shown work by artists from New York, the West Coast, Chicago and Rhode Island, as well as from Boston. Among the Boston-based black artists who have shown there are Kofi Kayiga and Bryan McFarlane in addition to the Boston Collective members.

If the experience of Theodore Landmark can be seen as symbolic of art's resuscitative powers, the expanded celebration of Alan Rohan Crite's 75th birthday in the spring of 1985 can be seen as a symbol of the coming of age of Boston's community of black artists. A full circle of maturation and strengthening of consciousness was rounded in that event. Through the cooperation of Edmund Barry Gaither, Director of the Museum of the National Center of Afro-American Artists; Nefertiti Burton, of Middle Passage; Dennis Didley, Arts Coordinator for the Harriet Tubman House in the South End; Dana Chandler, Director of Northeastern University's Afro-American Master Artists in Residence Program (AAMARP) and the members of Gallery NAGA, nine exhibitions of Crite's work were mounted in displays that stretched across Boston and touched a variety of audiences.

At the AAMARP galleries, some 400 of Crite's works were shown. They traced his conception of the sweep of African migration across the southern tier of the world's continents. At the Harriet Tubman House in the South End

were Crite's chronicles of life in Boston's multiracial communities in the period following his studies at the School of the Museum of Fine Arts in the 1920's. At the Children's Art Center were works that hark back to Crite's childhood in New Jersey. The Copley and Dudley branches of the Boston Public Library also displayed Crite's prints. The Museum of the National Center of Afro American Artists exhibited his paintings and drawings, and the Museum of Fine Arts, Boston, exhibited his prints. At the Episcopal Divinity School in Cambridge his works were mounted, and at Gallery NAGA, a Newbury Street collaborative of which Crite is a member, another exhibition of his works was held.

INSTITUTIONAL SUPPORTS

This extraordinary cooperative effort by museums and educational and cultural institutions illustrates the remarkable strengths of the creative community of Boston's Blacks. That strength is in part attributable to the great number of colleges and universities in the area. Black artists on the faculties of these institutions have been able to use their positions as a springboard for support of their creative work.

John Wilson at Boston University has, from his base on the faculty, competed successfully for the commissions to sculpt memorials to Martin Luther King in Buffalo, NH and in Washington, DC. Napoleon Jones Henderson has, from his position at Roxbury Community College, achieved the position of Vice President of the National Conference of Artists. Ellen Banks has, from her base at the School of the Museum of Fine Arts, become a fellow at the Bunting Institute at Radcliffe College and has won many grants for travel to Europe and South America. Bryan McFarlane has utilized his position at Massachusetts

College of Art as a support for creativity which won him the first Bay State Banner Award in 1984. From his base at Emerson College, Arnold Hurley produced work that won the Attleboro Museum Award for Painting and the Dana Pond Prize for Technical Painting, among other awards. From his position at Simmons College, Reginald Jackson has traveled to Africa and South America researching the ties between black culture in Brazil and that on the African Continent.

From his position at University of Massachusetts at Boston, Richard Yarde has exhibited work praised by Boston Globe critic Robert Taylor as one of the ten best shows in the greater Boston area. Dana Chandler has, from positions at Simmons College and Northeastern University, become a powerful supporter of the full range of styles adopted by black artists in Boston and across the country. Calvin Burnett has, from his long-term position at Massachusetts College of Art, won prizes too numerous to mention in competitions from Atlanta to Leipzig. Ben Peterson, at Massachusetts College of Art, has brought the photography of James Van Der Zee to a grateful Boston Black community. And Marcia Lloyd, at Massachusetts College of Art, has made annual festivals of black filmmakers a staple of the cultural scene. Milton Derr, of the School of the Museum of Fine Arts/Tufts University, has gained wide respect as a painter of fine sensibilities. Kofi Kayiga teaches at Massachusetts College of Art and produces some of the most startling expressionist images to come out of a Boston area studio.

A number of artists who trained at colleges in the Boston area now teach here at the secondary or elementary level while devoting most of their spare time to art. Robert T. Freeman, a graduate of Boston University, has been Director of Art in the Western Public Schools and Artist in Residence at the

Noble and Greenough School in Dedham. Michael Jones, a graduate of Massachusetts College of art, has been an instructor at the James P. Timilty School, Boston. He now teaches part time at Roxbury Community College. Clarence Washington, a graduate of Tufts University, teaches in the Boston Public School System. Fern Cunningham, a graduate of University of Massachusetts at Boston, teaches at the Park School in Brookline. Dorothy Anderson, who studied at Massachusetts Institute of Technology, has been a coordinator of an art program in an experimental school. Elaine Wong, who studied at Boston University (and Yale and University of Pennsylvania), teaches at Boston's English High School and part time at Massachusetts College of Art. Roxanne Perinchief studied at Cambridge College and teaches African Art at Kid's Fair in Boston. Robert W. Murrell, a graduate of Massachusetts College of Art, teaches in a private high school in Boston. Leon H. Robinson, a graduate of Boston University, has taught art in public schools and now supports his art through work as a metal finisher. Paul T. Goodnight studied at Massachusetts College of Art and has been an Artist in Residence in the Boston Public School System. Aukram M. Burton attended the University of Massachusetts at Boston and has been a photography consultant and teacher at Madison Park High School.

Some come to Boston to study and remain to create, earning their livings at jobs outside the teaching field. Alan Crite worked as a technical illustrator before retirement. Anna Dunwell studied at Boston University and the School of the Museum of Fine Arts. She supports her collage and tapestry productions through editing, writing and some teaching. Rene Westbrook studied at Boston University and the Massachusetts College of Art. She has supported her painting, sculpture and drawing through work as a television

producer and a librarian. Janice Munnings Melton studies at Antioch University, Emerson College, and Suffolk University. She works as a press photographer. Harriet Kennedy studied at the Museum School, Northeastern University and Boston University, and is now curator of the Boston Gallery of the Museum of the National Center of Afro-American Artists.

The concentration of institutions of higher education in the Greater Boston Area also provides outlets for the exposure of art outside of the commercially-oriented galleries. Exhibitions at University of Massachusetts at Boston, Simmons College, Northeastern University, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Harvard University, and Massachusetts College of Art have highlighted black artists. Blacks have been included in shows at Boston University, and Rudolph Robinson, a black photographer, won first prize in the 1984 competition at the University's bookstore.

In fact, universities and colleges constitute the major outlets for the display of works by black artists. Most of these exhibitions are organized at the artist's initiative, although for February, Black History Month, colleges are more likely to approach black artists for work, and are more receptive to showing them.

Thus, during February, 1983, it was possible, in the Greater Boston Area, to view over 350 paintings, sculptures, photographs, weavings and prints by black artists. Most of this work was displayed at colleges and universities, but other local institutions also exhibited work by black artists. In seven one-person shows and seven group exhibitions, the works of over sixty black artists were exhibited in community center, library, bank, university and museum settings. With few exceptions, the work was by artists living in the Greater Boston Area.

Clarence Washington's one-person show of paintings of Mexico was hung at the Museum of the National Center of Afro-American Artists. His fauvist-influenced paintings achieved their effects through placement and the proportion of shapes. His Matisse-like sense of design was checked by an expressionist attraction to acidic colors and a rejection of saturated tones. At the MIT Museum in Cambridge and at Simmons College Gallery in Boston, Reginald Jackson showed photographs, graphic designs, montage and electrostatic prints. Jackson captured the Africanisms that survive in the Caribbean and in South America as expertly as he documented the current life in West Africa. Sam Cornish's well-designed and poetically evocative photographs of books were appropriately displayed in the Fiction, Literature and the Arts Bookstore in Brookline.

Works by Romare Bearden dominated the collection on view at the 17 Wendell Street Gallery in Cambridge. More casual forms than in his collages were seen in his watercolors, which had a haphazard gaiety about them. Jerry Pinkney's large exhibition at the AAMARP Galleries at Northeastern University contained works in many media from pencil to watercolor. An illustrator of children's books, magazines, posters and postage stamps, Pinkney rendered the late Senator Everett Dirksen and ball player, Jackie Robinson, with the same facile mastery of technique. Alan Rohan Crite showed prints, paintings and drawings in several locations, in both one-person and group exhibitions. At the Dudley Branch of the Boston Public Library, and at University of Massachusetts at Boston's Community Arts Gallery, Crite showed works in several media. His best works were linoleum cuts, where the enforced simplicity of form restrains his tendency to overcrowd his images with anecdotal detail. Crite also exhibited in "New Works by Old Friends" at the

Harriet Tubman House in Boston's South End. This exhibition of work by eleven painters, photographers, and sculptors included seven welded constructions by Machu Piccu which had considerable drama in their archaic impact. Two vigorous wood constructions by Dennis Didley were shown, and three paintings by Paul Goodnight were excellent in drawing and exciting in color.

At the Boston Public Library at Copley Square were works by eleven members of the Boston Afro-American Artists Association. Outstanding among this group, which was then presided over by Henry Washington, were the painting "Sandbox" by Robert Murrell, Jr.; Leon Robinson's landscapes of the South End; and Henry Washington's abstractions of architectural forms.

Over one hundred works by sixteen artists at Northeastern University's AAMARP exhibition at the Federal Reserve Bank in Boston impressively demonstrated the diverse styles and themes of Boston-based black artists. From the quiet, monochromatic realism of Marcia Lloyd's oil, "Massachusetts Turnpike" to the severe abstract simplicity of Bill Travis's "Untitled" metal sculpture, the range was considerable. There was indignation and rage in Michael Jones's "A Picture is Worth a Thousand Words." Rudolph Robinson's photograph, "960 W," captured the texture of wood, metal, and paint in a visually exciting composition, and his three "Male Nudes" were jewels of light. The etchings of John Wilson showed mastery of craft articulating humanist concerns. Dana Chandler's several tissue collages had the softness of Baziotes about them. James Reed's "Still Life" used subtle variations in the texture of oils to good effect.

The Museum of the National Center of Afro-American Artists exhibited works by 19 artists from their permanent collection. An international grouping, the show was marked by high levels of artistry. Outstanding among

these were a cast concrete sculpture by Rene Westbrook; paintings by Pheoris West, Kofi Kayiga, Charles Searles, Tyrone Geter, Robert Thompson and Richard Yarde; and drawings by John Wilson and Milton Derr.

The profuse and rich output of these artists reflected sustained effort by artists who were making the most of the cultural wealth that Boston affords. Indeed they were creating an important segment of that cultural wealth.

AFRO-AMERICAN MASTER ARTIST IN RESIDENCE PROGRAM
AT NORTHEASTERN UNIVERSITY

Some see such outpourings of creative effort as unlikely to bring to the artists the kind of recognition they seek. This view holds that recognition by "mainstream" critics is the stuff of which careers are built. According to E.B., such recognition will not necessarily follow from exhibiting at a university or college:

Exhibitions at colleges are seen by critics as educational, as distinct from cultural activities. Not all exhibitions at MIT are reviewed. Not all exhibits at the Museum School are reviewed, or at other colleges.

Looked at in this way, the exhibition program of the Afro-American Master Artists in Residence Program is not a vehicle for career advancement in the same way that its provision of studio space can be. There is some dispute among black artists as to what directions their fulfillment as artists should take. Some, like E.B., pursue this goal through integration into the white mainstream art world. For the majority of Boston's black artists, career development is vaguely seen as dependent upon a growing economic and political base of black clients.

The Afro-American Master Artists in Residence Program at Northeastern grew out of such a focus. Along with the Museum of the National Center of Afro-American Artists, AAMARP, has been a powerful influence on the creative outpourings of the community of black artists in Boston. Dana Chandler, founder and Director of AAMARP, sees the support of the program's existence as a political manifestation of the black community. Chandler was invited to Northeastern University as Artist in Residence in 1974 while he held a position as Assistant Professor at Simmons College. According to Ramona Edelin, then Chairperson of Northeastern's African-American Studies Department, and Gregory Ricks, Director of Northeastern's African-American Institute at the time, it was Chandler's defense of the black community against insult and dehumanization and his dynamic representation of Pan-Africanism that made him their choice for the first artist in residence. In 1974, Edelin and Ricks convinced Northeastern administration to provide the funding for what was to become a much more ambitious program.

A fire of suspicious origin destroyed much of Chandler's work, and in 1976, he was invited to make use of some of the empty space in a former warehouse owned by Northeastern as a studio. In short order, Chandler conceived of a use for the entire second floor at 11 Leon Street in Boston's South End: the Afro-American Master Artist in Residence Program. Soon Chandler was able to invite painters Ellen Banks, Jacqueline Jordan, Renee Stout, Milton Derr, Tyrone Geter, Arnold Hurley and James Reed; photographers Reginald Jackson and Rudolph Robinson; fabric artists Barbara Ward and Susan Thompson; and collage maker Robin Chandler into studio space. Long-established painter Calvin Burnett and the sculptor and graphic artist John Wilson also became regular participants in AAMARP's exhibition program.

The roster has expanded as artists moved on or emergency space could be provided to include Bryan McFarlane, Michael Jones, and Rene Westbrook as residents, and Marcia Lloyd and Bill Travis as exhibiting artists.

In the less than 10 years of its existence, AAMARP has held more than 70 exhibitions of black and non-black artists. It has been the scene of performances by the New Africa Theater. It has hosted representatives from Tanzania, Kenya, Liberia, Ghana, Senegal, Dahomey, the People's Republic of China, and Morocco. Community groups have held meetings in Chandler's studio as well as in the performance area. AAMARP is seen as an important community resource by groups as diverse as the Boston YMCA, the Elderly Division of Boston City Hall, and the Roxbury Action Program.

In April, 1985, Northeastern University notified AAMARP that its quarters at 11 Leon Street would be closed for approximately a year and a half so that structural renovations could be carried out as part of the University's Southwest Corridor Development Plans. When the building reopens, AAMARP will have approximately one-half of the space it now has. In Dana Chandler's view, the need for AAMARP's programs is greater now than ever: "The need is for expansion. The expectations of the black community are greater. AAMARP must match the growing sophistication of the black community. People are looking to museum standards."

Chandler sees a need to remain on campus with a gallery and multiple performance space. But he also has hopes that an off-campus location in Roxbury can be acquired for the development of a major cultural center. He envisions a world cultural center under the aegis of AAMARP, a place where the culture of Africa, Asia, Europe and the Americas could be displayed. Some others are less certain that the city agencies involved in developing plans

for Roxbury will be as supportive of these ideas as early indications would suggest. A good deal depends on cooperation between Northeastern University, a private institution, and government agencies. One of the sites Chandler has been considering, the Norfolk House, is reported to be the building whose closing by Northeastern initially freed up the money that the African American Studies Department convinced Northeastern to apply to AAMARP. Four years after AAMARP came into existence, Northeastern moved to disband the African American Studies Department, AAMARP's parent department. Today that department struggles to survive.

The Last Picture Show is the title of AAMARP's final exhibition before the 32,000 square-feet complex is closed for redevelopment. There were sixty-seven works by sixteen artists on display. Milton Derr's "Portrait of a Black Man," a 1970 oil, has stylized large forms that explode in reds against a black background. His "Study of Steve Shaw and Me," a recent oil, seeks new territory in its unfinished look. The artist is combining the residuals of brush drawing with broad areas of color. Linear effects establish the figures, while broad greens of nature and blue sky establish the flat surface of the canvas. Derr's set of four folding panels constructed of photographically enlarged brush drawings has rhythmically caligraphic and wash effects. A celebration of sexuality through control of proportional distribution of black, white and gray comes across through these four black nudes.

In his "Study of Barbara Ward," a pen and ink drawing, Derr's wire-like lines establish a standing figure. The figure, with its doll-like cloth sculpture cuddled maternally, is more a point of departure for the artist's exploration of the rhythms of line. In Derr's ink and wash drawing from his

"Violence Series," smoldering dark shapes suggest a crowd in the lower section of the paper, while the upper portion suggests burning buildings. This is a successful integration of bold upper vertical striations and lower curvilinear forms and bleeding washes. In his large "Study for the Garden," dominant greens, citrons and complementary cadmium red lights, oranges, and yellows establish fluid forms of trees, foliage, grass and figures. The work is lyrical and poetically colorful.

Rudolph Robinson's ten photographs are from his Brooklyn West Indian Festival series and from his male nude series. Robinson achieves an intimacy with his subjects that gives his photographs a naturalness we associate with a hidden camera. It is as if he creates such trust in his subject that when they look toward his camera, they do so with a candor that is completely without embarrassment. So we see recorded the "Golden Man" in festival paint; the "Man on a Bench" whose aged fatigue carries down through the pyramidal space carved by his outstretched legs and is echoed in the shapes of coats hung behind him on the wall; the "Sound Girl" whose pensive face belies her spangled costume; and his "Carnival Group," from which four relaxedly embracing black youths smile out at us. In their closeness they respond happily to the photographer.

Susan Thompson's applique creations present Edenic scenes. In one untitled male in paradise and another untitled female in paradise, the simplicity of forms suggest the French primitive, Rousseau. The shapes of trees, vegetation, and small animals exist in an essentially two-dimensional space of harmony and pace.

John Wilson's "Roy" is a charcoal drawing in which precision of line delineates the features of an appealing child. The head dominates the extant

of the drawing, which frames the face so that the child's hair bleeds off the left edge and top of the work. Soft shading of volumes of the forehead, lips, chin and cheeks lend emphasis to the eyes, which are sharply precisioned. In his "Seated Man," Wilson uses mixed media in which the soft tones of the paper are set off against a white painted background. There is a coolness about the way the artist has observed the sitter, who leans with elbow on the table. Soft contours mark Wilson's "Seated Girl."

Rene Westbrook shows work from her Women, Rhymes and Rituals series. In "Woman Tide" a craypas and graphite work, a headless female torso is stretched across a black background. Masks hang expressionlessly above the body which, though headless, is alive. The masks suggest theater, the act that hides through color and makeup any revelation of the person underneath. In "Virgin Offering" another headless female is placed against a fabric pattern. The theme of headlessness and masks, which repeatedly occur in Westbrook's late nudes, addresses the dilemma of women's power and powerlessness. Westbrook's drawing is sure and simple in her graphite and craypas work. The contours of thighs, abdomens and breasts and the volumes of masks are rendered with woodcut-like striations that follow the roundness of the forms they establish. Her "What the Ancestors Saw" is a portrait of a young black woman who looks out at us with a quizzical expression. Drawn in charcoal, with color washes restricted to the fabric of the sitter's bandana and dress, this work is less compelling than Westbrook's craypas and graphite work. The drawing lacks the concentration of line that marks "Woman Tide."

In three works James Reed continues his celebration of black womanhood. In "Body Builder" she flexes her muscles in a weight lifting exercise against a halo-like red background. In a portrait of "Dr. Bernice Miller" she is in

scholar's robes with the book, Black Child, held in her two hands. In "Southern Girl" she is seated in the form of a gentle "S" curve counterpoised by the sweep of her arm. Reed's work has a solidity about it that is impressive in still-life paintings, where his control of light and texture works well with his spatial arrangements. His portraits do not always get to the character of the sitter in ways that go beyond the kind of qualities that differentiate articles in still life paintings. Yet the thematic concerns in his portraits are carried to the viewer through the strength of his forms. In sum, the sitter is a point of departure from which Reed aims toward a more generalized statement.

Ellen Banks presented a single work, "We Shall Overcome," a square canvas in which squares and rectangles are established by transparent washes of acrylic on a gray ground. Her forms were larger and somewhat darker than heretofore, and the textural qualities of variable transparencies suggested an agitation that is usually alien to her cool temperament. The yellow upper squares and rectangles, the red squares, and the white, blue and green rectangles are larger, more encompassing sizes than usual for Banks, yet she controls the proportional distribution of space in her geometrical compositions to good effect.

Michael Jones' prolific output is uneven. Sometimes he achieves a striking image that both holds the attention and draws you into his rhymed musings, as in "Chivalry is Reborn." Sometimes he does not quite make it to a masterly conceptualization of the role of color, drawing, paint quality and composition in conveying his theme, as in "Eros--The Cosmic Lover Loves You." Jones is a draftsman of considerable gifts. His thematic concerns are highly individual approaches to questions of sexual mores and morals, the effects of

ghettoization on the way people see themselves and treat each other. His vehicles are self portraits that adopt the figurative motifs of classical artists from Blake to David. These are, however, embued with Jones's concerns for the lives of blacks today. In "Chivalry is Reborn" Jones presents the eagle-emblazoned chest of a leather-jacketed youth holding a sword. One of several verses lettered on the background reads:

Please don't look at me that way sister
Because I really mean you no harm.

Another verse begins:

Brother gonna rip me off
Gonna take my shit and run...

Sometimes Jones's verse is combined with Biblical quotations, as in "Private Dancer" where a young girl's image is sensitively positioned with a poem which begins:

Every little brown eyed girl
Wants to be a dancer
When she grows up

Joined to this verse are quotations from Ecclesiastes, Song of Solomon, Psalms, Thessalonians, Hebrews and Proverbs. One work, "Here Today--Here Tomorrow?" seems to refer to AAMARP's future with its inclusion of the addresses, 11 Leon Street, in the composition. The verse accompanying Jones's image reads:

I've been told to keep quiet
and follow the golden rule
I would if I could get my
forty acres and a mule--...

After several more lines in this vein Jones writes:

I must keep painting.

Jones brings to his work an eclectic background of references to commercial art; exposure to classical images like Blake's "The Ancient of Days," which he has reinterpreted; and self-instruction in the forms of African Art. His drawing is sure and his conceptualization can be dramatic. His humor is catching.

Bill Travis has lent a single work to AAMARP's Last Picture Show. His "Primer Red" concerns itself with the relationships of seven wafer-like steel sheets of various dimensions, balanced on an armature. In the midst of works which grapple with social imagery it takes a concentrated effort to focus on the curvature of these monochromatic steel sheets. Travis rewards this concentration through his mastery of sensitive proportions and rhythmicity.

In Reginald Jackson's "T.J." an almost-silhouetted head of an African youth carves out an intriguing shape against an ancient cracked golden sun-drenched wall.

Robin Chandler shows an expanded range of colors in her latest collages. For several years she explored arrangements of silver foil and cutouts of the shapes of gingko leaves. She has not expanded her repertoire to include arrangements of copper, paper and tinfoil. In "Bringing Up the Sun," a copper sun, cutout dancers, dried leaves, and gingko fans are organized into a complex, dynamic composition that radiates. In "The Plunge," a blue plastic background suggests an underwater scene in which a small, fully-clothed figure swims among seaweed and foliage in the blue light. In "Sitting Pretty," the human figure takes the dominant position. A child's pretty composite face peers out above a delicate dress of lace and rice paper. This is a charming work, with sensitive use of embossed gold foil to lend striking color effects.

Dana Chandler's seven works trace the range of his voluminous output. His "African Sunscape--Red Sunrise #4," is a tissue collage in which an exploding orb is echoed in boomerangs of orange. In the lower section of the piece, green shapes of vegetation spread horizontally beneath the burning sky. The work is decorative. Its language is subtly evocative though its forms are derived from abstract expressionist modes. In "Amerikkka's Kontribution to the Black Woman," Chandler's mood is angry. His forms are crude and his colors strident: the shattered body of a black woman lies prone beneath red, white and blue flames. In "Mazelle's Kitchen," the colors are bright, pastel and affirmative in their celebration of fruit, bread and plant leaves.

Chandler keeps three strains of his creative search separate. One who is unfamiliar with his work could easily take "Winter Tree, Blue Moon" and "Abstracted Afro-American Tree Roots" for the work of the artist who did "African Sunscape," and could recognize "Warrior" as the work of the artist who did "Amerikkka's Kontribution to the Black Woman" and "Amerikkka's Kontribution to the Black Man," but would never suspect that they were all painted by the same artist who created the joyful sprited "Mazelle's Kitchen." Such diversity of stylistic approaches would be very difficult to maintain if the artist depended on galleries aimed at the commercial market. It took several generations for art enthusiasts to accept that Picasso's cubist, surrealist, blue and rose periods, expressionist, and Guernica periods were all the legitimate outputs of the same creative spirit.

It is a singular contribution of AAMARP that not only are a broad range of styles seen between the participating artists, but stylistic variations can be found within the same artist, who chooses to explore different directions.

Thus the "Violence Series" of Milton Derr and his "Study for the Garden" are different in spirit, yet both are self-contained expressions of matured talent.

Marcia Lloyd shows four of her "Charles Light Series." They display a sensitivity to changes of light from morning to evening and from bright to cloudy days. Lloyd has grown considerably since she did these works. Her Martha's Vineyard paintings exhibited in 1983 and her works done in China since then show a greater control of the interplay of shape, line and color.

Jacqueline Jordan's "Lake Dawn" is a pen and ink and watercolor work. She uses sketchy outlines on brown rolling hills and color washes to establish pink clouds as a backdrop for silhouetted trees. This single work suggests that she is a competent draftsman and careful colorist.

Bryan McFarlane has a growing reputation as a figurative painter who uses expressionist modes. In this show he exhibits five works. Three of these are part of a series he is doing on art's place in society. In "Artist Applying Makeup" a painter applies colors from tubes of paint to his face. The features of the artist are black, but he applies reds, greens, blues and oranges to the planes of his face. The figure of the artist is placed off-center to the left, and the hot colors on his face are nearly balanced by oozing tubes of paint on the right. The work seems unfinished, due to its unbalanced distribution of warm and cool colors, although it is heavily encrusted with impasto layers of paint. In "Artist Eating Paint" a figure emerges from blue layers of paint and carried blues throughout the face, shirt and hands. A bright highlight of lighter color on the nose and curling ribbons of paint anchor this composition successfully.

The theme of these works is society's lack of support for the arts. A kind of emotional turmoil grips the painter who creates aesthetic stimuli for

a population that, even at best, attends exhibitions to extend only quiet approval. In "Artist Eating Palette" McFarlane's bold, shocking frenzy of cadmiums against background blues laments the dilemma of the artist's devotion to art. In "Banana Fertility," a pastel work, McFarlane seizes on the design potentials of banana leaves. Aqua-blue and green leaves cradle banana plants in large ogival comfort. The dominant colors are offset by reds, maroons and purples. Many of McFarlane's landscape and vegetation compositions allude to his homeland of Jamaica.

Calvin Burnett exhibits three works, two of which are a pair showing "Men Walking" and "Women Walking." The third piece, "Special Significant Other," is a paint and charcoal portrait with generalized female features. The woman appears to be a dancer, caught in a pensive mood, with carefully considered stylized forms. In "Men Walking" and "Women Walking" the draftsmanship is sure and relaxes. Burnett presents us with a sophisticated synopsis of forms in black pencil and red ink. His figures hustle through streets to or from work or in the search for work. An inscription suggests the activity is equally divided between the two: "The harder we run the behinder we get" and "Young Black Males Jobless 51%."

In the range of orientations that AAMARP has been able to support through its studio spaces and exhibition programs, there has been a comprehensiveness that reflects the highest levels of professionalism that Boston affords today. The breadth of that range is indeed greater than that provided by the gallery scene on Newbury Street.

MUSEUM OF THE NATIONAL CENTER OF AFRO-AMERICAN ARTISTS

The Museum of the National Center of Afro-American Artists is the showplace of black art in Boston. It is the brainchild of Elma Lewis, the internationally-known sponsor of black culture in all its forms, founder of the Elma Lewis School of Fine Arts and the National Center of Afro-American Artists. The Museum's program of exhibitions is its most public activity. On average, five major exhibitions are mounted each year, reflecting historical, Caribbean, African traditional and contemporary art, contemporary Afro-American, and black New England art. The Boston Gallery holds exhibitions of paintings, sculpture, drawings and weavings by contemporary black artists, primarily from the Greater Boston Area. There is a program of conservation, including the purchase of major prints and drawings and the acquisition of paintings, sculpture and artifacts as gifts and by subscription. The Museum's ongoing activities also include: publication of catalogues and exhibition brochures, research in the history and criticism of Afro-American art, and documentation of the productivity of black artists through an extensive slide collection. In addition, a program in public education has been a feature of the Museum since its inception. School groups from the elementary to university level are guided through exhibitions, and the Museum Staff present lectures within and outside of the Museum. Exhibitions organized by the Museum are also placed in colleges throughout New England.

Under the directorship of Edmund Barry Gaither and with the guidance of Elma Lewis, the Museum began its exhibition program in 1970 in space shared with the performing arts division of the Elma Lewis School. This shared space allowed an exhibition schedule of 140 days per year, but the success of the

program soon supported the need for year-round exhibitions. By 1972, the Museum had added Harriet Kennedy to the staff through a shared position with the Museum of Fine Arts in Boston. In 1974, the Boston School Department closed an annex to the Ellis School, located in an 1870's mansion built by the Aaron Williams' Family. Through two years of negotiations with the city government, National Center of Afro-American Artists acquired the building as a museum site. After another two years of renovations, the Museum opened its doors in June of 1980 to 1100 guests.

The presence of the Museum of the National Center of Afro-American Artists in Boston is central to the spirit of the art community and to the black intellectual community in general. It is the locale of receptions for diplomats from African and Caribbean nations at which the black community of Boston can show its support for their independent policies. It is the scene of musical and dance performances at the opening receptions for artists exhibiting in its galleries. It is the repository of documentation of the accomplishments of black artists from the colonial period up to the present day. It is the location of readings from the works of black writers.

Three exhibitions on display in the month of June, 1985, underlined the diverse thrusts of the Museum's exhibition program. In one spacious gallery the work of Meta Warrick Fuller, 1977-1968, was on exhibit. Neglected by the mainstream of American art history, Meta Warrick Fuller's name has been kept alive by students of black culture. She was admired and encouraged by Rodin in Paris and exhibited in the Pennsylvania Academy of Fine Arts along with John Singer Sargent, Mary Cassatt and Thomas Eakins. Her work is in the spirit of the French Romantics with whom she studied. This influence is clearly visible in her 1917 "Peace Halting the Violence of War," where

seventeen figures of women and youths strain to halt a charging horse. That she chose, amidst her renditions of biblical themes, to do depictions of Sojourner Truth, Phyllis Wheatley, Frederick Douglass, Harriet Tubman, a monumet to the "Emancipation Proclamation," a series of "Waterboys," and several versions of "Ethiopia Awakening" speaks for her concern for her people.

Another exhibition in the Museum's Boston Gallery is of work by Clarence Washington. Entitled "Moods/Portraits," the show is made up entirely of figurative work. Washington, who is an accomplished landscapist, shows in these portraits an inclination toward simpler compositions. Whereas his Mexican cityscapes are marked by a helter-skelter spontaneity, the portraits are made up of larger areas and broader brushstrokes. The stylistic references are to the fauves and followers of Matisse, although Washington will tell you that the fauvist interest in African sculpture was one point of departure for him. There is no clear involvement with themes of black life in Washington's portraits. His colors are placed with reference to design strategies and the establishment of the overall mood of the work. All of the figures are placed center canvas. Backgrounds are sometimes relieved by a latticework of wet whites drawn across color or striations smeared in radiating lines out from the figure. Unlike the French pursuers of fauvist aesthetics, Washington has an expressionistic tendency to discount any purity of hue that unmixed colors might provide. The works, which date from 1978 to 1984, seem to grow increasingly somber as the 1980's progress. Thus we see in 1978's "Mood Portrait #8" a female rendered in colorful, clean pinks, oranges and tomato red and in 1979's "Mood Portrait #12" a female with clean, spirited lemon yellows, greens and caligraphic lines establishing a cafe chair. By 1982 his "Mood Portrait #11" shows somber maroons, charcoal grays and umbers.

The 1983 "Olmec Mood #29" shows the influence of Picasso's expressionist explorations: a sad mood invests the paint, which has a heavier quality.

Two of the main galleries are occupied with the work of Robert Tinch, a Boston native who now resides in Connecticut and is a doctoral candidate at New York University. Tinch's work seeks to yoke together the physical and the conceptual. His constructions are in the minimalist vein. One "Untitled" work is made of seven sand-blasted glass panels which rest on a platform base. The textural effect produced by sand-blasting is in the shape of an arc whose shadow is cast against the wall behind the panels. Another work, called "Charlie Resolved," consists of old truck and car tires stacked against a wall in an arrangement that mimicks a herringbone pattern. Such works are intended to surprise by their unexpectedness in a museum or gallery setting. The goal is not some aesthetic arrangement or proportions or textures, but something closer to the Dadaist insistence that any psychological provocation is equivalent to an aesthetic experience. The artist is bent on triggering a sense of intrigue on the part of the viewer. Rather than seeking to move his onlookers, the conceptual artist taxes his audience to fine a resolve to respond to some minimal possibility of visual interest. The Museum of the National Center of Afro-American Artists makes available to its audience the imaginative explorations of the widest possible range of professional black artists.

ORGANIZATIONS OF BLACK ARTISTS

Boston's two active self-supported organizations of black artists have quite different focuses. The Boston Collective states in its prospectus that it represents "a stage of Black Awareness beginning forty years ago." They

work with "a new consciousness of our African heritage and self in the American scene." This consciousness does not translate into stylistic or other formal concerns. But it does reflect itself in the travel of the members and in the subjects on which they focus. Allan Rohan Crite's work varies from cartoon-style histories to lino-cut allegories. His subjects range from images of Christian saints to sexually explicit paeans. Dennis Didley is a sculptor whose citations of African, Mexican, and Pacific Island art are carried out in found objects like broom handles. Paul Goodnight's work in pastels and oils combines the drama of modernistic montage effects with highly accomplished draftmanship that has made him one of the most respected young black artists in Boston. His themes concern black life in the Caribbean, the U.S. and Africa.

Napoleon Jones-Henderson works in applique to produce images that refer directly to the African heritage. Jones's colors are designed to reflect a total disregard for Western ideas of harmony. Reginald Jackson, a photographer, has been engaged in a long-term research project on African survivals in the culture of Brazil. His electrostatic prints juxtapose African masks and the black urban environment. Aukram Burton is a photographer who seeks to use his medium to expose people to their environment. Susan Thompson is a fabric artist who can catch the eye with her bold colors and intricate macrame and applique creations. The Boston Collective meets irregularly when members have issues that they wish to discuss with each other. For seven years they have organized exhibitions which have at times included others.

The other support organization in the area is the Boston Afro-American Artists, Inc. This organization, which dates back to 1963, still includes

some of its founding members among its exhibitors. The group has a variable membership that ranges from 40 to 100 members as inclinations go. Its aim is to provide exposure for professional as well as amateur visual artists. The traditional exhibitions of this group are the Arts in the Park display, which is open to artists simply by registration, and the Black History Month Exhibition at the Copley Square Library, which includes members only. The range of styles and level of professional achievement is considerable within the Boston Afro-American Artists, Inc. From the South End scenes of Leon Robinson, which can show a high level of mastery of poetic mood, and Michael Jones, who is also a member of AAMARP, to Roxanne Perinchief, whose fabric creations and macrame weavings show imagination and proficiency, and Henry Washington, whose bright-colored abstractions show judgement and control, to the work of students and beginners, the members of the Boston Afro-American Artists, Inc., seem to be enjoying themselves. Determination of the quality of the art is left entirely to the judgement of participating artists and to the viewers. Thematically the work varies from John Barbour's references to African sculpture in his semi-abstract oil, "Reflections in the Mind's Eye" and Rosanne Perinchief's applique, "Africa Stripped," where bullets hang from the tip of South Africa, to C.D. Carter's still life paintings of baskets.

ENTREPRENEURS IN ART

In May, of 1970, the exhibition, "Afro-American Artists: New York and Boston," opened at the Museum of Fine Arts, Boston. This was the first curatorial effort in Boston by Edmund Barry Gaither, and the first essay at cooperation between the nascent Museum of the National Center of Afro-American Artists and the Museum of Fine Arts. Among the visitors to this exhibit were

Constance Brown and Jane Shapiro. They found the show to be in Ms. Shapiro's words, "upbeat and interested in the real world" in ways that much of the art then being exhibited was not. The work of Romare Bearden had a "poetic" appeal, and Benny Andrews struck them as an artist whose paintings had an "aesthetic impact beyond its thematic message." To their knowledge, there was no gallery at that time in the Greater Boston Area that handled the work of black artists. The idea slowly grew that Boston could use a gallery that showed the work of black artists who did not fit into any easily categorizable stylistic niche.

The Wendell St. Gallery, developed out of these aesthetic aims, opened in 1976 with a combination of works by Bearden, Andrews and Jean-Claude Severe. According to Shapiro, "the idea of the gallery was born out of the 1970 exhibition, and the concept grew 'over a number of years'." Shapiro explains that the gallery, located in her home at 17 Wendell Street in Cambridge, is not intended as her sole source of income. "We do not want to get into that. Now we can do exactly what we want. We show just the artists we like, and we don't have to worry about meeting a fixed amount of income." But the gallery has, in her opinion "been moderately successful, and it has provided much pleasure from contact with artists."

Except for major shows, Wendell Street has no fixed hours, and the gallery does not handle a fixed roster of artists: "The artists we've shown are more like feelers. Some artists have major galleries elsewhere. Bob Freeman has the Clark Gallery in Lincoln. Barnette Honeywood has a gallery in California."

The Wendell Street Gallery has handled work by Allan Rohan Crite, although not in formal exhibitions. It has exhibited work by Reginald

Jackson, Robert Freeman, George Ganges, Ed McCluney, Barkley Hendricks, Richard Yards, and Clarence Washington. Shortly before her death, they contacted Alma Thomas, and in 1978 they exhibited her work.

The gallery is oriented toward the personal interests of its owners, Constance Brown and Jane Shapiro. They have gained a reputation as a gallery that specializes in art by black artists. The range of works at the Wendell Street is less broad than one finds at the Alchemie Gallery. They share with the Alchemie Gallery a disinclination to be financially dependent on the sales of art.

For many years, another location, The Gallery, a frame shop at 303 Columbus Avenue in the South End, has made its walls available to black artists. Artists like Fern Cunningham, Aukram Burton, Paul Goodnight and Arnold Hurley have shown their paintings, sculpture and photographs there. The business focus, however, is on frame and prints. The artists are left to their own devices to promote exhibitions there. Primarily, it has been a place where artists can display work and receive the comments of other artists.

Recently opened in the South End is the Harris-Brown Gallery. The gallery developed out of the collecting interests of Elizabeth Harris of Boston, and Edward Brown of Atlanta, whose areas of focus are Afro-American Artists and African Art. The gallery aims to present clientele of achieving blacks. Trained at Harvard School of Business, Ms. Harris is very clear about her priorities in selecting work to exhibit:

"The quality of the art is the first thing in selection. It has to be something that I like. I don't see a situation where I would show something just because there is a market for it."

Elizabeth Harris and her husband discovered their love of art when they collected their first painting by a Caribbean artist. Since then they have

acquired work by Bearden, Yarde, Freeman and Lloyd. Ms. Harris's partner, Ed Brown, has long specialized in African art, which the gallery has featured in some exhibitions. Exhibitions by five Afro-American artists have also been held there.

Ms. Harris describes the market for its artwork as "young upwardly mobile black families who have bought their homes and condominiums. They've bought their cars and their fur coats. They are now ready to buy art. The experience of the sixties has sensitized this group to their origins. I don't mean that the work has to deal with the black experience of pre-affluent times, but the identity of the artist as black makes the work attractive to this group."

Expectations at the Harris-Brown Gallery have been more than met in its first year of existence. A substantial white clientelle also supports the gallery, and pricing is set to encourage sales to a broad range of income groups. None of the artists currently being handled by the gallery is from Boston; this fact does not reflect disdain for the quality of work by Boston black artists, but rather the business decision to provide work that is somewhat distanced from the currents of familiarity in the city.

Other Massachusetts galleries that handle work by black artists in addition to their white exhibitors are located in the central art district of Boston and in Cambridge, Wellesley, and Lincoln. Of the ten galleries that can be so identified, one, Gallery NAGA, is a cooperative where Allan Crite has exhibited. One, the Mills Gallery, is available to artists who are granted studio space in the Boston Center for the Arts. Black resident artists there are Leon Robinson, Maurice Costa, and Tyrone Hall. Janice Munnings Melton has also exhibited at the Mills Gallery. One gallery, the

Copley Society, is a membership organization in which members are enabled to submit to exhibitions juried by senior members. Milton Derr and Dorothy Anderson have exhibited as members at the Copley Society. AAMARP arranged an exchange exhibition with the Copley Society in 1984. Traditionally established commercial galleries which have exhibited work by black artists are the Van Buren/Brazelton/Cutting Gallery, Cambridge; the Edna Stebbins Gallery, Cambridge; The Todd Gallery, Wellesley; the Clarke Gallery, Lincoln; and in Boston, the Alpha Gallery, the Helen Shlein, and the Harcus Gallery. These galleries vary considerably in their prestige, and an artist who once has exhibited in any of them is not guaranteed space in subsequent exhibitions. The Boston Visual Artists Union (BVAU) has a gallery in which members and invited artists can exhibit. Black artists, Leon Robinson, Elaine Wong, and Arnold Hurley have exhibited at the BVAU. Another gallery which is known to have had blacks among its artists, the Doll and Richards Gallery, is no longer in existence.

That less than ten black artists can be identified on the rosters of seven commercially-oriented fine art galleries, out of the one hundred and forty such galleries in the Greater Boston Area, is not a datum from which conclusions can be easily drawn. Many white artists who are associated with galleries cannot get exhibitions when they want to. A single gallery may have as many as fifty artists on its roster. Some galleries focus on a limited period, say Impressionist, or cater to a clientelle based on a particular educational institution or ethnic group. (There is a gallery in Boston known as a "Yale" gallery.) In this sense the determination of the Wendell Street and the Harris-Brown Galleries to focus on art by black artists may make good business sense even as it reflects another, more symbolic, function of art.

Because people invest important psychological components of their sense of identity in icons, emblems and symbols, the routes by which they come to cherish works of art are not describable in any simple terms.

CHANGING THE MAINSTREAM

It took an accumulation of complex factors--education, institutional growth, scholarship, and experience in social struggle--to expose the exclusion of all Afro-American artists from the Museum of Fine Arts, Boston's "A New World: Masterpieces of American Painting, 1860 to 1910," which opened in 1983. It was the view of many black scholars that that exclusion derived from a Eurocentric view of the symbolism of the "New World." Concerted opposition to this exclusion came from black scholars and artists from Massachusetts, Rhode Island, and Maine. They argued that the record of the stature enjoyed by several 19th century Afro-American artists during their lifetimes indicated that they were more entitled to be included in the exhibition than several of the white artists included. Unprecedented though it was, the modification of the exhibit for its journey to Washington, D.C. and to Paris added only one black artist, Henry D. Tanner.

Small though the addition of one painting by one artist might be, the insistence by black scholars and artists on recognition of the Afro-American contribution to America's cultural identity has had its repercussions. While the voluminous output of black artists shown during Black History Month in 1983 had received no notice in the mainstream media, the Black History Month exhibitions of 1984 stimulated a full page of interviews in the Boston Tab of February 15, 1984. On January 28, 1984, the Christian Science Monitor published an article on black artists, Henry Tanner, Robert S. Duncanson and

Edwin M. Bannister, the "Unsung Masters of American Painting" who were originally left out of the MFA exhibition. When the Museum of Fine Arts and the Institute for Contemporary Arts held their 1984 "Emerging Massachusetts Artists" exhibitions, two black artists, Dana Chandler and Dennis Didley, were included for the first time. The MFA participated in the celebration of Allan Crite's seventy-fifth birthday as well.

A corner may have been turned which, with sustained effort, could bring about a dramatic shift in the role black artists play in defining the character of mainstream art. I spoke to Harriet Kennedy about the circumstances black artists were facing. According to Kennedy, there is increasing institutional interest in black artists: "My experience has been in the museum field for seventeen years. I find recently that white institutions such as ICA and BVAU are just beginning to realize that their programs are tending to fail because they don't have a richer cultural or ethnic representation. I've been getting calls from them recently, wanting to have more participation by black artists--wanting lists of artists...so we have been trying to help them by giving them the names of artists".

In 1985, the Institute for Contemporary Arts "Boston Now" exhibition of photography included, for the first time, two black photographers, Reginald Jackson and Rudolph Robinson.

E.S. How do you account for the fact that black artists are now being included in shows at the MFA and the ICA?

R.R. Because they don't want the aggravation!

Aggravation alone is not likely to have moved these institutions to include work by black artists in their exhibitions. The persistence of black artists in producing images that reflect the world in which they live, within

circumstances of sometimes overt and violent racism, has given their art thematic power. Even the pastoral landscape of Marcia Lloyd showed an agitation of brushstroke and a greater definition of form in the wake of her fight against denial of tenure through what many saw as a violation of affirmative action procedures at University of Massachusetts/Boston.

It is the high level of aesthetic achievement, the richness of choreography in Rudolph Robinson's photographs, the breath-taking surprise Kayiga risks with his innocent child-like forms that never miss arresting proportions, that make their work more than ready for an art world that is willing to look.

ARTISTS AND COMMERCE

Not surprisingly, many of these artists who have survived without the help of Newbury Street insist on existing on their own terms.

E.S. How do you find the Mills Gallery as a dealership? Do you think it is able to generate sales at a level that some Newbury Street galleries can?

L.R. Newbury Street doesn't appeal to me. The Mills Gallery gives me a freedom that Newbury Street doesn't. I don't want to be told "This is good--so do this."

I asked another artist if conditions for sales had improved with the inclusion of blacks in MFA and ICA exhibitions. He replied:

M.D. I can't waste time with these Newbury Street people. I've been in the Copley Society, and they haven't sold anything. I sell on a one-on-one basis. I'm not interested in being rich and famous. I just teach. If two or three pieces sell in a year, that's O.K. I might have a shot at the Gallery NAGA, but I don't owe any people if they don't owe me.

E.S. Well, there are new galleries, like the Seventeen Wendell Street and the Harris-Brown...

M.D. The Seventeen Wendell is a little safe, and the Harris-Brown handles "safe" artists. I don't want to be a significant book illustrator. I'll go for a compromise if the commission is up front, but I will not sacrifice my time on speculation. I live off of my teaching salary. I've sacrificed having a family for my art. If I don't make this choice now I will regret it twenty years from now.

Even as some black artists insist on distancing themselves from market conditions, others see them as important considerations:

A.B. Black artists need to be looking at where the market will be five to ten years from now. Maybe people can't buy works on an individual basis, but leasing to institutions and community centers can be looked into.

E.S. Do you think that a person could support himself as a rental agent for artists?

A.B. If there was somebody willing to do it.

But entrepreneurial efforts are based on more than just finding a willing agent. The gains for an effort need be realizable with some degree of certainty. Most artists are not trained in business. Nor is it clear that most artists are willing to produce for a market that may not be willing to take their work on their own terms.

E.S. You've gained a considerable reputation as a sculptor. Have you ever entertained the idea or seriously attempted to earn a living from your art?

R.W. No. I haven't. And the reason I haven't is based more on my inability to focus on making money in general, rather than feeling I don't have enough talent or money sense or gumption to go out there and make money. I think if I believed that I could make money off of my work, and in addition to that wanted to take time to make money and to strategize to do that, I think I would definitely have money from my art.

Part of making money off of art would mean doing something that I'm not sure I'm ready to do, even at thirty-five. And what that means is specializing in an area that I would be making the money in.

E.S. So that suggests the wellsprings of your creativity are less related to the necessities of making a living than they are to being excited by the possibilities of producing something that has an aesthetic value. Or perhaps you might think of it in some other terms.

R.W. No. I would say that that's closer to the truth than not. I'll say that. I've had furious fights with people who think I'm wasting my talent, however, they define that talent, by not being more specific and focused and specialized. They believe that if I just take the time and work out the kinks of mass producing my work...I mean...you know, this last show...How many people came up to me and said, Rene, do you realize how long it takes you to do this? Why don't you get it down to a science? You could be knocking these things out...and instead of three weeks, you could make three in three weeks...You could make so much more money if you work faster...

It is possible that the symbolic functions of black artists are necessarily untied to market conditions. The black middle and upper classes are very small. To the extent that the art produced reflects the range of concerns in the black population, most of whom cannot be its individual consumers, the work will be expressive of motivations that are independent of commerce.

When artists do approach exhibiting their work, in addition to the strictly commercial possibilities, they may be very concerned about the symbolic function of their art.

E.S. Now the exhibition you're anticipating at the Seventeen Wendell Street Gallery, is that the first exhibition you've had in what is essentially a commercially organized gallery space?

B.M. In Boston?

E.S. Yes, in Boston.

B.M. No. I've also shown at the Alchemie Gallery which is probably of a little different nature because to a certain extent it's an alternative space. Which means its policies come under a different situation. It's not as consistent as the more commercial galleries. Well, the Copley Society, of which I am a member, I've just, like shown in a group situation. But I'm not particularly interested in the Copley Society, because I don't think it's a gallery that has a philosophy that generates a certain standard of work as opposed to its strong commercial policies.

I have people who are to some extent art agents for me in Wellesley. The Todd Gallery...I've shown with them, but it's more for selling's sake. It's not into promoting the artists's reputation as such.

E.S. Have they been successful in selling your work?

B.M. Yes. Through them I've sold two pieces to the Bank of Boston in Springfield, and that caused the Bank of Boston to come to me privately, and they bought some pieces for their Federal Street Offices. And these are large watercolors as well...

E.S. Your membership in the Copley Society has enabled you to be a part of group shows at the Copley Society. But you could, if you wish, have a one-person show at the Copley.

B.M. I think I'd have to make special arrangements to get that consideration, because I have not on a consistent basis taken part in many of the shows there...

E.S. I understand that if a person has been accepted in three of their juried shows, then that enables you to work out either a rental arrangement or something of that kind to have a one-person show.

B.M. Yes, I think so. But I've never really been interested in particularly having a one-man show there. For some reason I have a kind of preference as to who I need my name to be established with and how it is established. Because I think it determines the kind of artist you'll be seen as by the public. I think the attitude and the place that artists show their work and the form which that show takes can

determine largely how the audience perceives you as an artist and how the audience ultimately perceives your work...

In contrast to these considerations of the appropriateness of exhibition space, in which symbolic elements play a role, the place where art is produced may be a matter of minimal requirements.

E.S. Now you have been a member of AAMARP for several years.

B.M. Yes.

E.S. How soon after your arrival here did you become a part of that?

B.M. I'd say about eight months after coming...I was very aggressive in seeking studio space, because I'll get sick if I'm not painting, and I just needed somewhere to paint...I sought places. I applied to different universities, including U. Mass./Boston. I just searched everywhere I knew. I didn't know anybody...I walked around. I wrote letters...At Mass College of Art the Dean's encouragement was for me to leave the country. That man...later was forced out of office because of his insensitivity...But I didn't realize what he was saying until after two years. I started to understand the sociology of racial relations, because I never could link it to that, but I then knew...that it had to do with the fact that I was a foreigner and probably because I was black.

E.S. Who told you about AAMARP?

B.M. The person who recommended that I approach AAMARP was Ricardo Gomez, who was a student at the time at Mass Art. He just casually said, "There's a place, AAMARP. There are several artists over there..." And I immediately asked him where it was. Dana eventually saw my work, and he was impressed by what I had. He showed a lot of interest. A space was improvised for me. It was a small space, but I'd come there to paint until a larger space was available.

Such comments show a clear distinction between the way an artist may see his need to create his art and the way he may look at its relation to commerce.

E.S. Now you've persisted for a number of years in producing your photography, and only within, one might say, the last few years has that been getting the kind of printed recognition in the media that it perhaps deserved long before then. Nevertheless you persisted in doing this work. And still, even at this time, it's not something that will provide you with a means of supporting your family. Why do you continue to do this?

R.R. I think I was asking myself that same question a few days ago...I guess I persist in doing it because I persist in breathing; I don't do it because I want to. I just do it because it just does...

E.S. But breathing is something that one does because it's a way of staying alive. Are you saying that you do photography because that is a way of somehow being the person that you are?

R.R. To be non-academic in answering the question, I don't know. It hasn't yielded for me the kind of benefits that others have received from it. In fact, in many ways it's been very painful for me, but I guess I do it for the same reason that people breathe. I just have to do it. At some times I just hate even dealing with it, because in many ways I don't have the kind of joy that I would hope doing one's work would tend to bring.

PATHS TO THE SYMBOLIC

This and other testimonies suggest that, for the artist, the creation of art takes precedence over considerations that may govern other products in a market place. The processes that bring a work into existence seem highly individual, although they are inseparable from the symbolic and communicative role of the work. But the communicative role is not market-dependent.

R.R. The experience of the viewer is only enhanced by the art work...I'm rather intemperate when it comes to those people who attempt to explain the reasons for images in art work. I don't. I either like it or I don't I don't get hung up on why, and I don't think for it to speak to a person one should--One brings his own common experience to the work, and if the work embellishes or enhances one's existence, based upon a commonality, or broadens it,

for whatever reason, it is to be continued and to be enjoyed. For that reason it's kind of like wondering why you breathe...

In order for society to have its cohesiveness and have its foundation properly built the artist is just an element within that whole scheme of things. He plays a role which to the European mind's eye is unique, but to a more primal society the role is as normal as the growing of your own hair. So to me the artist is not an exceptional person. He's only exceptional by the fact that he continues to do his work...

In spite of the fact that their work may not directly address themes of black life, artists like Marcia Lloyd and Ellen Banks see themselves as playing a role as black artists.

E.B. Existence as a Black does not require that black themes be dealt with in work. You can show young blacks that there are many honest expressions for blacks.

E.S. Your work evolves out of something that is extremely personal to you. In that sense, even as you are a part of the context of the artists at AAMARP, the process by which your work develops is very much individual. So the question I'd like to pose is how you see the particular stylistic qualities of the work you do as a reflection of your individuality?

E.B. That's a tough one. I'll tell you why it's such a tough question, because I am looking for universal relations and forms, you see, so that I guess its just because I arrive at it that it's individual and person. I don't know, Ed. I went to music because I was looking for universal forms and relationships. I believe that there are relationships, forms, patterns, what have you, that people react to in a positive way, like the golden section that the Greeks used for so many years...So I looked for relationships that had stood the test of time for centuries...And that's when I began to realize that there was something in music, and I decided to try and identify these forms and carry them into the two-dimensional. So that I'm really not looking for something so individual. I don't know...

E.S. That's fascinating, in the sense that when one looks at some of the works that you've done there is a particular way that you have of using triangles and sort of a half-step of rectangular forms in relation to one another that marks your work. But it's something that's evolved not out of an interest, as you're saying, in an individual expression so much as a search for universals.

E.B. Yes. That's exactly where it came from, and maybe it's my personal handwriting that has made it individual, because of the experience I've been exposed to...But it did not start as a personal expression at all. Couldn't be further from that.

Artists may see the symbolic function of their art in terms of spirituality. That is, the primary function of the work is to communicate a message, a revelation. Thus when Dana Chandler speaks of his African imagery series and other works as an attempt to convey relevant and useful messages about his identity as an African in America, his intent is to invoke a spiritual/psychological identity. Some artists are direct and conscious of this intent.

K.K. I see my art really as an expression of my spiritual work.

E.S. Maybe you could talk a little about that--the art as an expression of your spiritual work?

K.K. It might seem sentimental, but I feel that since we are an extension of everybody else and no difference between the elements, whether tree or rock or anything, we are just part of the whole. And even in terms of my painting it's really a celebration of this concept--concept suggests too much thought--but it is reality, it's consciousness. And I'm always involved in not only one culture, not only the African perspective...

E.S. You have this idea of an identity between yourself and all other things before going to Africa, but somehow your going to Africa made that clearer to you?

K.K. I did not see myself as black or white before, because I was in a black country, and that was not a reality in my experience. Once I went to a white country, England, it became very clear that you are black and black means African. That's why I proceeded back to Africa. Having been to Uganda and Kenya, Tanzania and Ghana gave me a clearer sense of where Jamaica is--what Jamaica is--an African state as far as I'm concerned. With some people they're upset when I say a thing like that. But just living in Africa a while and living most of my life in Jamaica I can see the similarity and a sense of Jamaica. So my philosophical reading and instinctive or intuitive questioning is good, but politically you become aware that you are--particularly when you are in a white country. You have to have a point of view...

E.S. So you would say that you see greater similarities between things that you find in Jamaica and Africa...than you would between Jamaica and the New England area--say Boston?

K.K. Of course I find more in Ghana...because Jamaica is essentially West African and Central African too. Because children's dance which is very much practiced in a certain part of Jamaica is essentially from Central Africa, around Zaire...That is why I feel the way I work--it is really working with another part of myself. It's not just the way things are put into categories, like left side and right side of the brain, but it's coming from a consciousness. I am...more like a vehicle for a part of myself which needs this vehicle to express itself.

Kayiga's logic is of an old, pre-aristotelian kind. That is, relies on behavioral indices of meaning, symbolic forms, and metaphorical relations, rather than on the identities of the subjects by a definitional process. Much of the thinking of creative people in the visual arts, as well as in other fields, takes this ancient logical form. The artist experiences the creative process as having an involuntary quality.

E.S. Do you generally work on several pieces at once?

M.D. Yes. If I'm working on an idea, say this large family portrait--it's in two panels. It's expanded to working on drawings and painting combined. That portrait of Steve and myself came out of that combination. I work from bits and pieces, drawings, sketches. Once I begin working on something like this it totally controls me. One work feeds off the other. I like to get it all out.

The thinking of the artist is often of a visual, non-verbal nature. The expression of concerns may come through a process which is not deliberative but intuitive.

E.S. How does the music get translated into a two dimensional representation?

E.B. I take the score and I draw it note for note with the bass and treble clef. If it's a fugue I use the point where the voice enters for a second time, because there are more notes on the page in bass and treble clef. The spatial arrangement on the page provides the general arrangement on the canvas. Color derives from the key. Color in the Bach is red, yellow, and blue, the primary colors, because of the period in which he worked. It was a period of stained glass windows. Secondary colors relate to dissonance--Beethoven comes later. Bach's sound is note for note, few chords, few dynamics, no play of loud and soft. It is direct, so primary colors are appropriate. Space comes from the drawings of the notes. Negative space is no sound. That's the gray background.

E.S. Do you usually work on one painting at a time, or do you work on several?

E.B. I usually work on more than one painting at a time--usually two--two on the same theme. I work in series. One composer at a time.

E.S. Do you usually work right through to completion or do you find sometimes that there's something about a work that you can't get beyond and have to stop?

E.B. I have to finish a painting before I know something is wrong with it. Sometimes I do a work three, four, or five times to get the final painting.

E.S. What is it about a work that makes you feel you have to change it?

E.B. If the work looks dead, if it has no vitality.

E.S. When you say that the work has no vitality, is that to say that the arrangement of proportions and the distribution of colors in the work has to trigger something, a particular feeling in you?

E.B. It has to be exciting to me. There has to be a good relationship between the colors.

E.S. I notice that in your latest work you've introduced deeper, charcoal gray tones that I didn't see in your earlier work.

E.B. Since we were told that we had to move from AAMARP I've been using deeper colors.

In this way a concern for the threatened loss of studio space which the artist shared with others infused the work, although the conscious concern of the artist was music. With some artists there is a deliberate seeking to be in touch with unconscious motives and emotions.

E.S. When you begin to paint, what is the nature of that process? How does the painting come into existence?

K.K. I'm not really sure--Why I'm not really sure is I never set out to paint this particular painting necessarily. Because I always have many paintings going. And my paintings for me are a sort of dialogue...Sometimes I might have some very conscious ideas about what I'm trying to do. Once I confront the painting I just have to step back because the painting will not accept this imposition. So I say, O.K., I'll just rest, and I'll come back whenever--It may be all the same idea, but it will come more resolvable and clarified, because the next time I'll return to the painting when the painting will accept me...

E.S. All of your work that I've seen has a remarkable spontaneous quality, as though it were sort of done in a flash. But what you're describing in terms of working on many at once does not suggest that.

K.K. That's true. A painting will distill many months--even years. Although it may seem so spontaneous. I try to, once I encapsulate the spontaneity, I try to keep that freshness...by having a dialogue with the work. If I begin to force it into my constraint or in a mold, then all of that freshness will go.

Another painter may select out of the environment the forms that somehow reflect emotions which are experienced on a non-verbal level. The discovery of the appropriate symbol or metaphorical form may not be the result of conscious searching.

E.S. Have you ever found yourself in a situation where you reached a point where you couldn't move beyond that, and you had to step away from the work for a while?

M.J. Every once in a while I do have to stop right in the middle of a piece and start to work on something else, because I haven't gotten over an obstacle, either in the pictorial image, it needs more developing, or the poem has to be discarded and a new one created, or the poem evolved much more.

E.S. Can you describe a specific painting in which that occurred?

M.J. Usually the ones that have poems on them have a point at which they stop, and they either, in my mind, make it or not make it, and they have that sort of unsteady--I don't feel right about it for about a week. And then I come back and have the answer in my head and finish them.

E.S. Where does the answer come from?

M.J. Someone tells--someone says something to me--that's the answer. Or I hear a song on the radio--that's the answer. Or I'm walking along the street and I see something--that's it. So I come back--sort of put it with the rest--stire it up--that's just what I needed.

In some cases artists report that removing themselves from engagement with a work in order to allow solutions to problems to develop is a part of their art school training.

E.S. How do you go about selecting the scene you're going to paint?

L.R. Generally I see something, and I just proceed to paint it. I don't include everything I see, just the things that are useful to the composition.

E.S. Do you ever reach a point where you can't move ahead with a work and have to separate yourself from it before solving its problem?

L.R. That was part of my training. B.U. taught us to stop work on a piece for a while if it wasn't progressing. If the painting doesn't come together I go over it with gesso and start something else.

The artist may approach the work as a part of a search to bring into consciousness emotions which cannot be expressed verbally. This can be successful because many of the feelings which influence us are derived from pre-verbal experiences and are thus lodged in the psyche in associations with non-language forms.

E.S. What happens when you produce a painting? What is the source of the idea, and how does that idea achieve realization?

B.M. Well, the source of my idea, as I see it, is a kind of experience that I've had in Jamaica. I find myself reflecting a lot on my childhood days, and I also find a lot of images that come up in my mind. I've even had a couple of dreams about some of these images, like the banana leaves and the banana fields. I used to play a lot among these mountains and banana leaves as a child. That was a very profound experience for me as a child, and it still lives with me, and I still love nature. And whenever I go to Jamaica, that's the first thing I do. I go to the mountains. I go back to where I was born, the Maroon town. It's basically that of the natural environment and seeking ways of expressing them, and that of the human figure, because living in this country, particularly, the human figure takes on a special dimension. My interaction with different people, multiracially speaking, from every background and the positive experiences I've gotten from each of them, as well as the other experiences. And there's something about how I view the search of man--the way

I see myself searching for meaning for art--which I think I've found. I think part of the search is to simply work and while working part of the purpose is revealed. And I think that's one of the ways to work and to find the source. Sometimes it is the art work itself that shapes and tells you of that source, as opposed to knowing the source directly and fully in detail prior to the finished realization.

E.S. That's an interesting idea. Is that to imply that you begin a work, and then there's something about what happens when you begin the work that sort of makes the work take place?

B.M. Yes, because I feel, essentially, you know, we are moved by many profound experiences in our lives, that many times we are so attached to them they are so hard even to talk about or to begin a painting, but once you can identify a specific characteristic of that experience and start whatever part of that specific area of experience. If it had to do with a human being--if it had to do with a mere tree, or the mere earth or water elements, and so on as long as it had some serious meaning, and you are close and really you know that this thing means something special to you. It bothers you and haunts you, and you might not immediately have that visual expression or vision that you need to express. But the thing is it's a start, and that's how I see. That's how I just simply go ahead. A large amount of it is also depending on my intuition, and I just start right away. And while I'm working the act of creating shapes itself in one sense. And at the same time I can only impress a certain amount of my objective forms and content to it. But in another sense it's a large amount of intuitive moves.

E.S. Let's take a landscape that you've done, let's say, developed into a series. Can you describe how that began and how it progressed?

B.M. Well, one of the methods that I believe in, because visual things are supposed to...state themselves just for what they are saying, you know, I just start drawing. I draw pastel sketches, and if I'm not convinced that something special is in the drawing I will not begin the painting in most cases. I will do several studies of that one thing over and over again. Sometimes I will start without ever sketching. I'll start right away with my brush, but most of the time I do pre-sketches. As these

sketches develop I might have the thirst to begin a painting, because I might feel the limitation of the drawing instrument I'm using...and so I'll move to paint.

E.S. Can you describe what it might be about a drawing that will cause you to feel dissatisfied with it so that you don't want to progress with it?

B.M. Well, there's something about drawing that has a limitation as to the nature of things we use to draw. In a sense painting is a similar process where you cannot draw with paint, but I think with a pencil or with charcoal there's something about the point of it or how its shaped that you can only make lines or you can spread it a certain way but not immediately enough as you can spread paint with a wide brush or a cover a great area. And there is something...about drawing that if you're going to use color...the intermixture of the medium is limited as to the building of surfaces. So the building of surfaces and creating different kinds of surface is important to me in painting, so that the paint itself can communicate something special rather than just the form itself.

E.S. At some point, doing a series of drawings, you find that you have something that you feel you want to go on to paint. What is it about that, what you have in the drawing, that makes you feel that you want to go on to the painting?

B.M. I might immediately see a shape, you know, or a form that echoes something within me that I wasn't able to define by just simply a thought process. It was more or less there on the paper...It's not something I can plan for. I just see it whenever it comes, and I know that that is what I am feeling. This is a phenomenon that I cannot explain very well verbally. And I just go right ahead and start painting. I never wait at all because I think if I push it further than that, almost a serious anxiety--if I try and push it further in a lot of cases...I find I don't have a lot of enthusiasm, so I really have to go to the painting.

The shape or form that echoes something within the artist, if captured, conveys to the viewer a shared emotion. A photographer may describe this as a way of seeing.

E.S. I'd like to try a little experiment, if possible. I'd like you to select a couple of photographs, maybe one or two which you do not consider to be successes and possibly one which you consider to be a success, and I'd like you to discuss those. Is that a possibility, something we could do?

R.R. Here? My Work?

E.S. Yes.

R.R. I don't know. I can try. I think one of the criteria that I use to decide on whether a picture is taken is whether I'm seeing what I'm shooting, or whether I'm shooting what I'm seeing or shooting what I think I'm seeing, if that makes any sense to you. This is a clear example of shooting a picture of what I think I see. This is in Amsterdam. I was very fascinated by the instruments, by the dreadlocks, by the musicians. And when I saw the print of it, it doesn't do what I wanted to do, and what I wanted to do is...I don't know. I just wanted to capture the moment, so don't ask me what I wanted to 'cause I don't know. But...

E.S. O.K. When we look at this photograph there's something in it that fails to do what you wanted to do then?

R.R. One of the things that it fails to do...It fails to demonstrate the feeling of the moment. The moment I had at the time was the curiosity factor of this...situation...Imagewise it falls apart. He (a black musician) is diminished by the fact that he encounters these people here (points to background figures whose silhouettes contrast with the light behind them so that the musician's figure merges with them). The way I like to have photographs [is] to be clearly well-balanced, constructed well, and nothing in it that's extraneous, that has no control.

E.S. So those shapes sort of compete with the central figure and detract from him?

R.R. Well I wasn't seeing what I was seeing. It has nothing to do with whether they were competing. They were there. And they are no lie. What I'm saying is that when I begin to assess what's happening here it's just not getting the kind of crispness of the moment that I was feeling at the time. And it could be for many reasons, but the exposure could be

somewhat lessened. For whatever reasons the photograph is just not what I want.

Now this photograph here--I think this is one of my more successful photographs. (The photograph is one of a black youth, one of the surprisingly large number of blacks Robinson met, who study or make their home in Europe.)...The photograph very clearly demonstrates how I felt about the subject in the photograph and the situation I was in. As you can see it's a rather stark room, and this dark figure emerging out of the center panel in the background seems to just be mysteriously standing there--has no face, and he's balanced off by two windows very dramatically placed on both sides of him and a simple table in front of him in a very spartan room. And this photograph really clearly demonstrates the kind of image that I saw that morning. And I'm very pleased with this image...This typifies the kind of image that I like--well-constructed images which balance well, images which are dramatic. Here is a kind of mysterious drama which comes out of the photograph without trying to manipulate the images. There's nothing on there that wasn't the way I saw the image. And that's the way I saw the photograph when I first saw him.

E.S. I think that's a striking photograph, and the positioning of the man--dark figure against the dark wall, and the verticles of the window, and the oblique lines of the table work very well with the continuation of verticality on the legs of the table as well as the rungs of the chair and then the oblique lines of the legs of the chair.

The artist searches, selects, develops, and refines his images. It is the visual impact of the work as it gives concrete form to emblematic and iconic needs that affects the viewer. The artist may not, except with careful questioning, provide a clear description in verbal terms of what he is about. Yet, the symbolic role of the artist is played out. The drawings, prints, paintings, sculptures, weavings and photographs are prized as the symbols of the creative potential of a people.

The critical and scholarly work necessary to develop a wider public interest in black artists is a long-term process that is only slowly getting started. This is true for black artists in Boston and across the country. It is generally recognized by the art community that the exhibition of work is but the beginning of the route by which art arrives at its fruition symbolizing society's identity. Written critical evaluation plays a crucial part in providing a currency in language by which works can be discussed. The reluctance of critics from mainstream media to visit outlets accessible to black artists requires that capable blacks must undertake to fill this gap.

The anger in the images of Dana Chandler's expressionist "Concept Paintings" can be dated to the 1967 police riots in Boston. A good deal of the energy in the creations of black artists in Boston and its environs is traceable to resistance to the racist atmosphere of the 1970s, when Theodore Landsmark was struck down with the emblem of his country. The cultural underpinnings of these outrages has been a mainstream art world where the sole New England artist to win a gold medal in the 1876 Centennial Exhibition, a black named Edwin M. Bannister, could be unknown to curators of Boston's Museum of Fine Arts. The community of black artists and scholars have been able to begin the process of correcting that record. They still have a long way to go to complete that job. The potential is certainly there. The creative resiliency of the black community is perhaps symbolized by the figure of Theodore Landsmark, artist, attorney, dean, gallery director and survivor.

THE STATUS OF INSTITUTIONS IN BOSTON'S BLACK COMMUNITY

by

HUBERT JONES

INTRODUCTION

The status of institutions in Boston's black community cannot be understood or assessed outside the context of this community's relationship to the larger white community. This fact is illustrated by the elements that shape the existing social dynamic: numerical minority status, limited political clout, embryonic black business development, outward drainage of financial resources, the poverty of most of its residents and blocked channels to opportunities and resources in the external community. Consequently, the health, growth and survival of the black community depends upon whether its leaders can forge an institutional structure strong enough to acquire resources from outside the community and harness the internal ones.

Any community, including a "sub-community" like that of Blacks in Boston, can be a viable social system only if it is able to carry out certain basic functions: 1) It must protect its residents from physical harm and psychological threats; 2) It must establish social norms and human values that help to regulate social behaviour; 3) It must develop means to maintain the condition of its physical surroundings; 4) It must provide decent shelter for all its residents; 5) It must achieve economic viability in terms of provision of work and/or income to support family life and its essential institutions; 6) It must give sufficient attention to the development of its youth in the interest of self-perpetuation; 7) It must transmit its inhabitants' cultural and social traditions through education and training in art, music, history,

etc.; 8) It must define a common purpose and identity through symbolic and substantive programs and rituals to achieve unity and allegiance to common goals.

As taxpaying citizens of Boston, black residents have a right to expect city services to play a major role in carrying out many of the basic functions cited above. The police and fire departments should provide residents with protection from crime and harm. The city should provide physical maintenance in the form of street cleaning and repair, the removal of physical blight (abandoned cars and houses) and clearance and reuse of vacant land. The social needs of residents should be addressed by workable city parks and recreational facilities and programs. The health needs of residents should get attention in a first-class Boston City Hospital and in neighborhood health centers partially financed by city funds. City government, as an employer of 9,500 people excluding the School Department, should make available to black Bostonians a fair share of city jobs at all levels, at least proportionate to their numbers in the city population, which is not now the case. The Boston Housing Authority, as the "safety net" for the casualties of the private housing market, should provide safe and sanitary housing and support services for poor residents.

The Department of Public Welfare should provide income benefits for the elderly, the disabled, children and single parents when their economic survival required it. These benefits should be made available in such a manner as to promote self-development and where practical, independent living. Since formal education is important in the social and intellectual development of youth, black parents expect the Boston Public Schools to deliver excellent educational services in quality facilities.

Tragically, in all of the above areas, the public sector fails to meet the minimal expectations and legitimate demands of the black community. This outrageous neglect undermines the capability of black social institutions to carry out the cultural, educational, religious, social support and community development work which are their primary responsibility. Instead of working in a partnership arrangement with public agencies to supplement and augment their services, private black institutions are required to supplant these services, without adequate resources or compensation, and/or to assume adversarial postures in order to force public agencies to meet their mandated responsibilities.

The political advocacy work assumed by black institutions in their attempts to reverse patterns of public neglect diverts essential human and financial capital from the specific services for which they are intended. In many cases, this diversion of resources has resulted in erosion of management control and operational focus, contributing to the collapse of the organization. The demise of many social institutions in Boston's black community can be traced to this condition. Moreover, black institutions are in a classic Catch-22 situation: If they do not demand the delivery of quality services and resources from city agencies and the external private agencies which purport to serve the entire city, these black institutions must themselves respond to the flood of casualties spawned by this neglect without the ability to cope with this overwhelming demand. But if these black institutions and their leaders adopt tough advocacy actions, they risk diffusing their own goals. In some cases, public funds and philanthropic grants could be withdrawn if these actions are perceived as too disruptive by powerful forces in the white community.

In other large cities such as Atlanta, Chicago and Philadelphia, black elected officials play a major role in political advocacy and brokerage to force public agencies to meet their responsibilities to black residents and institutions. Boston, on the other hand, has little tradition of black representation. Prior to 1978 there were no Blacks elected to the Boston School Committee. Thomas Atkins, as the only black counsellor, served on the City Council from 1968 to 1971. The black community was without representation in that body for ten years until Bruce Bolling was elected in 1981. There was no Boston Black in the State Senate until 1975. Boston black representation in the State House of Representatives has been limited to a high of three seats. The absence in Boston of a black political leadership class has exacerbated the dynamic pressures imposed on social institutions and their leaders to fill the political void by engaging in political advocacy and brokerage work. Now, however, a black political leadership is developing in Boston. Currently, there are four Blacks on the Boston School Committee; two Blacks on the Boston City Council; one black State Senator, and five Blacks in the House of Representatives, three of whom reside in Boston. The formation of a black political leadership class has begun shifting political advocacy away from black social institutions. Obviously, this shift will create normal systemic disequilibrium, evidenced by the reluctance of these social institutions to transfer some political advocacy and brokerage to the black community's elected leaders. The challenge before the black community, its political leaders and its institutions, is to avoid counterproductive feuds and power struggles as they negotiate this transitional stage in black political development.

In the best of worlds, where governmental neglect of black Boston would not exist, black service institutions would focus on those tasks and functions that are uniquely their responsibility: cultural education and training, religious and moral development, supportive services for family life (adoption, substitute care and day care), community development projects, black business development, supplemental education focussing on black identity, social and recreational programs, and maintenance of economic and political mechanisms to respond to overall community problems, needs and opportunities. The latter would include the establishment of alternative systems of housing, employment, education and social services beyond public programs in order for residents, particularly the poor, to have choices.

Ideally, these unique functions should be primarily supported by the financial and human capital of the black community and supplemented with private philanthropy from the larger community. The proposition advanced is that these functions can only be performed by Blacks under their own organizational control. Therefore, black institutions must be protected from the vagaries of external financial control and policy formulations. The lessons learned from the black church, as an independent, self-sustaining organization, are instructive in this regard. Because of its financial independence, the black church is insulated from much of the political and economic machinations of the external community, although it is not an island entirely unto itself. However, its survival and viability is primarily dependent on its internal workings, its leadership and the utilization of its resources. Black churches often expand their services and operations by obtaining external resources from both public and private sources, but the core operations are secured and protected by internal financing. This

operational model should be the conceptual standard for all black social institutions in Boston, if their functions and services are to have the quality and permanence that a viable "sub-community" requires. The absence of this condition in the organizational life of the black community has negative consequences for organizational unity and collaboration.

Sociologists claim that communities have both vertical and horizontal ties. The vertical ties are the relationships between leaders and institutions with counterparts in the "extra-community" in order to obtain resources and services needed by the community. The horizontal ties are between or among organizations and leaders within the community. Those relationships required to achieve collaboration and a division of labor to perform all of the basic functions. A balanced state between horizontal and vertical ties should be achieved in order to create a viable community with strength, flexibility, self-direction and integrity. The traditional reality for urban black ghettos in America is that a gross imbalance exists in its respective ties. Because American black communities lack command of economic and political resources to support their institutions in an independent fashion, their vertical ties to the extra-community are usually far stronger than their horizontal connections. Organizational dependency fosters a large investment in external relationships which can interfere with establishing and nurturing horizontal ties within the black community. Horizontal bonds also suffer when black social institutions must compete for the funding offered by the public and private sectors. Consequently, the contraction or expansion of external funding pools has a direct impact, often negative, on the institutional and social fabric of the black community. This social system dynamic can make it difficult for black institutions to work out a rational

division of labor to assure the community's basic functions. Duplication and gaps in services are the result. Collaborative planning to achieve common community goals usually founders on the shoals of inter-necine competition.

To be sure, Boston's black community has not been exempt from this social reality and its negative consequences. However, a reading of former State Representative Mel King's book, Chain of Change, reveals that organizational development and vitality in the black community, over the last twenty-five years, has been prolific, resilient and developmentally sound due in large measure to coalition building and other forms of internal collaboration. A case can be made that black Boston has partially escaped the predicament of overinvestment through vertical ties. Nevertheless, the current decline of some black institutions in recent years can be attributed to these pernicious social dynamics.

This paper is based on a mini-study of twenty black service institutions in Boston. The data used to access their current status was obtained through interviews, at least one hour in length, with institutional managers, and from a review of annual reports, long-range plans, financial statements and program documents. (A list of persons interviewed are in the Appendix.) Evaluative data on those institutions funded by the United Way was obtained from its 1985 Allocations Document. Although the number of service institutions included is not exhaustive, the sample provides a fair representation of major service institutions in the black community. It is recognized that social supports in the black community extend well beyond formal organizations. There are a myriad of informal social units, particularly in Haitian and Cape Verdean enclaves, that provide substantial assistance to their members. Access to

data on informal services is difficult to obtain and beyond the focus of this investigation, though an important aspect of the contextual picture.

The social institutions focussed on include: cultural and educational organizations, health centers, social service and mental health agencies, community development organizations, civic and political groups, economic development mechanisms, churches and grassroots mobilization organizations. Before presenting the study approach and assessments, some definitions are in order.

Definitions

The Black Community: Since black people in Boston are located in substantial numbers throughout several neighborhoods, it is impossible to define the black community by arbitrary geographic boundaries. However, the highest concentration of Blacks resides in Roxbury, North Dorchester, Mattapan, Columbia Point and the South End. The current demographic trends indicate that the black population will increase over the next decade in Dorchester, Jamaica Plain, Hyde Park, Roslindale and Charlestown, where recent in-migration has taken place. The extent of this demographic shift will be partially determined by gentrification and the rate of influx of white, middle-income professionals. It is predictable that new black social institutions, or branches of existing ones, will sprout in these areas as higher concentrations of Blacks settle there. Most of the black institutions can be found in the neighborhoods with the highest concentrations of Blacks. Most black elected officials and political leaders reside in these sections.

Some commentators assert that the black community is as much a psychological reality as it is a geographic-locational one. The contention is

that because of the binding dynamic of race in Boston and America, black people, no matter where they live in the city or surrounding areas, are psychologically tied to black social and economic conditions and to the black institutions which operated to meet the needs of the black masses. This conception of community has not been operationalized to any great extent in the Boston area. For instance, there have been few systematic efforts to tap the financial and human resources of Blacks residing outside of the city to support black institutions in Boston.

Black Institution: An organization which meets the following criteria is defined as a black institution:

1. the vast majority of its board members and officers are black;
2. the chief managers are black;
3. the majority of personnel at all levels are black; and
4. its service mission is to deliver services primarily to black residents and advocate for their interests.

Some organizations are designed as quasi-black institutions. They are located in the black community for the purpose of serving black residents, but are affiliates of larger organizations with a majority of white board members and officers and white managers. These units or branches may have local advisory boards composed of Blacks; however, they are subject to the ultimate control and direction of the parent body. The Boys and Girls Club and the YMCA on Warren Street in Roxbury are examples.

STUDY APPROACH

With this contextual and definitional framework, the major social institutions in Boston's black community can be assessed. The study approach employed focuses on eight categories of organizational conditions which portray a collective picture of the institutional strengths and weaknesses in the black community. Therefore, the dimensions assessed have direct bearing on the likely survival and future health of an individual institution and its current and future contributions to building the internal strength of the black community. This analysis does not purport to assess the effectiveness of social institutions in delivering services to their consumers. Obviously, such an assessment would require social research outcome studies which have not been done.

Categories for Analysis

1. Financial Condition -- Budget size, budget growth rate, diversity of funding, debts and assets (property, endowment, contingency funds) can help assess the ability of an institution to respond to a sudden loss of funding that requires drastic personnel and operation cost adjustments. Diversity of funding is crucial to an institution's survival because it prevents being held hostage to a single funding source. Substantial assets can provide the protection and security black institutions need to cope with fluctuations in public and private funding. Stable recurring funds from sources such as the United Way and endowment income provides some clues to viability, depending upon the percentage of this income relative to total size of the budget. Budget growth rates may indicate the vitality of financial condition if increases far exceed rates for

inflation. Budget downturns in the face of the same or increased service obligations are, of course, problematic.

2. Stability of Board Leadership and Management -- The objective is to assess whether the board and management have worked out a consensus concerning responsibilities for policy making and management execution. The internal strength of numerous black institutions has been sapped by struggles between board members and managers, and among board members over the rights and responsibilities of each party. Board members' investment in the institution can be measured through board meeting attendance, contribution of resources, and advocacy for the institution. Is the chief manager responsive to board policy direction and accountability procedures? Does the board have confidence in management and staff performance? Does the board execute plans to strengthen its membership and prepare for turnover of its membership?

3. Staff Development and Training -- A major imperative for black institutions is to serve as training grounds for staff members so they are prepared to assume greater tasks and responsibilities in black community institutions and in the external community as well. Does the institution have its own formal training programs? Does it provide opportunities and assistance for staff members to attend school and/or educational conferences? Is staff upgrading and job mobility occurring within the institution?

4. Long- and Short-Term Planning Capability -- In order for black institutions to cope effectively with changing social and economic conditions and funding realities, solid planning is required. Does the institution have a planning mechanism supported by staff and financial resources? Does the institution have a written long-range plan? Does it want one? How much non-crisis-oriented planning is actually done? Is any planning done in collaboration with other black institutions or extra-community organizations?
5. Horizontal Ties -- The objective is to assess the quantity and quality of relationships with other black institutions, including joint projects, participation on their boards, consultations, support for their programs and membership in black community coordinating groups.
6. Vertical Ties -- The objective is to assess the quantity and quality of relationships with institutions outside of the black community, including participation on boards, consultations, planning, fund raising, speaking, brokerage and advocacy.
7. Ability to Carry Out Primary Service Mission -- The objective is to determine if the institution can carry out its professed service mission without being diverted by other demands from within and outside of the black community.
8. Ability to Mobilize Consumers, Residents at Large and Public Opinion -- One of the major social resources available to a social institution is

the people it serves. Its mobilized consumers or constituents can give it power to fight for the equitable allocation of resources from public and private sources, as well as to fight for essential protections and rights of residents. Black social institutions cannot carry out the community's basic functions without mobilized constituents who provide essential support and who hold them accountable for their performances. Has the institution demonstrated the ability to mobilize its consumers or constituents? How much time and resources are devoted to organizing and mobilization activities? What mechanisms for consumer accountability exist in the institution?

REPORT CARD ON BLACK SERVICE INSTITUTIONS

INSTITUTION	FINANCIAL CONDITION	LEADERSHIP STABILITY	STAFF DEVELOPMENT	PLANNING CAPABILITY	HORIZONTAL TIES	VERTICAL TIES	FOCUS ON SERVICE MISSION	ABILITY TO MOBILIZE OTHERS
Cooper Community College	FAIR	VERY GOOD	FAIR	FAIR	EXCELLENT	FAIR	GOOD	FAIR
Crispus Attucks Children's Center	VERY GOOD	VERY GOOD	VERY GOOD	GOOD	FAIR	GOOD	EXCELLENT	FAIR
Black Ecumenical Commission	Poor	Excellent	NA	Good	Good	Fair	Very Good	Excellent
Dorchester Area Planning Action Council	Good	Excellent	Good	Good	Good	Fair	Good	Fair
Freedom House	Fair	Poor	Fair	Good	Poor	Excellent	Good	Fair
Greater Roxbury Development Corp.	Fair	Fair	Fair	Good	Good	Good	Good	Fair
Harvard Health Center	The Center filed for protection under Bankruptcy Act. No further information.							8/85
Lena Park Community Development Center	Good	Good	Fair	Very Good	Poor	Excellent	Good	Poor

INSTITUTION	COMMENTS
Cooper Community College	A solid institution with the potential to become a strong operation with improvement in diversification of funding. Its strong assets are collaborative work within black community and Management of Resources.
Crispus Attucks Children's Center	Strong operating institution due to very good Board and Management performance. With improvements in planning and collaborative work could be a model child care institution.
Black Ecumenical Commission	Despite a poor financial condition, B.E.C. has provided important assistance to some black churches. At a time when new clergy leadership is emerging it is moving into a reduced operation. The capital needed is not likely to come from black churches.
Dorchester Area Planning Action Council	One of the strongest community action agencies in Boston. Board and Management stability is outstanding. Diversification of funding is imperative. Needs to develop vertical ties and involvement in city decision-making beyond A.B.C.D. system.
Freedom House	In a tough transition period. Needs to find a strong executive to carry on the legacy of the Snowdens. Organization is in search of a mission and new role within the constellation of service agencies. A misstep in transition could spell disaster.
Greater Roxbury Development Corp.	Has made a remarkable adjustment to loss of federal funding. Smart leverage of equity has made new initiatives possible. Could play an important role re: Dudley Development. A transition to new leadership its greatest challenge.
Harvard Health Center	
Lena Park Community Development Center	The black community's biggest agency has eliminated a 300,000 deficit within two years. Management and fiscal control is in good shape. Its relations within the community needs improvement. Lena Park is on the road to recovery.

INSTITUTION	COMMENTS
Roxbury Youth Works	Organization is growing rapidly due to staff contracts. Management strength is carrying organization, which was created by Judge Houston at Roxbury Court. Cash flow problems plague it. With funding improvement, could be a national model.
Roxbury YMCA	The YMCA is in sound operational condition. Its ties to community organizations are solid. Planning capability needs to be improved as well as external relationships. Organization could play a major role in rebuilding Fed. of Black Directors.
Urban League	Within the last year the institution has rebounded from the verge of collapse. This is due to improved Board performance and new Management. The League is clearly on the road to a complete rebuilding and a powerful leadership role in Boston.
United South End Settlements	Possibly the strongest black institution in Boston. \$3 million endowment. Strong Board and Management. Except for underdevelopment of horizontal ties, U.S.E.S. is a model for emulation.
Roxbury - N. Dorchester APAC	A solid, stable institution despite the loss of substantial federal funds and staff. Strong Board leadership has contributed to stability and its work with other community institutions. It needs to diversify its funding and develop external ties.
Museum of Afro-American History	Institution has new Management after a prolonged period of Board-Management conflict. A \$1 million grant from U.S. Park Service will reconstruct main site. Substantial contracts are providing working capital. Board is being expanded. Ties within community need to be developed. This important cultural organization is in process of recovery.
NAACP	An understaffed organization with a President and Staff Assistant. The struggle to build a new constituency after civil rights era is major challenge. Weak ties within and outside of the black community has led to quasi-isolation. Financial viability is dependent on annual awards dinner. Revitalization of the Board is critical.

REPORT CARD ON BLACK SERVICE INSTITUTIONS

INSTITUTION	FINANCIAL CONDITION	LEADERSHIP STABILITY	STAFF DEVELOPMENT CAPABILITY	PLANNING TIES	HORIZONTAL TIES	VERTICAL TIES	FOCUS ON SERVICE MISSION	ABILITY TO MOBILIZE OTHERS
Roxbury Youth Works	FAIR	VERY GOOD	FAIR	GOOD	POOR	GOOD	GOOD	FAIR
Roxbury YMCA	VERY GOOD	VERY GOOD	GOOD	POOR	GOOD	POOR	VERY GOOD	FAIR
Urban League	POOR	GOOD	POOR	VERY GOOD	VERY GOOD	GOOD	GOOD	GOOD
United South End Settlements	EXCELLENT	EXCELLENT	GOOD	EXCELLENT	FAIR	EXCELLENT	VERY GOOD	FAIR
Roxbury - N. Dorchester APAC	GOOD	EXCELLENT	GOOD	GOOD	VERY GOOD	POOR	GOOD	GOOD
Museum of Afro-American History	FAIR	FAIR	FAIR	POOR	FAIR	GOOD	GOOD	FAIR
NAACP	FAIR	FAIR	FAIR	POOR	FAIR	FAIR	FAIR	FAIR

INSTITUTION	COMMENTS
National Center of Afro-American Artists	This crucial cultural institution is in a critical state due to poor financial condition. A small staff is struggling to keep it alive. Strong Management and Board overhaul is required. Its demise would be a severe loss to the cultural life of the black community and Boston.
Opportunity Industrialization Center	O.I.C. has made a great adjustment to loss of federal funds. The acquisition of corporate contributions to take up some of the loss is impressive. The deficit is a burden. But the plan to eliminate it is sound. The move into housing development in order to generate income is critical to survival.
Roxbury Action Program	R.A.P. is burdened with a large deficit. Income from real estate is holding the operation together. The Board needs to be developed and staffing increased. Despite organizational problems R.A.P. has kept Highland Park from being totally gentrified.
Roxbury Boys and Girls Club	Under new Management, the Boys & Girls Club has improved its operation. It is making solid progress. It depends on the parent body for ties downtown. It needs to develop its own vertical ties. More mobilization of youth could be done.
Roxbury Comprehensive Health Center	R.C.H.C. is on the road to full recovery due to excellent Management and Board leadership. Historically, the institution had been plagued by poor fiscal control and Board dissension. Plan to eliminate the \$300 deficit appears sound. The future looks bright.
Roxbury Community College	Instability of Board and Management has been repaired. Formation of R.C.C. foundation is providing more resources for special needs. The building of a new facility should give college a big boost. Community relations need to be strengthened.
Roxbury Multi-Service Center	Institution is searching for a new Director. Conflict between Board and Management is a serious problem. Collaborative work within the community and respect in Boston are its great strengths. Rebuilding Board leadership and management critical.
Roxbury Children's Service	Strong program burdened by a financial deficit. Board development a major need. The rapid development of new programs requires greater Board investment. Agency has filled the void created by the closing of Putnam Center. Over-extension a danger.

REPORT CARD ON BLACK SERVICE INSTITUTIONS

INSTITUTION	FINANCIAL CONDITION	LEADERSHIP STABILITY	STAFF DEVELOPMENT	PLANNING CAPABILITY	HORIZONTAL TIES	VERTICAL TIES	FOCUS ON SERVICE MISSION	ABILITY TO MOBILIZE OTHERS
National Center of Afro-American Artists	POOR	POOR	FAIR	POOR	FAIR	GOOD	GOOD	GOOD
Opportunity Industrialization Center	FAIR	GOOD	GOOD	FAIR	FAIR	EXCELLENT	VERY GOOD	POOR
Roxbury Action Program	POOR	FAIR	FAIR	POOR	VERY GOOD	POOR	GOOD	FAIR
Roxbury Boys and Girls Club	GOOD	GOOD	GOOD	POOR	VERY GOOD	POOR	GOOD	FAIR
Roxbury Comprehensive Health Center	GOOD	EXCELLENT	VERY GOOD	FAIR	FAIR	GOOD	EXCELLENT	POOR
Roxbury Community College	FAIR	GOOD	VERY GOOD	GOOD	FAIR	VERY GOOD	VERY GOOD	FAIR
Roxbury Multi-Service Center	VERY GOOD	FAIR	GOOD	VERY GOOD	EXCELLENT	VERY GOOD	GOOD	EXCELLENT
Roxbury Children's Service	FAIR	FAIR	GOOD	GOOD	FAIR	VERY GOOD	VERY GOOD	FAIR

COMMENTARY

Financial Condition

The financial condition of black service institutions, in a collective sense, is precarious. Some of the major institutions are saddled with substantial financial deficits: National Center of Afro-American Artists (\$387,000), Roxbury Children's Services (\$139,000), Roxbury Comprehensive Health Center (\$300,000), Opportunity Industrialization Center (O.I.C.) (\$200,000), Harvard Street Health Center (has sought protection under Chapter 11), Roxbury Action Program (R.A.P.) (\$600,000), Freedom House (\$90,000), and the Museum of Afro-American History (\$60,000). On the positive side, Lena Park Community Development Center, which had a \$300,000 deficit two years ago, has almost eliminated the deficit with a program of aggressive fundraising. The Urban League, which has been struggling financially and has run the risk of losing United Way funding, has made a dramatic reversal. The operating deficit is only \$13,000 and full standing with United Way has been restored. Although the Roxbury Compresensive Health Center has a \$300,000 deficit, mostly back taxes and penalties due the Commonwealth, new management and board leadership has brought this critical health institution away from the brink of collapse with sound fiscal management and solid plans to eliminate debt. Also, O.I.C. has an imaginative plan for building consolidation and housing development and syndication which should eliminate its \$200,000 deficit within two years and put the institution on a sound financial footing.

Only one black service institution, the United South End Settlements (U.S.E.S.), has a substantial endowment to secure a good measure of stability and financial independence. The U.S.E.S. endowment stands at \$3.3 million,

generating \$200,000 of income for operations. The Roxbury YMCA comes next with \$150,000, followed by Freedom House with \$100,000 and Roxbury Multi-Service Center (R.M.S.C.) with \$62,000. All other institutions covered in this survey reported that they have no endowments. Although most black service institutions reported plans to raise endowment funds, under current financial condition their plans amount to far-fetched dreams.

Most institutions are heavily dependent on public funding to meet operational requirements and pursue their service missions. Although most institutions would prefer to keep public funding at or below forty percent of their total budget, few have been able to do so. Consequently, these institutions fight a losing battle to maintain diversification of funding, a mix of sources that protects an institution against operational collapse if funding is withdrawn. The need for a greater infusion of corporate, United Way and other philanthropic dollars is clear.

The experiences of the Dorchester Area Planning Action Council, the Roxbury-North Dorchester Area Planning Action Council, the Greater Roxbury Community Development Corporation and O.I.C. are painful reminders of the risk involved when funding is not diversified. Historically, all of these institutions have been primarily funded by the federal government. As a result of funding cutbacks by the Reagan Administration since 1981, these four institutions were forced into major personnel and programmatic retrenchments and are fortunate to be alive. O.I.C. has gone from a budget of \$2.3 million and 144 staff positions in 1975-76 to a budget of \$900,000 and 28 staff positions in 1985. The funding mix is now 30% public and 70% private dollars, reflecting the new funding realities. Dorchester APAC, which had a staff of thirty and a budget of \$300,000 in the late 1960s, now has a staff of seven,

for basic operations excluding Head Start, and a budget of \$140,000. Greater Roxbury Development Corporation (G.R.D.C.) has been reduced to a staff of four. The staff is carrying the work load of at least ten people. Fortunately, this institution has been able to stay afloat and initiate new development by refinancing its considerable property assets.

The collective picture regarding assets excluding endowment funds is a mixture of success and failure. An increasing number of institutions over the last ten years have accumulated real property in the form of facilities for their programs or housing developments. The most notable examples are: Lena Park (\$3 million), Roxbury Multi-Service Center (\$500,000), U.S.E.S. (\$1.2 million), Harvard Street Health Center (\$676,000), National Center of Afro-American Artists (\$474,000), Roxbury Comprehensive Health Center (\$1.9 million), O.I.C. (\$1.5 million), Dorchester APAC (\$142,000). G.R.D.C. also has substantial assets but does not release financial information. For the remainder of the institutions covered in the report, the property assets are negligible. Consequently, only a few black service institutions possess fixed assets which can be leveraged for program expansion or as a hedge against temporary financial downturns. However, the movement of more institutions away from the rental of facilities to an ownership-equity position is a healthy sign.

In sum, the financial condition of most black service institutions is fragile, particularly in the current funding climate. It is encouraging that a number of institutions in trouble have gained financial stability. However, a few risk extinction. The development of endowment funding is a critical need. Individually and collectively, black service institutions should press major local foundations for endowment funds, using the successful strategy

employed by the National Urban League to secure endowment funds from the Ford Foundation. Freedom House has received a challenge grant from the Boston Foundation to raise endowment funds. But it is the only black service institution to make such a request of local foundations in recent years.

Stability of Board and Managerial Leadership

A number of service institutions, which were floundering over the last five years due to instability in board and management leadership, have taken corrective action which has put them on the road to full recovery. This is particularly true for the Urban League, Roxbury Community College, Roxbury Comprehensive Health Center, Lena Park Community Development Center, and the Roxbury Clubhouse of the Boy's and Girl's Clubs. In most of these cases, the reversals have been dramatic. Unfortunately, there are other key institutions that are in unstable situations because they are searching for new chief managers and rebuilding their boards. These include Freedom House, N.C.A.A.A., Roxbury Multi-Service Center, The Harvard Street Health Center and The Museum of Afro-American History. The extent to which these institutions succeed in acquiring new leadership and working out a sound division of labor between board and management will determine their future viability. For some of them the prospects are dim. It is not surprising that all of the black service institutions with solid records of operations and performance have stable leadership where board members are demonstrably invested in the institution and have confidence in management and staff performance. This is particularly the case with U.S.E.S., Crispus Attucks Children's Center, Roxbury Youthworks, Roxbury APAC, Dorchester APAC, Cooper Community Center, and the Roxbury Comprehensive Health Center. In general, there is almost

unanimous consensus among the leadership of Boston's black service institutions that the conflicts between board and management which were tolerated in some organizations in the past are unacceptable today and that substantial gains have been made to purge destructive conflicts from most service institutions. The assessment of the institutions covered here bears out the validity of this collective judgment and the great progress that has been made in rebuilding effective organizational structures.

Nevertheless, many organizations require outside professional board development assistance if the required improvements are to be achieved. The institutions in this category are Roxbury Community College, Roxbury Multi-Service Center, the Urban League, O.I.C., Roxbury Children's Service, N.C.A.A., Museum of Afro-American History and Freedom House. If these organizations do not address this critical need, they will be likely to waste both time and resources.

Staff Development

Although most service institutions provide some staff development/training opportunities, few conduct regular, sustained in-house training beyond staff meetings and orientation programs. All organizations financially support staff attendance at conferences and workshops within and outside the black community. The vast majority permit staff members to take paid released time to attend courses beneficial to work performance and personal development. Most institutions take advantage of the training programs conducted by the Department of Social Services, the Department of Mental Health, Action for Boston Community Development, the United Way and city agencies. A few agencies provide finances for college attendance for

staff members. None of the black service institutions are involved in joint training of staff. In general, the data reveal that black service institutions are not investing in staff development to the same extent as in the late 60s and early 70s. This is probably due to financial and personnel retrenchments which caused a shift of operational priorities into other areas. The drastic reduction of personnel in established federally funded institutions has eliminated possibilities of job mobility and consequently has fostered rapid staff turnover as employees seek new jobs, commensurate with the growth of their skills, outside of their institutions. The reduced investment in staff development and training is understandable given fiscal realities, but it is short-sighted because it undermines the black community's objective of getting Blacks into positions at all levels in the total Boston community. During the 1960s, black service institutions served as valuable training grounds for Blacks who acquired skills and knowledge which propelled them into major leadership positions both within and outside the black community. Most of today's managers of black service institutions were trained at lower levels in community organizations. This legacy should not be squandered.

Planning Capability

The overall shifts in public and private financing have forced most service institutions to realize that long-range planning is essential for organizational viability and survival. Consequently, almost all service institutions have planning mechanisms, in the form of long-range planning committees. However, very few institutions have a staff member devoting primary time to planning and to monitoring institutional plans. Over half of

the institutions covered have written long-range plans that serve as a basis for operational decision-making. Very few of these institutions are developing their long-range plans in conjunction or consultation with other service institutions or black churches in the community. The United Way's new requirements for long-range planning for its member agencies have been a positive force in moving black service institutions it funds into serious social and organization planning. If current planning is to be improved, the United Way needs to back up this essential step with financial support for competent staff planning. In order to stretch limited resources to meet their individual and collective needs, black institutions would do well to share planning staff and resources.

In short, the black community is hampered by its dependence on the inadequate planning work of external organizations to determine how resources will be allocated to black institutions. In order to control the impact of this planning, the black community must participate in the process.

The current lack of collaboration among black service institutions does not bode well for the development of such joint efforts. The recent initiative of the Federation of Black Directors to establish a Resource Center providing technical assistance, management and planning resources for black service institutions with State funds is indicative of the kind of collective action needed in the black community. It should be pursued vigorously.

Horizontal Ties

Overall, black service institutions are investing little time and resources in developing working relationships between and among themselves.

With the exception of the Urban League, R.M.S.C., G.R.D.C., Cooper Community Center and the Dorchester and Roxbury APACs, service institutions are not substantially involved in collaborative projects with other black institutions, including black churches. Indeed, the extent of the schism between service institutions and black churches is startling. There are few black ministers serving on the boards of black service institutions; most boards have none serving. Service projects involving both churches and service institutions are rare in black Boston. Both sides agree that a gulf exists and that they operate in "two different worlds" in the same community. Some ministers point to the fact that most institutional leaders are not members of churches and do not appreciate the positive contributions that churches make to the social life of the black community. Most community leaders agree that this schism evident in Boston would not be found to the same extent in other large cities in the North or South.

The bottom line is that the weak ties between black social institutions have greatly contributed to the fragmentation of Boston's black community. Most institutional leaders report that they are investing more time and resources in developing relationships with external institutions and leaders. Also there is increased investment in a range of broader coalitions beyond the black community, including: the Committee for Boston Public Housing, the Boston Housing Partnership, the Boston Student Human Service Collaborative, the Boston Committee, The Boston Panel of Child Welfare Agencies, Neighborhood Centers for Youth, Greater Boston Civil Rights Coalition, City Wide Educational Coalitions, etc. To be sure, all of these coalitions are working on problems and issues of crucial importance to Blacks in Boston. But, in most cases, black participants have minority power status in these

arrangements. The strategic importance of building coalitions with the broader community for blacks cannot be discounted. However, unless a party brings clout to coalition actions the chances are high that its presence will be exploited for the benefit of other parties. In the absence of a viable institutional infrastructure within the black community, the current ascendancy of broad-based coalitions with black participation is fraught with grave dangers as well as opportunities.

The epitome of the phenomenon is the current status of the Federation of Black Directors. It serves as the only unity mechanism for service institutions within the Black community. Most institutional leaders claim that they have become frustrated with its lack of focus and operational discipline. Although almost all leaders articulate the need for such a collaborative organization, many admit that they have withdrawn from active participation, even though they remain technically members of the organization. When asked what they could do to turn the Federation into a viable entity for sharing and collective action, institutional leaders evince a posture of helplessness. The same phenomenon is revealed in the separate world of black ministers. The Black Ministerial Alliance is essentially moribund. It has not met on a regular basis for a year.

In sum, the institutional fabric of the black community is asunder. Its internal strength is being sapped by disinvestment of energies and resources. The potential clout of service institutions and their leaders is being undermined by the paucity of internal collaboration. Without substantial work and progress on this aspect of organizational life, the empowerment of the black community stands at risk.

Vertical Ties

The access of black institutions to arenas of power and decision-making beyond the black community is grossly uneven. As stated above, many black service institutions have developed strong ties in the external community in order to acquire the resources needed to operate. Those institutions with recognized "power" which have been most successful are U.S.E.S., R.M.S.C., Lena Park and Freedom House. At the same time, some service institutions have limited or no substantive working relationships with external organizations and leaders and are therefore cut off from access to resources needed to build a diversified funding condition. The Roxbury-North Dorchester and Dorchester APACs fall into this category. Unfortunately, this unevenness of access has been tolerated by black Boston. Empowerment involves getting all social institutions into decision-making mechanisms in the external community. Those leaders now "at the table" have a responsibility to advocate for greater inclusion.

Focus on Service Mission

Almost all service institutions are now able to focus on carrying out their service missions. They profess to have sufficient internal discipline to avoid being deflected into other activities demanded of them. The new accountability required by all funding sources appears to have contributed to this posture. There is a clear awareness on the part of institutional leaders that maintenance of funding necessary for organizational survival depends on solid delivery of mandated services. The recent decision of the United Way Board to drop the Elma Lewis School of Fine Arts from its membership, due to

chronic financial and operational problems, is a case in point. It is safe to conjecture that such action would have not taken place in the 1960s.

Inherent in this more hardnosed, businesslike emphasis on accountability is the danger that some service institutions may become unresponsive to changing social conditions and crises which call for temporary diversions from service missions until new programs and organizations can be established to deal with them on a permanent basis. In short, the traditional, non-bureaucratic responsiveness and humaneness of black social institutions should not be sacrificed due to accountability requirements, as necessary as they may be. Generally, though, the trend toward greater organizational focus and discipline is a healthy one.

Ability to Mobilize Consumers

Most black service institutions fail to mobilize client/consumers and other community residents to respond to critical problems facing them. Notable exceptions are the Roxbury and Dorchester APACs and the Roxbury Multi-Service Center. Most service institutions are not investing staff resources in consumer mobilization on a sustained basis. The focus is on crisis-to-crisis mobilization involving sporadic work efforts. Consequently, political advocacy by black institutional leaders and politicians cannot easily be backed up with people clout.

No institution covered in this study is doing day-in-day-out voter registration work. Some are engaged in this activity during election periods and allow their facilities to be used as voter registration sites. Consequently, the great opportunity to build a solid voter constituency across the black community is being squandered. In short, the sustained mobilization

of consumers, constituents and residents at large is not a major operational priority of black service institutions.

Bay State Banner

The black community's major newspaper is the Bay State Banner, which celebrates its twentieth anniversary this year. The fact that this paper has survived as a viable institution through periods of financial crisis is a tribute to the tenacity and managerial skills of its owner and publisher, Melvin Miller. These are only three inside directors of the corporate board: Melvin Miller, his brother, Jack Miller, and Cheryl Landy, the Associate Publisher. The current circulation of the Banner is 10,500, down from a high point of 11,500. Mail subscription, which has declined in recent years, accounts for one-third of the paper's circulation. The Bay State Banner does not make public disclosure of its financial information. However, according to Melvin Miller, it operates on a balanced budget and has a previous debt which the publisher claims is under control. Ideally, the paper needs ten to twenty percent more revenue to provide the amount of coverage Miller envisions for it. He believes that the paper is deficient in its coverage of local sports and in consistent, in-depth treatment of social and economic issues important to the black community. In order to avoid conflict of interest in reportage and editorializing, the Banner has a policy that its employees cannot serve on the boards of institutions in the black community. Membership on the boards of external organizations is permitted. Miller claims that he has been less than successful in getting service institutional leaders and black clergy to write articles and columns for the paper, even though these opportunities have been provided to them. Consequently, the major news

vehicle in the black community is not being used by the community's leadership to shape public opinion. It cannot be assessed here how much of this condition is due to the history of conflict between Miller and community leaders over editorial positions he has taken. The reality is that the alienation that does exist compounds the fractured state of the black community.

Boston Bank of Commerce

The Boston Bank of Commerce is New England's only Black-owned and -operated bank. All top officers are black along with twenty-three of the bank's twenty-seven employees. The bank's headquarters is located in downtown Boston, with one branch located in Roxbury. The Boston Bank of Commerce opened in August 1982 with deposits and branches from the failed Unity Bank and Trust Company, Boston's first minority bank. Within the first year the bank got into an internal battle for management control which resulted in the departure of Juan Cofield, its first president. Ronald Homer was then installed as the new president and the institution got a big boost from a consortium of investors led by former U.S. Senator Edward W. Brooke.

Bank assets have jumped from \$13 million to \$22.6 million. The bank made a \$72,000 profit for the fiscal year ending June 30, 1985. The previous fiscal year, the bank had registered a loss of \$146,000. This past fiscal year, there has been a 90% growth in the number of accounts and a fifty percent dollar growth, reflecting a deposit growth from \$12 million to \$20.5 million. The loan portfolio increased by 83%. A large percentage of loans are with minority businesses and social institutions in the black community. The recent progress achieved leads President Homer to express guarded optimism

about the bank's financial future. He is hoping to maintain the trend of the last fiscal year and believes that the excellent business climate for a black banking institution should make that possible.

In spite of a low profit margin, the Boston Bank of Commerce made financial donations to community organizations amounting to almost \$10,000. It has made its facilities available to black service institutions, especially the Roxbury Multi-Service Center, where President Homer serves on the board. There has been an increase in use of the bank by black institutions, with the exception of black churches. Homer believes that the bank can serve an important networking function for black social institutions and businesses by introducing them to each other and to financial resources in the downtown community. Clearly, the recent achievements of the bank are the most significant development in black Boston.

The Black Church

In his brief history, Faith, Culture and Leadership: The Black Church in Boston, published in 1983 by the Boston N.A.A.C.P., Robert C. Hayden wrote the following:

"The black church became the vehicle for preserving black culture in a strange land. It is the only institution of and for black Americans, which started in the African forests, survived slavery, and remains perhaps the most viable organization of the black community in the United States. Indeed the one black institution which has had the greatest influence on the lives of black people in America has been the black church."

Hayden goes on further:

"And it is not just a religious experience, it is a protest, a protection, a promise. It is a place of love, and a place to organize anger, a place to throw your head back and shout. The black church is its own secret. It

is the major institution of the black community, the only 'thing' it has owned outright before and after Emancipation."

This statement can be applied to black churches in Boston today. They are the major form of social organization in the black community which possesses autonomy and independence from white sources of power.

The roots of the black church in Boston go back to 1805, when the First African Baptist Church was established in the African Meeting House on Beacon Hill. This building is now the site for the Museum of Afro-American History. By 1913, when Boston's black population had reached 13,000, ten black churches had been established in the South End and Roxbury. These churches were established and grew in response to racial segregation and discrimination in organized religion and in the general community.

There are over eighty black churches in Boston with a diversity of faiths and denominations, including: Baptist, Methodist, Congregational, Presbyterian, Episcopal, Holiness, Pentecostal, Lutheran, Islam, Jehovah's Witness, Seventh Day Adventist, African Methodist Episcopal, Unitarian and Roman Catholic. The largest number of black churches, at least 31, are in the Holiness and Pentecostal category. The largest number of black worshippers are in the nineteen Baptist churches. These two church groups account for more than half the number of black churches. Most black churches are growing in membership and in church attendance. Some claim the growth is exponential without providing documented evidence.

Black churches provide social services, employment assistance and educational programs. Today, the only educational alternatives to the public schools in the black community are church-operated: St. Joseph's School, Berea (Seventh Day Adventist), Owens-Roberts Educational Center (People's

Baptist Church), Clara Muhammad School (The American Muslim Mission). Their existence attests to the staying power of black churches. All of the private, independent schools established in the black community during the 1960s (Highland Park Free School, New School for Children, Roxbury Community School, etc.) have closed for financial and other reasons.

During the last six years there has been a major transition in the leadership of major black churches. With the retirement of many black ministers, who served their congregations for two decades, a new group of younger clergy, who range in age from 30 to 40, has been put into place. Rev. Michael Haynes of Twelfth Baptist Church, Rev. Warren Brown of Columbus Avenue A.M.E. Zion Church and Rev. Charles Stith of Union United Methodist Church are among the few prominent senior ministers with longevity of service. Consequently, there is a new cadre of black ministers working hard to establish themselves with their congregations and deciding on how to use the church base for service to the broader black community. They are now focussed on their major mission: taking care of their flocks. Ronald McLean, Director of the Black Ecumenical Commission, sees this new group of dynamic young ministers as the future hope for involving black churches in social activism and empowerment of the black community. Currently, however, church activism beyond internal church business is at an all-time low. The Black Ministerial Alliance which during the 60s and 70s regularly brought clergy together to share information and mount joint social action is basically defunct. It has not met regularly for over a year. The only joint activities carried out by black ministers are Emancipation Day and Good Friday services. These collaborative religious services have been inspirational, vibrant events, reflecting the potential power of collective action. One sign of

renewed organizational activity is the creation in the Spring of 1985, of the African American Churches for African Support. Under this banner, thirty black ministers are involving their churches in raising funds to help African countries deal with famine. The churches have a fund-raising goal of one million dollars which they plan to deliver to appropriate religious groups in Africa. This collaborative effort was kicked off on May 18, 1985, with a conference on "Famine in Africa and the Role of the Black Church in North America" at the New Hope Baptist Church. This new form of social activism could lead to joint action concerning local needs, conditions and problems.

Most of Boston's black Baptist ministers are participants in the Baptists Ministers' Conference of Greater Boston and Vicinity. This organization meets at least twice a month to focus on religious and social concerns. It is chaired by Rev. Larry Edmunds of St. John's Baptist Church in Woburn, who is also a professor at Salem State College. This body, which contains many of black Boston's new dynamic church leaders could be a future force for community leadership.

The Black Ecumenical Commission, established in the late 1960s, is another important organizational base for the black church. Its mission is to work with black churches to assist them in responding to the problems of poverty and disenfranchisement experienced by Blacks and other minorities in Massachusetts. It has developed programs in the areas of elderly care, energy conservation, child care, voter education, civil rights, advocacy and prison ministeries. The Commission has facilitated the collective purchasing of goods by black churches in order to obtain discount prices. It provides technical assistance and organizational support to black churches concerning empowerment work such as the famine relief project. B.E.C. was established as

a result of a one million dollar grant made by the United Church of Christ in response to the demands of black ministers and their allies within this predominant white church body. Of the original grant, only \$160,000 remains for operation of the organization. In order not to completely erode the remaining funds, Director Ronald McLean plans to soon move to a part-time status. Without an infusion of major new funding, B.E.C.'s survival and its interim effectiveness is in jeopardy. It is the one church-related organization that is deeply concerned about the schism between black churches and service institutions and with its own capability to play an effective role in a bridging or healing process. Its demise would be a blow to black institutional life in Boston.

Black ministers are not reaching out to service institutions and their leaders and vice-versa. Some ministers believe that institutional leaders avoid substantial ministerial involvement in their organizations for fear of the spectre of church control. Rev. Michael Haynes recalled the black churches' attempt in the mid-60s to support the election of a black minister to the presidency of the Boston N.A.A.C.P. Ministers enrolled their members into N.A.A.C.P. membership in readiness for the "takeover" election. N.A.A.C.P. officers declared the election null and void and failed to announce the election results, claiming that the new church members were not eligible to vote because they had not been members long enough prior to the election. Thus, the candidacy of Rev. Gilbert Cauldwell of Union Methodist Church was crushed. This was the last major effort on the part of black clergy to participate in providing leadership in a major social institution.

Ministers interviewed for this study believe that most political and institutional leaders are not active members of black churches and cite this

as a reason for alienation between the clergy and community leaders. They claim that this is not the case in other major cities.

In summary, as individual institutions, the black churches are alive and well as measured by overall membership growth and church attendance. A new cadre of young ministers may contribute to community leadership in the future. The churches remain the most effective form of social organization and communication in the black community. Because of its current inward focus, the black church is isolated from much of the political advocacy and empowerment work carried out by other social institutions and political leaders. This gulf contributes greatly to the ruptured social and institutional fabric in the black community. The decline of its major unity mechanism, the Black Ministerial Alliance, is fostering an inward orientation that denies black churches the chance to use their resources as leverage to achieve collective gain.

CONCLUSION

Boston's black community is fractured due in part to the non-collaborative posture of many of its social institutions. Its infrastructure is underdeveloped. The overinvestment of service institutions in vertical relationships with external organizations and leaders is draining the community of some of its internal strengths. The schism between black churches and service institutions reinforces this problem. Because service institutions fail to devote resources to the consistent mobilization of consumers and constituents, institutional leaders and politicians cannot acquire people clout they need to be effective in political advocacy. Thus, they are unable to play their part in the struggle for resources and services

the black community has a right to expect. This condition also means that consumers cannot hold service institutions accountable for their performance. Internal mechanisms that bring community leaders and institutions together to achieve collective planning and action are in need of overhaul and development. The emergence of black elected officials now provides the black community with leaders who can operate in political arenas such as the State House, City Hall and the School Committee to fight for access to resources and power. This political leadership class will increase, thereby necessitating that much of the political advocacy assumed by institutional leaders be shifted to elected politicians. However, a constituency of registered voters must hold them accountable and set the community's agenda for their political work. The absence of ongoing voter registration and education by institutions across the community poses a serious problem in this area.

A new group of church leaders are quietly organizing and could have a significant effect on how leadership forms and operates in the black community. It is likely that current political and service institutional leaders will resist their emergence. There is the danger that they could be pushed back into the separate church world, with dire consequences for building an integrated community.

The black community has suffered over the last decade as a result of the operational ineffectiveness of the Boston N.A.A.C.P. and the Urban League. These two advocacy organizations are required to protect black Bostonians against violation of their civil entitlements and against the erection of barriers to educational, employment and social opportunities. The viability of the N.A.A.C.P. and Urban League is critical to the enhancement of respect and unity in the black community. The recovery of the Urban League, under its

new President, Donald Polk, is a healthy development. Jack Robinson, the President of the N.A.A.C.P., has recently asserted the organization's positions on public decisions concerning the selection of the Police Commissioner and the Superintendent of Schools. Whether this assertiveness is backed up with internal organizational strength and broad-based constituent support is questionable. Non-partisan advocacy institutions are essential to relieve service organizations of counterproductive political advocacy. This void must be filled in order to achieve a rational division of labor among black social institutions.

Many observers claim that black Boston lacks leaders who command broad respect across all segments of the community, and who can rally leadership to address critical problems. The late Melnea Cass, former Senator Edward Brooke, and Rev. Richard Owens, who possessed this capability, are now off the scene. The black community awaits the emergence of similar commanding personalities.

It is a tribute to black service institutions that they have survived, mostly in a viable state, despite the severe cutbacks in federal funding. For the most part, these institutions have weathered the shifting funding realities in the private and public sectors. The need to achieve more financial security through diversification of funding and the building of endowments has been accepted but not sufficiently operationalized. The recent recovery of several institutions near extinction is a hopeful and encouraging development in the institutional picture. The tough lessons learned by these institutions should have a positive impact on others. Improvements in planning capability, managerial and fiscal control, and leadership stability are increasing in service institutions, and are likely to continue to do so

because essential operational requirements are being embraced by boards and institutional leaders. The demise of numerous black institutions (Roxbury Federation of Neighborhood Centers, the Black United Front, Putnam Children's Center, the Ecumenical Center, etc.) and the new funding climate are generating different organizational behavior. Nevertheless, some key institutions are struggling to gain their equilibrium: the National Center of Afro-American Artists, Freedom House, Harvard Street Health Center, Greater Roxbury Development Corporation and the N.A.A.C.P. The collective assistance of black institutions should rally to their aid. But this is not the institutional style in black Boston and herein lies the black community's most serious deficiency.

It should be remembered that the vast majority of black service institutions were established within the last twenty years, spawned by the civil rights movement and by federal governmental programs. In relative terms, these institutions are struggling to move beyond infancy. The survival of these institutions in the face of uncontrollable funding and operational constraints is an outstanding achievement, financial deficits notwithstanding.

Few black communities in America have created such a plethora of innovative organizations which serve as models for Blacks in other cities. Creative energies and inventiveness abound in Boston's black community. But the challenge before black institutions is to harness these assets and other resources to create a more integrated, healthy social fabric. This must be our legacy to black children yet unborn.

Options For The Future

1. The development of a collective strategy to obtain foundation and corporate funding for the creation and enhancement of endowments.
2. The assignment of one service institution, perhaps the Urban League, to publish an analysis, on an annual basis, of state, corporate, and United Way funding to the social institutions in the black community.
3. Financial assessment of every black service institution to support the Federation of Black Directors in order to build a serious investment in this crucial unity mechanism. Overhaul of the organization is imperative.
4. The planning and execution of a working conference of black clergy and institutional leaders to develop concrete steps to build a new partnership.
5. Creation of collaborative social and organizational planning projects.
6. Creation of joint staff training and development programs.
7. Systematic oversight of voter registration activities by the Black Political Task Force to assure that this function is a consistent part of every service institution and black church.
8. Establishment of a Community Assembly that meets at least once a year to share information on new community initiatives.
9. Formulation of a collective plan for the mobilization of consumers or constituents by service institutions.

APPENDIX

PERSONS INTERVIEWED

1. Shirley Carrington
Deputy Director, Lena Park Community Development Center
2. Leslie Christian
Executive Director, Crispus Attucks Children's Center
3. Ken Davis
Executive Director, Roxbury YMCA
4. Clarence Donlan
Executive Director, Opportunity Industrialization Center
5. Frieda Garcia
Executive Director, United South End Settlements
6. Henry Hampton
Chairman of the Board, Museum of Afro-American History
7. Barbara Harrell
Executive Director, Roxbury Children's Service
8. Rev. Michael Haynes
Senior Minister, Twelfth Baptist Church
9. Ronald Homer
President, The Boston Bank of Commerce
10. Deborah Jackson
Executive Director, Roxbury Comprehensive Health Center
11. Rev. K. Gordon James
Minister, Southern Baptist Church
12. Stephen Johnson
Business Developer, Greater Roxbury Development Corporation
13. Chrisina King
Real Estate Manager, Greater Roxbury Development Corporation
14. Lloyd King
Executive Director, Roxbury Action Program
15. Georgette Leslie
Executive Director, Roxbury-North Dorchester APAC
16. Elma Lewis
President, National Center of Afro-American Artists

17. Ronald McLean
Executive Director, Black Ecumenical Commission
18. Melvin Miller
Publisher, Bay State Banner
19. Ricardo Millett
Executive Director, Roxbury Multi-Service Center
20. James O'Neill
Deputy Director, Dorchester APAC
21. Richard Peters
Executive Director, Cooper Community Center
22. Donald Polk
Executive Director, The Urban League of Eastern Massachusetts
23. Donald Potts
Executive Director, Roxbury Boys and Girls Club
24. Jack E. Robinson
President, N.A.A.C.P., Boston Branch
25. Muriel Snowden
Co-Director, Emeritus, Freedom House
26. Rev. Charles Stith
Senior Minister, Union United Methodist Church
27. Dr. Brunetta Wolfman
President, Roxbury Community College

RACE AND POLITICAL CHANGE IN BOSTON

by

JAMES JENNINGS

INTRODUCTION

This paper provides a status report on major black political developments in the 1980s. It begins with a brief political and historical background of Blacks in the city. A current political profile is then composed based on voting data as well as on a review of current elected leadership and of recent events in the black community.

From this information emerges a picture of the major electoral characteristics of Blacks in Boston. The conclusion of this paper examines these emerging political trends in terms of the general political landscape and discusses the impact of "Black Politics" on new political and social directions for the city.

THE HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

Any extensive discussion of the current status of black politics in Boston should be prefaced by a brief historical note. This is simply that the black struggle for power in the electoral arena is not a recent occurrence in the city, as has been claimed by many historians and scholars.¹ Taking issue with this claim, Hubie Jones has written:

The history of Black politics in Boston is the story of determination and resiliency in the face of overwhelming odds created by an electoral system fraught with racism. During every time period in this century, Blacks ran for elective office over and over again. After absorbing political defeats, Black politicians regrouped and reformulated political

alliances in new efforts to prevail against insurmountable numerical odds. This proud legacy of persistence and political logistics is the foundation upon which current Black political activism now rests.²

The heightened level of activism during the 1983 mayoral election notwithstanding, Blacks in Boston have a long tradition of political struggle in the electoral arena. But whether or not the focus is specifically on electoral activism, it must be acknowledged that Boston enjoys a unique place in the political history of Blacks in America. Blacks in this city have continually provided leadership to national struggles for justice and equality. It was in Boston that many of the free Blacks in the ante-bellum period struggled not only against the enslavement of their fellow Blacks, but also against second-class citizenship and inferior public education opportunities. In 1830, for example, black activist and journalist David Walker announced "An Appeal to the Colored Citizens of the World..." in nearby Cambridge. The first Blacks in America elected to a state legislature were from Boston. William Monroe Trotter founded the Guardian here. Booker T. Washington founded the Negro Business League in Boston. This city was the home of Malcolm X during his youth. Minister Louis Farrakhan was born and raised in this city.

Despite the small size of the black community in Boston before the 1950s, Blacks have a history of involvement in the city's electoral activity. While some black leaders concentrated on protest activities that usually concerned national and international issues, others focused on local electoral activism. Individuals like Shag Taylor, Robert Merrit, Mable Worthy and Lawrence Banks, just to mention a few, were able to organize and deliver black

votes and to sponsor candidacies for state and city offices in the two predominantly black wards, Wards 9 and 12, before the second World War.³

The returns which Blacks sought to obtain from this electoral activity were the traditional kinds of rewards for this kind of political effort: petty patronage, favors from City Hall and the governor, and civic appointments. At the 1942 Fourth Anniversary Dinner of the Greater Boston Negro Trade Association, the Reverend S.M. Riley summarized the benefits which were expected by Blacks for their ballot box activities:

1. playground facilities
2. protection for pedestrians and children
3. removal of electrical wires from over the tennis courts at the William E. Carter playground
4. re-opening the branch library in Ward 9
5. better housing, and
6. jobs.⁴

These kinds of benefits are still expected, in slightly different form. But today, another expectation for participation in the electoral arena has been added to these 'divisible' benefits: a sharing of power in the City of Boston.⁵

The extensive electoral activism of the black community in Boston before the second World War seems to have slowed considerably by the early 1950s. Mel King offers an explanation: he argues that lack of control over community institutions pushed Blacks to rely increasingly on the good will of those in power during this period. He writes:

The fifties and early sixties were the period of the service stage, of being dependent. During that time, we fought to have access to the services available to others in the society, pressing to be allowed to

vote, to eat and drink where we wanted, to be able to use public facilities, hotels, motels, parks and other resources which had been denied to people of color for generations. The efforts to get jobs, decent education and other basic American opportunities were all focused on the services offered by churches, social service agencies, settlement houses, charity groups and 'concerned' business and commercial groups. We did not see clearly the dependence and debilitation which a service relationship creates. We did not understand that as long as we waited for others to help us, we would never be able to take charge of our own lives. We always assumed that our inability to get access was due to our own inadequacies.⁶

The "Service Stage," a period extending roughly from the 1940s to the early 1960s, was a time during which Blacks were dependent on the "good will" of white society for access to its goods, its services, its jobs, housing and schools. The dependency was based on the primarily negative self-image of black people and on the fact that resources and institutions in the black community were controlled externally by Whites.

The political orientation and attitudes of the black community have moved well beyond this stage. The present status of political development in Boston is such that Blacks are now planning to participate fully in the electoral arena. But, as I suggested earlier, their goals are no longer merely the divisible benefits that any ethnic group in American society expects as a result of local political activity. Blacks are planning not only to become integral partners of the current power structure, but are also attempting to change the very nature of that power structure. A growing number of black activists believe that their brand of politics can make the city liveable for everyone, not just for Whites and the well-off; their heightened electoral activism is bringing a very new political spirit to Boston.

Perhaps one symbolic reflection of this change occurred the night of the mayoral general election in November, 1983. On this night, well after the announcement that Ray Flynn would be the new mayor of Boston, thousands of people--Blacks, Latinos, Asians and Whites--marched from Mel King's election night headquarters at the Parker House to City Hall. Although they were on the losing side in the mayoral election, they marched to proclaim a "victory." As they marched, they chanted: "A people united shall not be defeated." It was a racially integrated and enthusiastic gathering; they felt good about working and campaigning together in a racially alienated city; they felt good about an electoral campaign which brought a sense of racial and ethnic cooperation to a city like Boston.

The Mel King campaign, both in 1979 and 1983, signaled the emergence in Boston of a new kind of political vision and activism, molded and spearheaded by Blacks. This emerging vision was clearly something new and unusual for the city and its leaders. But at the same time, there were signs that this vision would become an integral part of the city's political fabric.

THE ELECTED LEADERSHIP

The number of black elected officials in Boston is a result of many years of individual sacrifice and persistent community-based efforts to increase the level of political participation. Currently, there are three Blacks sitting on the School Committee, a body composed of nine district seats and four at-large seats. Up until 1981, the School Committee was structured as a five-member body, elected entirely at-large. It was extremely difficult for Blacks to be elected to this body, primarily because very few white voters were willing to support black candidates. In 1979, however, John O'Bryant

became the first black official to sit on the Boston School Committee in over one hundred years. A few years later, another black educator, Jean McGuire, was also elected. Despite these individual victories, the at-large system for election to the School Committee was criticized as an obstacle to black political participation. Most black activists argued that the at-large system prevented individuals from winning massive support from black voters, and that only Blacks with Irish surnames, such as O'Bryant and McGuire, could ever win at-large seats on the School Committee. This particular charge is substantiated by the fact that many attempts were made to remind voters in white working class communities that both O'Bryant and McGuire are black.⁷

After several lawsuits, some token support from Mayor Kevin White during his last two years in office, and a massive citizen movement under the name of "Citizens for District Representation," the present combined district/at-large School Committee and City Council system was adopted in a referendum on November 31, 1981. The School Committee ballot was adopted by approximately six thousand votes out of seventy-one thousand votes cast. These same ballots had been defeated in 1977. What made a difference in the second attempt was the support of a strong neighborhood coalition and increased activity on the part of black activists. Based on a turnout in Wards 9, 12, and 14, the black vote supporting the proposed changes increased by thirty-eight (38.2) percent over the number of black supporting votes cast in 1977. As a result of this change, two additional Blacks were elected to the new thirteen-member School Committee in 1983.

Before Boston voters approved these changes, it was also extremely difficult for Blacks to win seats on the City Council. Although Tom Atkins was elected to this body twice (in 1967 and in 1969), many other Blacks who

had won massive votes in their own communities would then lose the election due to the resistance of white voters. Since 1969, Bruce Bolling has been the first and only Black to win a seat to the at-large City Council (in 1981). Bolling, however, defeated the tenth finisher, Jim Kelly of South Boston, by only two hundred votes. He also had the strong backing of Mayor Kevin White. As a matter of fact, Bolling was the only winner in that election from the group dubbed 'Kevin's Seven' by the media.

As a result of the change to a combined thirteen-member district/at-large structure, Bruce Bolling won re-election in 1983 as a district candidate representing Roxbury. Joining him was Charles Yancey, representing Mattapan and Dorchester. This was Yancey's third attempt to win a seat on the City Council; although he had consistently won the black vote, he lacked the support of white voters necessary to win at-large. These district seats made it possible for Blacks in these neighborhoods to be represented in local government. In 1983, two relative political newcomers won district seats on the School Committee representing the black community. Shirley Owens-Hicks, former President of the Urban League of Eastern Massachusetts, was easily elected from District 4. Grace Romero became the first 'Latina' to be elected an official in Massachusetts; her victory was primarily the result of the endorsement of the Black Political Task Force.* She represents District 7 in Roxbury.

*The Black Political Task Force, founded in 1979, is an organization of activists working in communities of color. It is primarily an organization which endorses candidates for office. Its purpose is to enhance the political influence of communities of color in the electoral arena. Its active membership ranges from between thirty-five to fifty individuals, including many of Boston's black elected officials.

Although the change from a completely at-large system of election for the School Committee and the City Council has increased the number of black officials elected to these bodies, the district lines were still considered discriminatory by black and Latino political activists. A coalition of community-based organizations representing Blacks, Latinos, Asians and Whites formed to bring a civil rights suit against the City of Boston. The Black Political Task Force, the Latino Political Action Committee and the Boston People's Organization contended in a federal court that the district lines prevented people of color from fully participating in city elections. Basically, the suit made two claims: first, that the districts "packed" Blacks into two seats, while Latinos were "cracked" into five districts. The particular boundaries placed a ceiling of two seats on a black population which could probably elect three representatives to these bodies and prevented the Latino electorate from consolidating in order to maximize their potential influence.

A second argument against the district boundaries (as originally drawn by Boston's City Council and approved by the new Mayor, Raymond Flynn) was that the constitutional principle of "one person, one vote" was violated. The City Council had used the already outdated state decennial census of 1975 rather than the 1980 federal census in order to determine the population of the proposed districts. The state census grossly undercounted Blacks and Latinos while overcounting Whites in the city. In 1983, Judge Andrew Cafferty of the U.S. District Court in Massachusetts declared the district boundaries unconstitutional on this basis. The City Council then drew another district map which was subsequently rejected by the original plaintiffs, who sued

again. In this follow-up suit, Judge Cafferty rejected the claim made by the plaintiffs.

Election to the state legislature has been easier for Blacks because the districts have not been gerrymandered to dilute black voting strength to the extent to which city lines have been. Currently, there are three black state representatives and one black state senator. The state senatorial seat was created in 1972 in order to provide Blacks in Roxbury, Mattapan, and Dorchester with representation in the Massachusetts State Senate.

The first black State Senator was William Owens, who defeated Republican Francis I. Hector handily in 1972 and went on to be reelected in 1974, 1976 and 1978. In 1982, a number of challengers attempted to dislodge Owens from this seat; a major reason for this action was his switch from the Democratic Party to the Republican Party. This switch was not a result of ideological reconsiderations; rather, Owens felt that his fellow Democratic State Senators were not supportive of the needs of the black citizens of Massachusetts. Switching to the Republican aisle was an individual protest and an attempt to strengthen the idea of independent politics among Blacks. While some activists congratulated Owens for this protest against the Democratic Party, others criticized it as an empty gesture which would hurt the voters in his district. A few also criticized the Senator because he joined the Republican Party instead of declaring himself an independent, as State Representative Mel King and Saundra Graham had done earlier.

There were four contenders in the Democratic Party primary race for this seat in September 1980; Royal Bolling, Sr., edged out John Bynoe in the final tally. The two other contenders in the Democratic Primary did not receive a significant number of votes. In the November general election, Bolling Sr.

edged Owens by approximately one thousand five hundred votes out of twenty thousand cast. As a Republican, Owens received about forty-nine (49.0) percent of the total vote in the predominantly black district. Despite Owens' defeat as a Republican candidate, the result is noteworthy for several reasons. First of all, considering that Owens ran as a Republican, he did quite well in a presidential year when Blacks voted resoundingly against Ronald Reagan. Owens received a greater proportion of votes than did any other Republican candidate in Massachusetts that year. For example, John Sears, the Republican candidate for Governor, received thirty-seven (37.0) percent of the vote state wide.

The current incumbent, State Senator Royal Bolling, Sr., served in the House of Representatives during the periods from 1960 to 1970 and from 1972 to 1974. He won the race for State Senator in 1982 and was unopposed in the 1984 Democratic primary and general election. In this last election, the Senator received endorsements from many groups in his district and the city.

Royal L. Bolling, Jr. is the State Representative of the Sixth Suffolk District in Mattapan. The son of Royal Bolling, Sr., he was first elected in 1973 and reelected successively to the present time. With the resignation of State Representative Doris Bunte in 1984, Bolling, Jr. became the longest-serving black State Representative in Massachusetts.

Byron Rushing, President of the Museum of Afro-American History, replaced Mel King as the State Representative for the Ninth Suffolk District in the South End. King had served in the State Legislature for ten years before resigning to run for mayor a second time in 1982.

The third State Representative seat in the black community, the Seventh Suffolk District, is held by Gloria Fox. She won the seat as a result of a

special election held in March, 1985. This particular episode may reflect 'mixed' signals in black political activity. The relatively low turnout for this special election was criticized by the media and many observers as resulting from political ignorance or apathy. The election was also diagnosed as a battle between "power brokers." Such simplistic explanations, however, gloss over the complex forces that contribute to voter turnout. Offering "apathy" as an explanation of black political behaviour obscures the subtleties of the situation and overlooks the growing political activism and sophistication of Blacks in Boston.

In October 1984, Mayor Raymond Flynn announced that State Representative Doris Bunte had accepted an appointment as Administrator for the Boston Housing Authority, the fourth largest housing authority in the country. Four contenders announced bids for the seat Bunte vacated: John Bynoe, Gloria Fox, Franklin Williams and Grace Romero. John Bynoe and Gloria Fox emerged as the two frontrunners. In the special Primary election in March 1985, Williams and Romero each received less than one hundred twenty votes out of approximately two thousand five hundred cast.

Both Bynoe and Fox are long-time community activists, widely respected in the black community. The endorsements of both candidates were florentine. Generally, organizations and voters did not perceive major differences between the candidates' positions on issues, although Gloria Fox was better known as an organizer and community activist. John Bynoe based his campaign on promises of what he would do in the future for the community. Groups which had been on opposite sides in previous elections endorsed the same candidate in this special election. The Black Political Task Force supported John Bynoe, while two of this organization's founders and former members, Mel King

and Doris Bunte, supported Gloria Fox. In a joint endorsement, the Bollings sided with the Black Political Task Force. Many activists admitted that little differentiated Bynoe and Fox in terms of their civic and community work.

As a result of a series of articles in the Boston Globe which characterized the voters in the Seventh Suffolk as apathetic and lacking concern, the Black Political Task Force drafted a "Unity Letter" to share with various groups and individuals endorsing both Bynoe and Fox. The signatories rejected the analysis offered by the Globe. This letter, sent to the Boston Globe but never published, read as follows:

Since the election for State Representative of the Seventh Suffolk is over, we wish to make this statement. Your series of articles on this special election gave the impression that the Black community was hopelessly divided; generally, the articles also claimed that various organizations and individuals have either lost or gained credibility depending on whether they endorsed John Bynoe or Gloria Fox. Some of your articles suggested that this special election was but a battle between "power brokers" in the Black community. We disagree strongly with the political analysis offered by the Globe. Your analysis was myopic and not at all sensitive to the growing political sophistication in the Black community. The turnout was indeed low; this was due to a number of important reasons, not apathy, as some of your reporters were quick to suggest. These reasons include: 1) the way the media covered (or rather, did not cover) the campaigns of the candidates, 2) the fact that there were very few real contests for this seat in the past; State Representative Doris Bunte successfully served this District for 12 years and the voters appreciated her leadership during this period, and 3) many voters were supportive of both John Bynoe and Gloria Fox, and decided not to choose between two well-respected individuals. In fact, this special election was but an 'internal' debate among activists in our community. Both Mr. Bynoe and Ms. Fox are highly respected.

We feel that the people of the Seventh Suffolk realized a few significant victories in this special election. First, the campaigns proceeded in a relatively civil and respectful manner. Secondly,

there was a focus on issues, rather than on personalities. The community debates and campaign statements made by John Bynoe and Gloria Fox focused on issues, not on each other. We cannot say the same thing of other elections in Boston. Thirdly, and perhaps most importantly, we were able to disagree about candidates or tactics at the same time that there was general consensus about the important issues. We have come to realize that disagreement with tactics does not mean that we have to disagree about strategy. And our strategy is to develop ways by which Blacks and other people of color can be empowered in this city.

We are proud of the subtle but powerful messages emerging from the Seventh Suffolk as a result of this special election. The candidate that some of us chose happened to lose. But we all won something. We will disagree again in future electoral contests; and we will continue to debate within our community what is in our best interests. But we are united in understanding the importance of a politics which seeks to empower people of color."

This "Unity Letter" was endorsed by the Black Political Task Force, by every black elected official in Boston, and by Saundra Graham, Mel King, Doris Bunte and political activist Boyce Slayman.

THE BLACK VOTER

The electoral potential of Blacks in the City of Boston is increasing rapidly. This is a result not only of heightened political activism and sophistication among black voters, but also of the increased black population. As a result of migration and birth rates, the black population continues to grow considerably.

The total population of Boston has been declining since 1940; since 1970, it declined by twelve and one-fifth (12.2) percent.⁸ In 1970, approximately 641,071 persons resided in Boston; ten years later, the figure was 562,994 persons. Accompanying this decline has been a decrease in the total white

population. In 1970, there were 524,709 Whites residing in Boston; by 1980, this declined by twenty-five (25.0) percent to 393,937 persons. Meanwhile, the black and Latino populations have increased considerably; the number of Blacks increased by one-fifth (21.0) percent, while the number of Latinos has more than doubled (by 101.0 percent) during the same period. This kind of growth has also been marked by increasing concentration and segregation of Blacks in Boston. In 1970, the black community was located in the geographic "core" of the city. Only two census tracts outside this geographic core showed at least three hundred Blacks. One of these census tracts (1401) was located in Hyde Park, and the other (909) was located in Columbia Point, an area bordering South Boston. The residential expansion of black population between 1970 and 1980 occurred in predominantly black areas, and, through expansion, spread into the fringes of these areas. The over-all Boston residential pattern for Blacks in 1980 was basically similar to that of 1970: a geographic core of Blacks, surrounded by a ring of Whites. The difference between these two years is that the black core was larger in 1980 than it had been ten years earlier. This will probably be the case in 1990 as well.

If these demographic trends continue into the 1990s, it means that the black vote will become increasingly important in city-wide and state elections. Currently, there is a total of 363,000 potential voters in Boston; approximately 202,000 or fifty-six (56.0) percent are registered.⁹ Between thirty-five and forty thousand of these registered voters are black; this means that Blacks make up almost one-fifth of the registered electorate. In addition, there are between seventy and eighty thousand black potential voters in Boston. If slightly more than half of these are of voting age, but not registered, it means that an additional thirty to forty thousand Blacks

could be tapped as new registered voters.¹⁰ This represents a growing and significant electorate of black voters.

Voter registration rates are increasing in the black wards and precincts of the city and beginning to catch up to votes in some white neighborhoods, but this is not the case across the entire black community. Furthermore, the rates do fluctuate considerably. Between 1976 and 1980, white middle-class and residential neighborhoods such as West Roxbury and Roslindale consistently had higher voter registration rates than other neighborhoods. White working class neighborhoods, such as South Boston, East Boston, and parts of Dorchester, also had higher voter registration rates. During this period and earlier, Blacks did not register at the consistently high levels of Whites in these particular neighborhoods. The voter registration rates in these areas have ranged between sixty-five (65.0) and seventy-five (75.0) percent between 1976 and 1980. In the same period, the voter registration rates in black neighborhoods did not surpass the fifty (50.0) to fifty-five (55.0) percent levels. Before the 1983 mayoral election, there was an increase in the number of registered voters for all neighborhoods, probably due to the gubernatorial election in 1982. The four predominantly black wards (8, 9, 12, 14) reflected this increase over the period from 1979 to 1980; but their levels were still much below white middle-class and working class neighborhoods, which enjoyed a range of between seventy (70.0) percent for East Boston and eighty-four (84.0) percent for West Roxbury (Table 1).

The Mel King for Mayor campaign in 1983 generally had a very strong impact on voter registration in the black community. As Table I shows, the predominantly black wards showed increased voter registration rates during the King campaign in 1983. Between 1976 and 1982, the average voter registration

Table 1

VOTER REGISTRATION RATES IN BOSTON BY NEIGHBORHOODS, 1976-1982

Ward/Neighborhood	1976-1977	1977-1978	1979-1980	1982	1983
Ward 20, West Roxbury, Roslindale	76.7%	79.9%	74.7%	84%	83%
Ward 2, Charlestown	72.9	77.3	70.7	81	81
Ward 7, South Boston, Dorchester	72.3	77.3	67.0	75	82
Ward 6, South Boston	70.9	76.0	67.3	79	87
Ward 16, Dorchester, Neponset, Cedar Grove	70.8	75.3	68.8	77	80
Ward 18, Hyde Park, Mattapan	69.1	73.1	64.2	71	77
Ward 1, East Boston	62.2	66.3	65.2	70	73
Ward 19, Roslindale	62.1	67.2	62.6	78	80
Ward 17, Dorchester	60.8	66.8	52.7	66	75
Ward 13, Savin Hill	59.6	63.9	53.8	67	74
Ward 12, Roxbury	59.2	65.5	50.1	63	80
Ward 15, Dorchester	57.3	61.3	46.8	62	72
Ward 22, Brighton	55.0	57.9	53.1	71	70
Ward 11, Jamaica Plain, Roxbury	52.2	56.0	49.4	63	73
Ward 3, North End, West End, South End	51.7	56.6	49.5	65	68
Ward 10, Jamaica Plain	51.2	55.6	47.1	58	71
Ward 9, Roxbury, South End	50.2	50.2	51.0	66	81
Ward 14, Dorchester, Mattapan	48.6	54.1	41.3	54	82
Ward 8, Roxbury, South End	44.5	52.1	41.7	53	82
Ward 21, Allston	38.1	40.7	31.9	47	54
Ward 5, Beacon Hill, Back Bay	37.3	42.9	38.8	56	60
Ward 4, Back Bay, South	30.9	35.1	27.9	42	49
Boston	60.0	61.0	62.0	66	

Source: Annual Reports of the Election Department, Document 10 (1977-1983), Boston, Massachusetts.

rate in Ward 8 had been forty-eight (48.0) percent; in 1983, it jumped to eighty-two (82.0) percent. The average voter registration rates in Wards 9, 12 and 14 were fifty-four (54.0) percent, fifty-nine (59.0) percent, and fifty (50.0) percent, respectively; in Ward 9, the voter registration rate climbed to eighty-one (81.0) percent. And in Wards 12 and 14, the figures for 1983 were eighty (80.0) percent and eighty-two (82.0) percent. Although these new voter registration rates are still not as high as those in other neighborhoods (e.g., South Boston, Charlestown and West Roxbury), the increase did represent a major political development: a heightened interest in the electoral processes on the part of the black community and the introduction of new voters into those processes.

Strangely enough, the heightened activism exhibited in the black community dissipated somewhat in 1984, during the Jesse Jackson campaign for the Democratic Party's presidential nomination. The overwhelming number of Blacks who voted in the Democratic Party presidential primary (March 13, 1984) supported Jackson. In all of Boston, however, Jackson received only 10,900 votes out of a total 73,823 votes cast. In the previous mayoral election, the black voter turnout had resulted in capturing close to twenty percent of the total electorate, yet in the March 1984 election, black voter turnout had declined twelve (12.0) percent of the total electorate. A notable decline in turnout occurred between the city's mayoral preliminary election in October 1983 and the March 1984 Democratic Party presidential primary. The gap was even greater between the turnout for the city's general election in November 1983 and that for the March 1984 presidential primary. This decline was similar in size across the entire black community. In Ward 8, for example, fifty-eight (58.0) percent less voters turned out to cast their ballots in

March 1984 than did in October, 1983; in Ward 9, the decline was fifty-two (52.0) percent; in Ward 12, it was fifty-seven (57.0) percent and in the last predominantly black Ward 14, the decline was sixty-two percent (Table 2).

Some reasons for this discrepancy can be found in the literature on political participation; for instance, there is evidence that local elections are generally of greater interest and concern to voters. Other factors in the decline seem particular to Boston's political scene. Many activists associated with the Rainbow Coalition worked feverishly during the King for Mayor campaign in 1983. The Jackson campaign was anticlimactic. After a Herculean effort in 1983, activists found that, in 1984, they could not generate the funds nor the interest to maintain the previous year's level of involvement. But the change in the level of involvement from one election to the other, although separated by only a few months, may also mean that Blacks are becoming more selective in deciding when to participate in the electoral processes.

Table 2

Number of Persons Registered by Wards Who Voted in City Preliminary and General Election (1983), and Who Also Voted in the Democratic Party Presidential Primary (1984)

<u>Wards</u>	<u>October 1983</u>	<u>November 1983</u>	<u>March 1984</u>
8	2,261	2,778	961
9	3,935	4,747	1,898
12	5,261	6,306	2,267
14	6,758	8,285	2,575

The fluctuating voter registration rates in the black community seem to suggest that the electorate is evolving into several components. One section, probably representing between forty and fifty percent of the black electorate, consistently remains registered; individuals in this sector need not be reminded to register to vote. Historically, another section has remained outside electoral processes. Many Blacks have never registered, or if registered, have failed to vote. Some may have considered this right a futile exercise of time and effort. This sector probably comprises twenty-five to thirty percent of the total black electorate, and it is this sector which Robert Lane terms the "politically divorced." In recent years, however, a third sector has emerged as a strong influence on black voting patterns. This sector (comprising perhaps twenty-five to thirty percent of the black electorate) is participating in electoral processes on a selective basis, depending upon the particular issues that are emphasized and how they are presented to the electorate. What may be developing in Boston, then, is the following:

"Politically-Divorced" Blacks	"Selective" Blacks	"Participatory" Blacks
25-30%	25-30%	40-50%

The "Selective" black electorate may be a recent development. This sector is politically conscious and is involved in the public affairs of the black community. But, unlike the "Participatory" Blacks, "Selective" Blacks

approach the electoral process not as a civic or even "historical" responsibility, but as a deliberate political strategy. As the electoral process begins to become a more prominent factor in deciding public issues in Boston, this sector becomes more electorally involved. Conversely, as electoral activity loses its saliency, this sector probably continues to pursue change actively but through other routes entailing community activism.

The "Participatory" Blacks not only remain registered, but even compete with white voters in terms of turnout. Between 1967 and 1979, black voters tended to turn out at a consistent rate throughout the entire city. In only two city elections, out of a total of fourteen during this period, was the proportion of black voter turnout much lower than that of white voters. Based on Wards 9, 12 and 14, the black voter turnout in the 1969 preliminary city election was eighteen (18.6) percent, while the city turnout rate was twenty-seven (27.1) percent. In 1973, ten (10.0) percent of all black voters decided to cast a ballot, but the city's total turnout rate in this same election was eighteen (18.3) percent. In the other five preliminary elections during this period, however, registered Blacks turned out to vote at a rate similar to that of the city as a whole (Table 3).

During city general elections in non-mayoral election years, black voting rates were also consistent with city-wide rates. In fact, in 1977 black voter turnout in Ward 12 slightly surpassed that of the rest of the city. This may have been a result of John O'Bryant's campaign for a seat on the School Committee during a tumultuous period for public school issues. The gap between black voter turnout and the city's turnout rate was greatest during the last two mayoral general elections; in 1967 and 1971; however, the gap was a small one. The gap was partially due to Mayor Kevin White's realization of

Table 3

Percent Voter Turnout in City Preliminary Elections,
By Wards 9, 12, and 14: 1967-1983

Ward	1967*	1969	1971*	1973	1975*	1977	1979*	1983*
9	47.8%	18.9%	49.6%	11.4%	39.1%	22.9%	48.8%	62%
12	55.4	20.5	52.9	10.4	41.3	28.0	49.7	61
14	48.2	16.4	46.2	8.0	34.6	23.8	40.9	63
Average Turnout Rate for Wards 9, 12 & 14	50.5	18.6	49.6	10.0	38.3	24.9	46.5	62
City Turnout Rate	56.4	27.6	51.7	18.3	38.8	24.6	51.3	63

Source: Annual Report of the Election Department, Document 10
 (1967-1983), Boston, Massachusetts

* Mayoral Election Years

the importance of black voter support in these elections. Without the support of black voters, White would have lost these elections (Table 4).

CONCLUSION

The black community of Boston has held a unique position in the overall political history of Blacks in America. Despite this tradition, observers since the end of World War II have criticized the seeming political backwardness of Blacks in this city. Before the Mel King for Mayor campaign in 1983, Blacks were criticized as "complacent" by many. If these impressions

were ever true, that is no longer the case. The invitation for this paper posed the question: to what extent has black political power come of age in Boston? From this writer's perspective, it seems that Blacks in this city have come of age politically. This is not to say that Blacks have solved all the problems involved in developing effective political strategies. But those Blacks who have focused their energies on community activism are now joining the "Participatory" Blacks to impact on the electoral arena. This coalition will pressure elected and appointed black leaders to behave in more accountable ways. And it will make their jobs more difficult as they attempt to balance the needs of their constituencies with the needs of those in power. The joining of the new 'Selective' Black activists with the "Participatory" Blacks will make the electorate less predictable and more issue-conscious.

If demographic patterns evident between 1970 and 1980 continue during the decade of the eighties, then it is possible that by 1990 the majority of Boston's citizens will be people of color: Blacks, Latinos and people of Asian-descent. This fact alone will give the black community a greater potential mantle for leadership and activism. And this leadership, if it materializes, could represent a strong new political and social force in this city. As the "Selective" Black electorate proposes the idea that electoral participation is a vital tool in determining important public issues, participation should become more intense and long-lasting. The new black electorate will approach relationships with those in power in more demanding ways.

The "Selective" Black electorate is forming the backbone of organizations like the Black Political Task Force, Blacks for Empowerment and the Rainbow

Coalition. Although these organizational efforts are relatively new, the emerging agenda reflects concerns about the particular distribution of power and wealth; the relationship between the private decisions and their effects on public life in Boston; and public policies which are "theory-oriented" rather than "people-oriented," to use the words of Martin Luther King, Jr. The momentum of this agenda will continue for some time because it is not being built around a few individuals, but rather on a vision of a livable Boston for everyone. That the impact of the black community in the city will be different and "creative" if Black political development continues to increase its power and sophistication in this way can be witnessed by looking at how black politics have begun to influence Boston today. Although Mel King lost the 1983 mayoral general election, his candidacy influenced the direction of the campaign in Boston. The major issues of the 1983 mayoral campaign were largely set by King; the black community was the reference point. Thus, Mel King is an example of a losing black mayoral candidate helping to set the tone for a new kind of politics in Boston.

It is still true that Blacks and other people of color are not yet able to journey through many white neighborhoods without fear of racial harassment or violence. And, except for a few secretaries, Blacks are seldom seen or heard in the corridors of power in Boston. Large institutions of health, education, finance and the media have yet to open their professional doors to the black community. The corporate sector still pursues business in ways which keep Blacks in their traditional social and economic "place." But now, as a result of growing black struggles for power, the political and corporate leadership of the city must adopt at least the sentiment (if not the substance) of a black political agenda.

FOOTNOTES

Chapter 8 - Race and Political Change in Boston (Jennings)

1. See, for example, Ralph Otwell, "The Negro in Boston", in Edward C. Banfield and Martha Derthick A Report on the Politics of Boston Massachusetts, Joint Center for Urban Studies, Cambridge, Massachusetts, 1960, p. 45, and Charles J. Hamilton, Jr. "Changing Patterns of Negro Leadership in Boston" (unpublished thesis: Harvard University, 1969, p.15).
2. James Jennings and Melvin I. King, Black Politics in Boston: From Access to Power, Schenkman Publications (forthcoming), Boston, Massachusetts, p. 2.
3. See James Jennings, "Black Politics in Boston, 1900-1950", op. cit.
4. Boston Chronicle, 1942.
5. 'Divisible' benefits are their political rewards, which can be discretionally distributed by the government, such as patronage jobs and contracts; 'indivisible' benefits refer to systemic rewards such as integrated schooling, or full employment policies. For the classical definition of both terms, see Robert Dahl, Who Governs, Yale University Press, New Haven, Connecticut, 1960.
6. Melvin I. King, Chain of Change, South End Press, Boston, Massachusetts, 1980, p. 4.
7. This claim was cited in court testimony charging the city of Boston with disenfranchising Black voters. See "Black Voters et al. v. John J. McDonough, et al.", 421 F. Supp. 165, 1976.
8. Demographic information for the city of Boston was obtained from various U.S. Bureau of the Census Reports and the Boston Redevelopment Authority.
9. Information for Black voting characteristics is based on census data and election reports published by the city of Boston; also see James Jennings, "The Black Voter In Boston," Black Political Task Force, Feb. 1982.
10. Ibid; but especially, see "The Black Voter in Boston."
11. See, for example, Walter Burnhan, The Changing Shape of the American Political Universe, Angus Campbell et al., The American Votes, John Wiley & Sons, New York, 1964, V.O. Rey, The Responsible Electorate, Robert Love Political Life, The Free Press, New York, 1959.

One critical test for Mayor Ray Flynn and the corporate leadership of Boston is the particular development of race relations in this city. Race relations will not improve appreciably until all people and all neighborhoods can enjoy the fruits of the city's economy. Race relations will make or break Boston as a major city, because race in this city and in America is still fundamental and because, at some point in the very near future, there will be many more people of color than Whites in Boston. This is a city which historically was built upon the exclusion and rejection of people of color; it must therefore readjust itself drastically as its political climate changes. The leaders of Boston realize this; the black community also understands this. Black politics will increasingly challenge those in power to take a stand of action on this fundamental issue. Blacks are indeed beginning to exercise exciting and creative leadership in this city.

CONCLUSION

by

PHILLIP L. CLAY

The foregoing essays provide a portrait of the current status of Blacks in Boston. The picture is one of substantial and persistent inequality, dependence, deprivation and discrimination in which longstanding racism on the part of mainstream Boston is deeply implicated.

The portrait also shows that, in their long struggle for an equal and independent place in Boston's mainstream, Blacks have yet to develop an effective personal, institutional, economic or political counteroffensive. The sense of powerlessness and frustration, while punctuated with bursts of optimism and creative energy, is an unfortunate, but we think accurate, assessment of the way things are in Boston for Blacks.

Several observations and conclusions recur throughout the essays that document this assessment.

* The changing racial mosaic requires a new definition of relationships between the races in the city. No longer are race relations simply a matter of black-and-white; attention must also focus on relations among Blacks, between Blacks, Hispanics, and various immigrant groups, and on relations with ethnic and non-ethnic Whites. There is also the matter of the relationships that cut across racial lines and figure into such issues as jobs and housing. For example, equal housing and job opportunities are sometimes related as much to class and intergenerational issues as they are to racial issues.

* While the essays in this report debunk many of the myths about black families, the truth remains that a number of factors combine to produce a black underclass whose members are locked into a cycle of poverty and dependency, while the probability increases that their children will be similarly ill-prepared for life and work in the mainstream. Trends in education, employment and other areas suggest that this black underclass is growing even as we make Boston better for the increasing middle and upper class workforce who commute into the city to take jobs created by the city's economic renaissance. If the black poor in this city are in a crisis, their children face a mega-crisis that is becoming evident in mounting teen pregnancy, high unemployment rates, and increasing drug abuse and crime. There is a kind of collective depression originating in racism that makes many young people paralyzed to accept help or to help themselves.

* The black middle class in Boston, as in the nation at large, continues to grow. While Boston's black middle class lacks the strong and deep institutional underpinnings traditional for this class in other cities, there is a growing recognition that a base of business, political, social and other institutions and leaders must be built. It is also increasingly clear that the black middle class must be the principal architects and managers of this institution-building. There are, however, major obstacles, including funding, relationship to mainstream or white institutions, class issues in leadership, and conflict in priorities. The momentum within the black community to overcome these

obstacles (as they have overcome personal ones to obtain the mobility they enjoy), seems not to be present.

- * One of the negative consequences of not having an established middle class institutional tradition in Boston is that the black middle class is not yet poised to address the question Blacks face both locally and nationally: what is the role of the black middle class vis-a-vis the black poor and the white middle class. The community has to address the marginality and tension built into this situation. To answer this question, the black middle class must develop an effective leadership, which requires structure, an agenda, accountability, and so forth.
- * The report card on black institutions shows some positive signs of improved health such as greater attention to quality of service and improved professionalism. But a growing number of these institutions are in crisis because of cutbacks in federal funds and limitations and restrictions from other sources. Greater support is needed, both from the funding sources and from the black community itself, if those organizations are to play the roles we expect. A continuation of the status quo is likely to make them increasingly marginal, effective only as a rather thin "safety net" and not the stimuli for community development.
- * Recent black participation in politics represents a real reversal of past patterns of limited black voting and electoral influence. As the black share of the population increases, so will the potential for even

greater influence. For this potential to be realized, however, requires an institutional mechanism that matches the complex parameters of Boston politics. In addition to negotiating and forging coalitions, the institutional mechanisms will have to play a major role in articulating issues, recruiting candidates, mobilizing voters and forcing accountability as well as responsibility. These functions are not currently performed in any predictable or consistent manner and black political influence is unlikely to be maximally effective until they are.

* Blacks continue to be excluded from the city's institutional mainstream. Whether in the arts, as this report documents, or in other areas, the effect is the distortion and restriction of individual black professionals and of Blacks in general. This is the source of a "new segregation" that need not exist. When black artists, scholars, scientists, writers or other professionals are excluded from or kept marginal in their professional activities or affiliations, it underscores our contemporary failure as an urban community. This is not an artifact of history or an economic imperative for which we can point backwards to causes, but rather the direct result of current separate and unequal treatment.

* In recent years the Boston business and corporate community has contributed more to Blacks through charity than in the past. Several multimillion dollar gifts and endowments have been made in the area of jobs, education and housing. The shifts on the philanthropic side have not, however, been matched by similar enlightenment on the business side;

so that corporate executive suites, board rooms, vendors, contractees, and management teams remain nearly all white. Business seems willing, for example, to create a few summer jobs for kids, but not to make a similar investment in building ladders of mobility for their parents. The latter requires institutional change, while the former only requires a check for a tax-deductible contribution.

- * Blacks in Boston face a housing crisis in all of its dimensions: limited quantity, poor quality, high costs and restricted access. Improved health in the city's economy and the greater attractiveness of Boston neighborhoods make Blacks disadvantaged competitors. The problems appear to be worsening as the struggle for control of housing and land development grows.
- * Blacks have relatively little to say about physical development in Boston. This is true both in the case of specific communities and in terms of black presence in the professional and agency settings where deals and decisions are made. This is true despite the fact that Blacks live in several areas targetted for major redevelopment.

We close with two questions. Who is responsible for the state Blacks are in and who is responsible for making Boston a more just city? The first question is much less interesting and important than the second. Our view is that the answer to both questions is that we are all implicated. Whites have created and maintained two Boston's and Blacks have done less than they could have to ameliorate the situation.

History aside, the real question is who steers us out of the present situation. We believe we have made the case that our present path will not lead to a solution. White Boston will have to make major changes in the way it treats Blacks and in the way decisions are made. But Blacks must, for the first time in this city, put together an offensive and defensive strategy that matches the challenges in the present state of affairs. This does not suggest that Blacks forget or ignore how they arrived at this juncture, but it does mean they must take some positive responsibility for their own liberation. We do not underestimate the psychological, strategic or other difficulties in taking these steps. We do not belittle the tensions likely to occur. We also do not exonerate white Boston for its role in creating the situation nor excuse it from a responsibility to be supportive of new initiatives, but we feel that new initiatives are required and that black self-articulation and determination are indispensable.

The contributors to this volume are convinced that failure to follow this course means that the present status of Blacks in Boston will not improve. These conditions should not prevail in future Boston.

